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Background to the report
1. Wage setting between businesses and employees is regulated
via the FederalWorkplace Relations Act 1996 and the various
State Acts. The principal objective of the Federal Workplace
Relations Act 1996 that is relevant to this report is to provide
the means:
(i) for wages and conditions of employment to be
determined as far as possible by the agreement of
employers and employees at the workplace or en-
terprise level, upon a foundation of minimum stan-
dards; and
(ii) to ensure the maintenance of an eﬀective award
safety net of fair and enforceable minimum wages
and employment.
2. Each year since 1997 the Australian Council of Trade Unions
(ACTU) has submitted a claim to the Australian Industrial
Relations Commission (AIRC) for adjustment to the minimum
pay and conditions mentioned in the 1996 Act.
3. In its 1997 decision the AIRC observed that the term safety
net was undeÞned and oﬀered some discussion of how it pro-
posed to interpret the term. In its decisions the AIRC has
interpreted the phrase "eﬀective award safety net of fair and
enforceable minimum wages" to include the federal minimum
wage (FMW) and the various Federal minimum award wage
rates.1 This system of minimum award wage rates has become
known collectively as the Safety Net.
4. After the AIRC has passed down its decision there is a ßow
on to employees not directly covered by the FMW or by fed-
eral awards. This ßow on can occur in several diﬀerent ways.
First, state industrial commissions can choose to incorporate
the Safety Net adjustment in their states minimum wage and
1 Previous AIRC decisions are available on the world wide web at URL:
http://www.e-airc.gov.au/wage2004/decisions. This web page con-
tains links to Safety Net cases held under earlier legislation as well as
to the various national wage cases held between 1985 and 1991.
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can also choose to incorporate it into the various state indus-
trial awards. Second, many industrial agreements provide for
automatic pass-on of the Safety Net adjustment to employ-
ees paid more than minimum award wage rates. Third, some
businesses exercise their discretion to pass on the Safety Net
adjustment to employees who are paid more than minimum
award wage rates and who have not received a wage adjust-
ment via one of the two other mechanisms described above.
5. Because Safety Net adjustments can inßuence wages via the
various paths described above it is not straightforward to ob-
tain information from administrative databases on how many
employees have their wage increment set by the annual Safety
Net adjustment. This information must be obtained through
surveys of business.
6. Against that background, the following research questions were
posed by the Department of Employment and Workplace Re-
lations,
 How many businesses and employees have their wages
adjusted through the annual Safety Net case and its ßow
on eﬀects?
 What is the eﬀect of annual Safety Net decision on wage
setting and labour costs?
 What was the eﬀect of the 2003 Safety Net adjustment
on employment?
 What is the eﬀect of Safety Net adjustments on employ-
ment levels?
7. We were commissioned by the Department of Employment
and Workplace Relations to undertake two tasks. The Þrst
of these was to design a questionnaire, to be included in the
October/November 2003 Yellow Pages survey of 1800 small
and medium sized businesses, that could provide information
to help answer these research questions.2 The second task was
to analyse the data collected from that survey.
8. Our principal instruction from the Department was to produce
a survey and analysis that was methodologically sound. Since
we are economists and econometricians this requires that we
pay attention to both economic theory and statistical theory
2 Small sized businesses are deÞned as businesses, with one or more but
less than twenty full-time employees. Medium sized businesses are
deÞned as businesses with between twenty and 200 full time employees.
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and that we are explicit about the methods used and assump-
tions made.
9. The research and analysis behind this report was somewhat
more complex than we initially envisaged. This was primarily
because the response rate to the survey was lower than we
expected.
10. Low response rates raise two questions. First, are the esti-
mates biased. Second can valid inference be made about the
population on the base of the survey of the survey.
11. Our analysis suggests that the answer to the Þrst of these
questions is that the survey provides unbiased estimates of the
population quantities of interest. See the Þnal section of this
overview at page 20 and Chapter 7 for further information.
12. Inference requires standard errors and this is more problem-
atic.3 The low response rate means that the usual formula
for constructing standard errors may not be applicable. While
standard errors are desirable the issue of economic signiÞcance
is of greater importance and we have allocated much of our
time to embedding that quality in our report.4 Further dis-
cussion of response rates and other statistical issues is provided
on page 20 and Chapter 7.
Economic framework
13. Facts rarely, if ever, speak for themselves, they are gathered
and interpreted within a framework of theory. Often that
framework is left implicit. Being explicit focuses attention on
the areas where further research and analysis can help resolve
the debate and reduces the scope for confusion and misrepre-
sentation.
3 Statistical inference is the process whereby statements are generated
about the probability that some outcome could have been generated
purely by randomness.
4 Economic signiÞcance is the notion that estimates should satisfy two
criteria. First they should be consistent with maintained economic
theory or the reasons that the theory does not apply should be ex-
plained. Second, the estimates should be of a magnitude to be of
practical importance either for policy or for understanding how the
economy works. The article Signifying Nothing, The Economist, 29
January 2004 provides a discussion of this concept with links to rele-
vant academic articles  those articles have one ßaw, they convey the
impression that economic signiÞcance is a new concept. It is not. It is
a concept that can be traced back to the beginnings of econometrics
and is fundamental to good practice.
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14. We have used an economic framework that is eclectic. It en-
compasses the body of neoclassical theory as well as that part
of the modern economic theory of labour markets that departs
from neoclassical assumptions.5 In short the framework used
is a neutral one.
15. A useful stylized representation of this framework is obtained
by viewing each business as being faced by four possible wage
ßoors. These comprise,
1. The relevant minimum award wage rate;
2. The eﬃciency wage. This is the wage that maximizes the
ratio of the eﬀort supplied by the worker to the wage.
Eﬃciency wage theory diﬀers from neoclassical theory
because it involves the assumption that the level of eﬀort
supplied by an employee depends on the wage paid. The
eﬃciency wage can be thought of as a wage ßoor because
a proÞt maximizing business will not choose to pay a
wage below the eﬃciency wage.6
3. The competitive wage. This is the wage that the business
needs to pay in order to retain existing employees and
attract new employees. It is determined by the wage
that would be paid to the worker by other businesses.
To simplify the discussion we use the term competitive
wage to include both,7
(a) the wage that would be determined through the in-
teraction of supply and demand in a neoclassical
model of a perfectly competitive labour market; and
(b) the wage oﬀer that a business would optimally choose
to make in a, more realistic, search model of the
labour market.
4. The reservation wages of the workers in the labour mar-
ket in which the business sources its labour. This is
relevant only in those circumstances where there are no
other businesses that could employ the workers. In this
5 The economic framework that we use is set out in more detail in Chap-
ter 6.
6 Akerlof & Yellen (1986) and Katz (1986) provide surveys of the litera-
ture on eﬃciency wages.
7 We put these categories of wage ßoor together for two main reasons.
First, the survey instrument that we design does not provide any in-
formation that could be used to distingish between these two models.
Second, the diﬀerence does not matter for this report.
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case the supply curve of labour to the business is ob-
tained by aggregating the supply curves of the individ-
ual businesses operating in that market. Unlike the three
other cases, discussed above, the wage ßoor varies with
the quantum of labour demanded and thus by varying
employment the business can determine the wage paid so
as to maximize proÞts. In this case the business is said
to be a monopsonist. The monopsony case is often ex-
tended to encompass the situation where employees face
costs of changing their employer. This would arise for
example through the costs of selling and buying a house
to move locations and the cost of losing any Þrm speciÞc
human capital through changing employer.
16. The wage paid by the business to each worker is the maximum
of these wage ßoors for that particular worker in that
particular business.
17. The theories of the labour market that lay behind these vari-
ous wage ßoors are well understood and are taught in under-
graduate economics courses.8 As such this framework is not
controversial. What is controversial is the empirical relevance
of each of the theories. Here a theory is empirically relevant,
for a business, if,
 it is currently binding for that business. That is the
particular wage ßoor is higher than any of the three other
wage ßoors; or
 under a plausible policy change the wage ßoor would
become binding.
18. This way of thinking about the empirical relevance of the vari-
ous theories has two advantages. First, it explicitly recognises
that all of the theories are approximations to a more com-
plex reality. Second, no single theory is likely to apply to
every business in an economy. As such, the research questions
posed earlier are best addressed by seeking information on the
frequency with which each of these theories are relevant to
businesses.
8 Despite the general features of these theories being well understood, lit-
tle empirical work has been undertaken in applying them to Australian
data.
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Combining theory and evidence to obtain a prelimi-
nary assessment of which theories are relevant
19. Working with four wage ßoors is complicated and we ask whether
there is evidence that allows us to rule out, as unsupported by
the available evidence, any of these wage ßoors. A signiÞ-
cant piece of evidence in this regard is that value added and
employment has grown faster in certain industries  in the
main these are industries with a larger proportion of employ-
ees paid an award wage.9 These facts, when viewed in the light
of the economic framework, outlined above constitute strong
evidence that:
1. Either the minimum wage or eﬃciency wage is the bind-
ing wage ßoor. The unusually rapid growth of these
indicators provides:
(a) strong evidence against the assumption that em-
ployment and wages are determined via the inter-
section of labour demand and supply as in a neo-
classical model;10 and
(b) even stronger evidence against the assumption that
wages and employment are determined via monop-
sony in these sectors;11 and
2. The elasticity of labour demand with respect to the real
wage is greater in these award dependent industries than
it is for other industries.12
9 By award dependent industries we mean, industries that in ABS Cat-
alogue 6306.0 have more than one quarter of their employees paid a
minimum award wage rate. Inspection of ABS catalogue 5204.0 shows
that value added has grown more strongly in these industries than for
the economy as a whole. Inspection of ABS Catalogue 6291.0.55.001
shows that employment has grown faster in the award dependent in-
dustries than for all industries.
10 The justiÞcation for this statement is that when one of these two wage
ßoors is binding all of the shift in the demand curve is translated into
employment changes. In contrast when the competitive model holds
with the wage determined by the interesection of supply and demand,
changes in demand are partially reßected in employment changes and
partially in changes in wages.
11 The justiÞcation for this statement is that under monopsony, the bulk
of any increase in demand is taken by the monopsonist into proÞts and
less ßows through into wages or employment than in the competitive
case.
12 The justiÞcation for this statement is that, for a given shift in demand,
a larger proportion of that shift is translated in employment the larger
is the responsiveness of demand to the real wage.
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20. The conclusion at point 1 above is consistent with both the
ACTUs and the Commonwealths position at recent Safety
Net cases. These parties can be viewed as disagreeing about
which of two wage ßoors are biting. The conclusion at point
1 says that one of these wage ßoors is biting for the award
dependent industries but is silent about which ßoor it is.
21. In part of recent theoretical academic literature monopsony
is suggested as a serious possibility whereas it had long been
regarded as a theoretical curiosity.13 Thus, we must take ac-
count of this possibility and include tests to assess its empir-
ical relevance. The evidence discussed above shows that we
can dismiss the monopsony hypothesis as unsupported by the
data for the award dependent industries. We can also dismiss,
for the award dependent industries, the hypothesis that wages
and employment are determined in a neoclassical model via
intersection of labour demand and labour supply. Thus, in
addition to the question regarding how widespread is the in-
ßuence of the safety net adjustment on wage setting, we focus
attention on the following issues that remain to be resolved by
research:
1. Is it the eﬃciency wage, or the minimum award wage,
that determines the level of employment in industries
where there are a large number or employees paid the
minimum award wage rate?
2. Have past Safety Net wage increases priced minimum
award rate labour out of some businesses and activities?
That is, is the minimum award wage a binding constraint
on employment for those in businesses that currently hire
little or no labour at minimum award wage rates?14
3. And if the minimum award wage rate is binding, what
would be the eﬀect on employment of increasing that
wage via a Safety Net adjustment.
Eﬀect on wage setting and labour costs
22. About 1.8 million employees of small and medium sized busi-
nesses are paid minimum award wage rates. See section 2.2,
Table 2.4, page 33.
13 See Manning (2002).
14 It could be the case, for example, that the minimum award rate is
binding so tightly for those businesses that they choose to hire no
employees at the minimum award wage rate.
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23. A further 1.1 million employees who are paid over award wages
received automatic pass-on of the May 2003 Safety Net adjust-
ment to their wages.15 See section 2.3, Table 2.13, page 39.
24. An additional 1.4 million employees who are paid over award
wages, had received or were expected to receive, discretionary
pass on of the May 2003 Safety Net adjustment. See section
2.4, Table 2.18, page 42.
25. Thus, the annual Safety Net adjustments to minimum award
wage rates inßuence the wages of about 4.3 million employees
of small and medium sized business enterprises. This repre-
sents just over two thirds of the 6.7 million persons employed
by these businesses. See section 7.7, Table 7.8, page 117 for
estimated population characteristics.
26. As a reference point there were 9.7 million persons employed
in Australia at December 2003. Thus, we estimate that about
69 per cent of Australian employees are within scope of the
survey.
Eﬀect on labour demand
Short run eﬀects
27. We estimate that the May 2003 Safety Net adjustment, via its
eﬀect on labour demand, cost about 14,000 jobs in the three
months prior to the survey going into the Þeld in October /
November. See section 3.3, Table 3.3 page 49.
28. The estimate above relates to the eﬀect on labour demand in
businesses that had employees in October / November 2003.
There will also have been some job loss caused by the SNA
in businesses that had more than one employee in May 2003
but had only one employee when the survey was in the Þeld
in October / November 2003. Businesses that currently have
one employee were asked diﬀerent questions to businesses with
more than one employee, thus we do not have comparable
estimates of job losses attributable to the 2003 SNA for these
businesses. However, from the responses to other questions
put to businesses with one employee we do know that the
2003 SNA and previous SNAs have caused some job losses.
Estimates of the broad magnitude of the eﬀect of past SNAs
15 Unless otherwise indicated all statements in this report relate to small
and medium sized businesses. That is businesses with between one and
200 full-time employees. In some instances we omit the qualiÞer small
and medium sized businesses so as to shorten sentences and improve
readbility.
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on employment by businesses that currently have no employees
are reported at page 12. Those estimates relate to experience
over several years and it is not straightforward to make an
estimate of the eﬀect for any given year.
Implied short run elasticity of demand
29. We estimate that the implied short run elasticity of demand for
minimum award wage rate workers with respect to the mini-
mum award wage rate to be about -0.2. Here short run is
taken to be a period of three months. Over such a short period
of time businesses cannot change their production technology,
their capital stock or their location. Interest, therefore, mainly
centres on the medium to long run eﬀects when businesses can
alter these aspects of their operation.
30. These estimated elasticities are provided to assist the reader
in comparing the results of our study with those from other
studies. The practice of comparing elasticities between re-
ports is fraught with danger as each elasticity has its own spe-
ciÞc meaning embedded within the context of the model and
dataset from which it is constructed. The main valid use of
these elasticities is to provide a quick check that the estimated
employment eﬀect of the 2003 Safety Net adjustments is not
remarkably diﬀerent from the range of responses that would be
predicted from examination of the Australian or international
literature.
Medium to long run eﬀects
31. We estimate that guaranteeing not to adjust the Safety Net
for a period of Þve years would result in employment demand
being 245,000 job places higher than otherwise would be the
case. See section 4.2 Table 4.2 page 60.
32. A signiÞcant part of this additional demand would be for full-
time (about 116,000 persons) and part-time employees (about
53,000 persons). The additional demand for casuals is esti-
mated to be about 76,000 persons. See section 4.2 Table 4.2
page 60 and section 5.4 Table 5.7 page 68.
33. The extent to which this higher labour demand would trans-
late into increased employment depends on a number of fac-
tors. The most important of these being the number of people
currently without a job that are willing to work at the mini-
mum award wage rate. We note in this regard that there are
currently about 575,000 persons unemployed in Australia.16
Labour supply is thought to be inelastic with respect to the
16 Seasonally adjusted December 2003.
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real wage, thus we expect that under a guarantee not to change
the Safety Net for a period of Þve years, most of those currently
unemployed would remain available for work rather than with-
drawing from the workforce.
34. Of course, how many of the currently unemployed ultimately
Þll the job opportunities created, will be determined by the
incentives that they are provided by the tax and welfare system
to take up the job opportunities.
Role of past Safety Net adjustments in job losses by
businesses that currently have no employees other than
respondent
35. We estimate that about 189,000 businesses have no employ-
ees other than the respondent. About 40 per cent of these
businesses reported that they previously had employees. See
section 5.2, Table 5.1, page 65.
36. Some of these employees lost their jobs because of previous
Safety Net adjustments. We estimate that about 75,000 job
losses occurred for this reason. However, this is the cumulation
over a number of years and does not represent the number of
job losses in any given year. Previous Safety Net adjustments
played a major role in about 23,500 of these job losses and a
moderate role in a further 25,700 job losses. See section 5.3
Table 5.4 page 67 for further details.
Eﬀect on pay levels of a guarantee not to increase the Safety
Net for Þve years
Workers currently paid an award wage rate
37. A guarantee not to adjust the Safety Net for a period of Þve
years would not necessarily hold Þxed for Þve years the pay
of workers currently paid a minimum award wage rate. Under
such a guarantee some workers that are currently paid the
minimum award wage rate would receive pay increases that
moved them to being paid over award wages.
38. The evidence for this is that the bulk of businesses, that re-
ported that they would hire additional employees under such
a guarantee, also reported that they would fully or partially
adjust wages of some of these employees to compensate for in-
ßation. That is, under a guarantee of no change in the Safety
Net, employees hired at minimum award wage rates would
move to being paid over award wage rates. See section, 4.3,
Table 4.5, page 63.
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39. This Þnding has a sound foundation in economic principles
and, as discussed in chapter 7, the questionnaire was designed
so as to be able to test for its existence and quantify its mag-
nitude. It arises because, in the absence of annual Safety Net
adjustments to minimum award wage rates, businesses would
have the option to respond to temporary adverse economic
circumstances by not raising the nominal wages of their work-
ers. The imposition of a system of minimum award wage rates
removes this option for the businesses with regard to workers
paid at or near minimum award wage rates. In an uncertain
environment with Þxed costs of hiring and retrenching this op-
tion has a value to businesses. Therefore removal of the option
via a minimum award wage rate imposes a cost on business.
This cost can be avoided only by using technologies that min-
imize the use of low skill workers.
40. Aside from hiring and Þring costs, the value of the option
depends principally on two things. The Þrst of these is the
gap between minimum award wage rates and overaward wages.
The second is the extent and nature of the variability of the
shocks that the business experiences. A guarantee not to ad-
just the minimum award wage rate for Þve years would allow
the gap between with the actual wage paid to grow over time
and thus reduces the cost imposed on the Þrm via a reduced
value of the option not to adjust nominal wages in hard times.
41. The empirical relevance of this eﬀect is illustrated by our Þnd-
ing that about one Þfth of businesses said they would hire ad-
ditional workers under a guarantee of no change to the Safety
Net, and also said they would provide employees that are cur-
rently paid an award wage rate with the same percentage in-
crease in wages as provided to over award employees.
42. One might ask does the eﬀect just described mean that a policy
of adjusting minimum award wage rates in line with inßation
would have roughly the same eﬀect as guaranteeing not to ad-
just their level by not providing Safety Net adjustments? The
annswer is no. This is because there are important interac-
tions between hiring and Þring costs, uncertainty and mini-
mum award wage rates.
43. These interactions mean that the existence of minimum award
wage rates imposes a cost on businesses since it removes the
option, that might be exercised in adverse circumstances, of
not adjusting for inßation, the wages of workers paid an award
wage rate. The magnitude of this cost depends on the level of
the wage. A guarantee of no change in the Safety Net would
have diﬀerent eﬀects, when compared to inßation indexation,
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on the level of the minimum award wage rate. This explains
why the two policies will have diﬀerent eﬀects even though
many businesses would, on average, choose to compensate for
inßation those employees paid an award wage rate.
Eﬀect on wages that are above minimum award wage
rates
44. A guarantee of not adjusting minimum award wage rates for a
period of Þve years would also inßuence over award wages. We
have seen that 40 per cent of employees in small and medium
sized businesses are paid more than the minimum award wage
rate but receive the annual Safety Net adjustments. This
means that for these employees wage setting is on a Safety
Net plus basis. A guarantee of not adjusting minimum award
wage rates for a period of Þve years would give businesses an
increased option not to adjust the pay of overaward workers
in bad economic circumstances.17 We expect that this would,
for a period of time, slow the rate of growth of over award
wages. Thus, not all of the increased labour demand that we
have identiÞed would ßow through to minimum award wage
rate workers; some would ßow through to increased demand
for workers paid over award wages.
Implied elasticities of demand
45. Assuming that the guarantee of no change in the Safety Net re-
sults in a 13 per cent change in minimum award wage rates, we
Þnd that the long run elasticity of demand for full-time mini-
mum award wage rate workers with respect to real minimum
award wage rates to be about -1.14. The comparable demand
elasticity for part-time minimum award wage rate workers is
about -0.89, while the comparable demand elasticity for casual
minimum award wage rate workers is about -0.67. We estimate
the overall elasticity of demand for all minimum award wage
rate workers with respect to real minimum award wage rates
to be about -0.90. See section 4.2 Table 4.2 page 60.18
17 Those businesses that exercise their discretion to pass on the SNAs
might be viewed as already having some capacity to choose whether
or not to pass on the SNA. But, it is a very constrained choice they
exercise since not passing on the SNA when the majority of other
workers are receiving the SNA would most likely have an adverse eﬀect
on motivation and worker eﬀort.
18 These estimated elasticities are incidental, rather than essential, to the
analysis in this report. They are provided to assist the reader in com-
paring the results of our study with the results of other studies. See the
qualiÞcation given earlier regarding the use of elasticities. The elastic-
ities reported here diﬀer from the usual demand elasticity for two main
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46. The Þndings given above involve medium to long run esti-
mated labour demand elasticities for minimum award wage
rate workers with respect to minimum award wage rates. It is
also useful to express this information in terms of the elastic-
ity of demand for all workers with respect to minimum award
wage rates. This elasticity uses all employees as the denom-
inator. Thus, it is calculated by multiplying the elasticities
discussed above by the ratio of the number of minimum wage
rate employees in small and medium sized businesses to total
employees in those businesses. The relevant factors are 0.176,
0.468, 0.406 and 0.273 for full-time, part-time, casual and all
workers respectively. Applying these factors yields estimated
elasticities of demand for full-time, part-time, casual and all
workers with respect to minimum award wage rates of -0.20,
-0.42, -0.27 and -0.25 respectively.
47. It is important to recognize that the two sets of elasticities
(when reported with the factors) contain exactly the same in-
formation about labour demand. But, they express it in a
diﬀerent way.
Implications for causes of casualization of the workforce
48. The elasticities presented above yield an important prediction
regarding the casualization of the workforce; at least part of
the casualization of the workforce may be explained by the
combination of minimum award wage rates being relatively
high in Australia and demand for full-time minimum award
wage rate employees being far more responsive to changes in
minimum award wage rates than is the demand for casual min-
imum award wage rate employees.
49. The capacity of our approach to explain other features of the
labour market such as the trend towards casualization should
be viewed as evidence that the approach adopted in this report
has value  one of the most important signs of a successful
theory or framework is the capacity to explain a lot with a
parsimonious framework.
reasons. First, the elasticity is calculated with respect to minimum
award wages rather than the wage paid. Second, the estimated elas-
ticity incorporates the option value eﬀect discussed above. The reader
should take these considerations into account when interpreting these
elasticities.
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Concentration of minimum award wage rate employees in Þrms,
industries and regions
50. Minimum award wage rate employees are highly concentrated.
Of those businesses that have at least one employee, 59.3 per
cent have no workers paid a minimum award wage rate. That
is, only 40.7 per cent of businesses have at least one employee
paid a minimum award wage rate. See section 2.2, Table 2.1,
page 30.
Regional dimension
51. We Þnd large regional diﬀerences in the proportion of busi-
nesses that pay at least one employee minimum award wage
rates. For example, in the Sydney metropolitan area only 21.6
per cent of small and medium businesses have one or more em-
ployees paid exactly a minimum award wage rate. In contrast
56.8 per cent of businesses in non-metropolitan New South
Wales have at least one employee paid a minimum award wage
rate. See section 2.2, Table 2.2, page 31.
Industry dimension
52. There are similarly large diﬀerences across industries in the
proportion of businesses that have at least one employee paid
a minimum award wage rate. In Accommodation, Cafes and
Restaurants 59 per cent of businesses have at least one em-
ployee paid a minimum award wage rate. In retail trade 56
per cent of businesses have at least one employee paid a min-
imum award wage rate. In Finance and Insurance, by way of
contrast, 27 per cent of businesses have at least one employee
paid a minimum award wage rate. See section 2.2, Table 2.3,
page 32.
Implications of the concentration of minimum award
wage rate employees
53. The concentration in particular Þrms, industries and regions
of workers paid minimum award wage rates has important
and wide ranging implications. Most importantly, it matters
for how the eﬀects of changes in minimum award wage rates
should be measured. SpeciÞcally, time series and cross section
statistical analyses that do not take account, in their models,
of this concentration of minimum award wage rate employees
will be biased towards Þnding that annual Safety Net adjust-
ments to minimum award wage rates have a smaller eﬀect on
employment than is the case.
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54. The main reason for this is that, for businesses that have no
employees paid a minimum award wage rate, or that have only
one employee, all of the eﬀects of changes to minimum award
wage rates occur via a decision as to whether or not to employ
at a minimum award wage rate. This decision is not captured
in those empirical approaches which assume, either explicitly
or implicitly, that production uses both over award wage and
minimum award wage rate labour. Such approaches only mea-
sure the substitution eﬀect (ie adjustment at the intensive mar-
gin) they do not measure adjustment at the extensive margin.
55. The term intensive margin is used here to refer to changes in
the mix of minimum wage rate workers and over award wage
rate workers. While the term extensive margin is used here
to refer to the decision as to whether or not to employ any
workers at a minimum award wage rate. The distinction is
made for two reasons. First, from a businesses perspective the
two decisions will involve diﬀerent considerations. Second, for
economists and econometricians, adjustments made at the ex-
tensive margin, as deÞned here, involve additional modelling
considerations. Usually, economists and econometricians as-
sume, either implicitly or explicitly, that all adjustment occurs
at the intensive margin. This is much simpler than is the case
if adjustments at the extensive margin are also modelled. The
cost is that if there is some adjustment occurring at the ex-
tensive margin, then models that assume the absence of such
adjustments will underestimate the eﬀect on aggregate em-
ployment of Safety Net adjustments to minimum award wage
rates.19
56. One of the strengths of this report is that we can quantify the
empirical signiÞcance of this eﬀect and can quantify the mag-
nitude of the bias incurred by those approaches and estimation
methods that ignore adjustment at the extensive margin.
57. To do this we decompose our estimated increase in labour de-
mand according to whether the job increase was at the inten-
sive or extensive margin. The estimate of additional demand
for 245,000 jobs is comprised of:
 32,000 job places in businesses that exist but currently
have no employees. This avenue of job creation is missed
in modes of cross section and time series analysis that
19 This qualiÞcation also applies to the international evidence on the em-
ployment eﬀect of changes to minimum wages. It has not, to our
knowledge, been previously mentioned in the literature on the eﬀect
of minimum wages.
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either explicitly or implicitly assume every business has
at least one employee other than the respondent.
 213,000 job places in businesses that currently have at
least one employee. This is comprised of:
 138,000 job places in businesses that employ at least
one person paid a minimum award wage rate. This
eﬀect is captured in standard modes of analysis;
and
 75,000 job places in businesses that currently do
not employ anyone at a minimum award wage rate.
These are not captured in standard modes of cross
section and time series analysis that either explic-
itly or implicitly assume every business has at least
one employee paid a minimum award wage rate.
58. Thus, some 44 per cent of new jobs come from adjustments
to employment made at the extensive margin and 56 per cent
arise via adjustment made at the intensive margin. We esti-
mate that standard modes of analysis would neglect these ef-
fects and underestimate by about 107,000 jobs or 44 per cent
the eﬀect on labour demand of guaranteeing not to adjust the
Safety Net for a period of Þve years.
59. The implication of this Þnding is that, estimates, made for
Australia, of elasticities of demand for minimum award wage
rate workers with respect to the minimum award wage rate
will, if they are based on models that exclude adjustment at
the extensive margin, be biased downwards (ie towards zero).
The estimates given above suggest that to remove most of this
bias in estimates made for Australia one should multiply the
estimated elasticities by a factor of 1.79.20
60. In order to fully remove this bias econometric models would
need to be respeciÞed to allow for adjustment at the extensive
margin as well as the intensive margin.
Macroeconomic management
61. The Þndings of regional and industry diﬀerences in the inci-
dence of minimum award wage rates also has important impli-
cations for macroeconomic management and for the regional
and industry eﬀects of macroeconomic shocks. Occasionally
the Australian economy is hit by adverse macroeconomic shocks
that require real wages to fall if employment levels are to be
20 The scaling factor 1.79 is calculated as 1/0.56.
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maintained. The fact that certain regions have a larger propor-
tion of employees paid minimum award wage rates means that,
in the event of such an adverse macroeconomic shock, more of
the adverse shock will be transformed into reductions in em-
ployment (and hence increases in unemployment) and less into
reductions in real wages for employees in those regions. That
is diﬀerences in the regional incidence of minimum award wage
rates will translate into diﬀerences in the cyclical volatility of
employment and unemployment.
Evidence on wage setting for over award employees
62. In addition to gathering evidence on the eﬀects of the Safety
Net on wage setting, the survey also sought information on
wage setting for over award employees.
63. Inßation is low on the list of factors inßuencing wage setting.
This is true independently of whether the business is asked
about past consumer price inßation, expected consumer price
inßation, the price at which the businesses own goods or ser-
vices are increasing or productivity. What does matter, how-
ever, is proÞtability.
64. Aside from proÞtability the other factors that are important
in wage setting are
 paying a wage necessary to retain good employees, re-
duce turnover and attract high quality employees;
 rewarding good performance; and
 paying a wage that motivates employees.
65. These Þndings have some important implications. First, it is
clear that for many businesses and industries the neoclassical
model and the search model provides a good approximation.
For these businesses competition, to attract and retain good
employees, is intense.
66. Second, whatever the merits are of the monopsony argument
overseas, there is no support in the results of this survey for the
hypothesis that Australian small and medium sized businesses
are characterized by monopsony. A Þnding that is consistent
with our earlier discussion of other evidence.
67. Third, the Þndings suggest that the eﬃciency wage model is a
good approximation for some businesses.
68. Further details are in section 2.6 page 43. The monopsony and
eﬃciency wage models are brießy discussed in sections 6.4 and
19
6.6 respectively, pages 75 and 77 respectively.
Statistical issues
69. The analysis in this report was conducted using information
from questions placed in the October/November 2003 survey
of small and medium sized businesses. That survey is a panel
of 1800 small and medium businesses. It provides the most
comprehensive coverage of small and medium sized businesses
in Australia that is available from a regular survey.
70. The population of interest for this survey comprises private
businesses with between one and two hundred full-time em-
ployees in all industries other than the primary sector. Be-
cause this is a panel the sample frame has two parts. The Þrst
part comprises businesses that are members of the panel. The
second part of the sample frame comprises the Desktop Mar-
keting Systems database of telephone numbers of Australian
businesses. Potential recruits to the panel are selected via
telephone numbers chosen randomly from this database. Po-
tential recruits are admitted into the panel if they a) agree to
participate; and b) come from the same state and industry,
and are the same size, as the Þrm that they are to replace in
the panel. This feature of the selection of respondents ensures
that, over time, the panel remains representative of small and
medium sized Australian businesses.
Response rates
71. The response rate for this survey was between 20 and 22 per
cent. It is important to be precise about what this response
rate does and does not mean. Most importantly a low re-
sponse rate does not necessarily mean that the estimates of
population quantities obtained using design based estimators
(DBEs) of population means or sums are biased.21 What it
does mean is that one needs to mount additional arguments
in order to convince ones most trenchant critic that the design
based estimators are unbiased for this survey.
72. The discussion below provides the additional arguments that
we feel make a compelling case that the design based esti-
mators used in this report are not signiÞcantly biased when
applied to the data obtained from this survey.22 We then pro-
21 Design based estimators depend for their validity on the survey being
designed and administered so that the probability of selection into the
sample is known.
22 By not signiÞcantly biased we mean that any bias is too small to
modify the main Þndings of the report.
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vide a discussion of the model based estimators that are also
used in this report and which are unaﬀected by low response
rates.23
73. Before turning to those issues it is also important to emphasise
that the response rate of between 20 and 22 per cent does not
mean that the data collected by the survey is of low quality.
Indeed, the opposite is the case as in part the low response rate
arises because major eﬀorts were made to select businesses that
match those which leave the panel. This requires that more
businesses be contacted, and thus more refusals encountered,
than would be the case with a one-oﬀ survey.
Reasons why the design based estimators are unlikely
to be signiÞcantly biased
74. There are three main reasons to support the contention that
the low response rates do not create a signiÞcant bias in design
based estimators for this survey.
75. First, the decision not to respond was made before the business
was told (at the preamble to question 11) that the survey
contained some questions about Safety Net issues.24
76. Second, the non response was attributable to factors that are
best described as random and would not, therefore, be ex-
pected to over (or under) select respondents that,
 have minimum award wage rate employees;
 have passed on the 2003 Safety Net adjustment to over
award employees;
 have reduced employment because of the 2003 Safety Net
adjustment;
 would increase employment in response to a guarantee
of no change to the Safety Net for a period of Þve years.
77. Third, the weights used in this survey are constructed via
poststratiÞcation. They therefore are, by virtue of their con-
struction, robust to missing at random non response; see Lohr
(1999, p. 268).
78. Thus, we do not consider it likely that the non response causes
any signiÞcant bias in the estimates we make in this report.
23 Chapter 7 provides a more detailed discussion of the statistical issues
and deÞnes terms such as design based estimator and model based
estimator.
24 All businesses that reached the preamble to question 11 completed the
survey.
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79. The only additional evidence that could be provided here is
from the analysis of a survey of non respondents. Such analysis
would involve testing hypotheses that the non responses are,
using the terminology in Lohr (1999, p. 265), either missing
completely at random or missing at random.25 If the Þrst
of these hypotheses cannot be rejected then no adjustments
are required to produce unbiased design based estimators. If
the Þrst hypothesis can be rejected but the second cannot be
rejected, then all that is required to reduce the bias is the
reweighting, via poststratiÞcation, that we have already done.
Thus, the only way that such a survey of non respondents
could modify the results obtained using design based estima-
tors would be if it was found that, after controlling for the
characteristics of businesses such as size, location, industry
etc, the probability of non response was related to the busi-
nesses answers to the Safety Net questions. Such a Þnding
would not aﬀect the results obtained using model based esti-
mators which are discussed below.
Model based estimators
80. Model based estimators provide an alternative to design based
estimators and have Þve main advantages. First, they are un-
aﬀected by non response. Second, they allow the investigator
to provide some indication of the likely extent of any bias as-
sociated with design based estimators. Third, they provide
estimators that are more eﬃcient than DBEs in the sense that
they produce smaller standard deviations and tighter conÞ-
dence intervals. Fourth, they bring to light important rela-
tionships in the data. Fifth, they can provide a better basis
for testing hypotheses than do design based estimators.
81. We have discussed the model based estimators that we believe
can be applied to this data set but have not yet applied those
estimators to the dataset.
Summary
82. We have sought to be explicit about the statistical issues that
arise in this work and we have sought to adhere to the high-
est standards for the execution and presentation of empirical
work. Our assessment is that we have dealt with the non
25 A non response is said to be missing completely at random if the prob-
ability of non response is unrelated to both respondent characteristics
and the responses to the questions of interest (ie the Safety Net ques-
tions). A non response is said to be missing at random if, after con-
troling for respondent characteristics, the probability of non response is
unrelated to the responses to questions of interest. There are standard
econometric procedures for testing these hypotheses.
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response issue using the best statistical and econometric prac-
tices available.
83. Of course, given the richness of the dataset obtained from this
survey, and the importance of the issues under investigation,
there is always more that could be done. But, our judgement is
that the features that might be discovered in a more extensive
model based estimation approach would be in the Þne detail
rather than requiring major modiÞcation of the conclusions
drawn in this report.
84. We have observed that further assurances about the validity
of design based estimators could be obtained for this dataset
by taking a random sample of non-respondents and analysing
it to establish beyond doubt the hypotheses advanced above
that the non response was random rather than systematic.
We note that these assurances will not be required for those
conclusions of the report that are subsequently conÞrmed us-




1 Structure of the report
1.1. Chapter 2 presents evidence from the survey on how wages are
determined in small and medium sized Australian businesses.
Particular attention is paid to the question of the extent to
which SNA adjustments are passed on to workers receiving
over award wages.
1.2. The estimated eﬀect on employment of the May 2003 SNA is
presented in chapter 3.
1.3. The estimated eﬀect on employment of guaranteeing not to
adjust the Safety Net for a period of Þve years is presented
in chapter 4.
1.4. The eﬀects of SNAs on Þrms that currently have no employees
are presented and discussed in chapter 5.
1.5. Good analysis and research is guided by economic theory.
Chapter 6 sets out the relevant bodies of economic theory that
have guided our analysis.
1.6. The empirical contribution of this report is based on the analy-
sis of questions related to SNAs placed in wave 43 of the Yel-
low Pages survey that was administered in October and No-
vember 2003. This survey and the statistical foundations for
our methods of analysis are discussed in chapter 7.
1.7. These chapters are in two parts. The Þrst part comprises
analysis of the completed survey responses. The second part
comprises more technical material on the economic framework
used and the technical details of the survey.




II. The impact of minimum wages on small
and medium sized businesses: results from
the analysis of a survey
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2 Evidence on how wages are determined in small
and medium sized Australian businesses
2.1 Introduction
2.1. In this chapter we study how wages are determined in small
and medium sized Australian businesses.1 The questions of
interest here are Þrstly, what is the extent to which SNAs
impact on wage setting, and secondly what is the nature of
that impact? Is it uniform across industries, regions? Does
the extent of the impact vary by size of business?
2.2. In addressing these questions we Þrst report, in section 2.2,
on businesses directly aﬀected by the May 2003 SNA because
they have at least one employee paid a minimum award wage
rate. We then report in section 2.3 on Þrms that were di-
rectly aﬀected by the May 2003 SNA because they are party
to agreements that provide for automatic pass on of SNAs.
2.3. Businesses may be indirectly aﬀected by SNAs because they
choose to pass-on SNAs to employees who are paid over award
wages, but are not entitled to receive automatic pass-on of
the SNA under their agreement. Section 2.4 reports on Þrms
that are inßuenced by SNAs in this way. Reasons why busi-
nesses choose to exercise their discretion to pass on SNAs are
canvassed in section 2.5.
2.4. Many factors other than the annual SNAs inßuence wage set-
ting. The evidence gathered in the survey on these other fac-
tors is reported in section 2.6 and related back to the Safety
Net which is the main focus of this report.
1 All data in this section relates to businesses that have one or more
employees other than themself. That is, businesses that reported yes
to q11.
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2.2 Businesses with employees paid exactly a minimum award
wage rate
2.2.1 Number of businesses with employees paid exactly a minimum award
wage rate
2.5. As shown in Table 2.1 we estimate that some 238,109 busi-
nesses have at least one employee paid a minimum award wage
rate. This represents 40.7 per cent of the 585,476 businesses
that have more than one employee and provides one measure
of the extent of the inßuence of SNAs.
Table 2.1: Businesses with at least one employee paid a mini-




with at least one em-
ployee paid a minimim
award wage rate
All Þrms Per cent
1 to 5 161738 432497 37.4
6 to 10 36765 79734 46.1
11 to 20 21752 38155 57.0
21 to 50 12003 23835 50.4
51 to 100 3873 7795 49.7
100+ 1977 3461 57.1
All sizes 238109 585476 40.7
2.6. Businesses with one to Þve FT employees are least likely to
have at least one employee paid a minimum award wage rate,
and businesses with more than 100 FT employees are most
likely to have at least one employee paid a minimum award
wage rate.
2.7. There are marked regional diﬀerences in the extent to which
Þrms are inßuenced by the SNA by virtue of having one or
more employees paid a minimum award wage rate. These dif-
ferences are shown in Table 2.2. Looking across the states,
South Australia and Queensland have the largest proportions
of businesses directly inßuenced by the SNA, 56.0 and 52.2 per
cent respectively. New South Wales has the smallest propor-
tion of businesses (34.4 per cent) with at least one employee
paid a minimum award wage rate.2
2.8. In some instances the diﬀerences within states, between the
capital city and the remainder of the state, are larger than the
2 The Northern Territory has 33.4 per cent of businesses with at least
one employee paid the minimum wage.
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diﬀerences between states. Sydney, for example, has only 21.6
per cent of businesses reporting that they have an employee
paid exactly a minimum award wage rate. In contrast for the
remainder of New South Wales the comparable Þgure is 56.8
per cent of businesses.
Table 2.2: Businesses with at least one employee paid a mini-









Sydney 26271 121854 21.6
Other NSW 39798 70068 56.8
NSW 66069 191922 34.4
Melbourne 45471 128300 35.4
Other VIC 14655 33338 44.0
Victoria 60126 161638 37.2
Brisbane 25647 51119 50.2
Other QLD 32753 60862 53.8
Queensland 58400 111981 52.2
Adelaide 17616 31000 56.8
Other SA 4086 7732 52.8
South Australia 21702 38732 56.0
Perth 16189 42022 38.5
Other WA 5037 12477 40.4
Western Australia 21226 54499 38.9
Hobart 2772 5386 51.5
Other TAS 2759 7024 39.3
Tasmania 5531 12410 44.6
Northern Territory 1667 4998 33.4
ACT 3387 9295 36.4
Australia 238109 585476 40.7
2.9. Victoria and Western Australia are evenly balanced in terms
of the proportion of businesses directly inßuenced by SNAs in
the capital city relative to the remainder of the state. Queens-
land shows an intra state regional incidence of workers on the
Safety Net that is similar to that for NSW but not as pro-
nounced. Tasmania has a pronounced intra state regional in-
cidence of workers on the Safety Net that is the mirror image
of NSW with 51.5 per cent of businesses in Hobart reporting
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that they have at least on employee paid minimum award wage
rates compared with 39.3 per cent of businesses in the rest of
Tasmania.
2.10. As is shown in Table 2.3 there are also substantial diﬀerences
across industries in terms of the incidence of minimum award
wage rates.
Table 2.3: Businesses with at least one employee paid a mini-












C Manufacturing 22777 49263 46.2
E Construction/Building 24550 75579 32.5
F Wholesale 22570 54916 41.1




I Transport / storage 12638 36462 34.7
J/L Communication, Prop-
erty and Business Ser-
vices
39357 137290 28.7
K Finance and Insurance 6836 25134 27.2
O Health and Commu-
nity Services
9307 27746 33.5




All Industries 238109 585476 40.7
2.11. Finance and Insurance is the industry group where the small-
est proportion of businesses (27.2 per cent) have at least one
employee paid a minimum award wage rate, and Accommo-
dation, Cafes and Restaurants (58.8 per cent) is the industry
group with the highest incidence of businesses aﬀected by the
Safety Net.
2.12. Because a large proportion of businesses are inßuenced by the
annual SNA it is clear that these adjustments have the po-
tential to have signiÞcant macroeconomic eﬀects. The nature
of these eﬀects will depend in part on how the incidence of
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minimum award wage rates is distributed spatially, by indus-
try and by size of business. Moreover, because the Safety Net
provides a system of wage ßoors, the pattern of distribution
of minimum award wage rate employees across the economy
will be a factor that causes diﬀerential responses to macroeco-
nomic shocks. Evaluating the extent to which the Safety Net
has this eﬀect is beyond the scope of this report.
2.2.2 Employment
By size of business
2.13. We estimate that just over 1.8 million employees are paid a
minimum award wage rate. Small businesses employ the bulk
of workers in this category  the largest number of these em-
ployees (603,013) are in businesses with 1 to 5 full-time em-
ployees a further (337,336) person are employed at a minimum
award wage rate in businesses with 6 to 10 full-time employees.
See Table 2.4.
Table 2.4: Number of employees paid a minimum award wage
rate, cross tabulated by size of business
Size FT FT PT Casual All
1 to 5 157531 187151 258334 603013
6 to 10 93867 56160 187309 337336
11 to 20 123915 42235 71637 237787
21 to 50 145054 49874 159883 354811
51 to 100 79039 19250 28471 126760
100+ 122726 13959 29811 166497
Sub Total 722131 368630 735442 1826203
2.14. Businesses with at least one employee paid a minimum award
wage rate account for 3,376,581 employees in total which is
about one half of the workforce of all businesses with less than
200 full-time employees. See Tables 2.5 and 7.8.
2.15. Table 2.6 presents evidence on the extent to which minimum
award wage rate employees are concentrated in particular busi-
nesses. It shows the number of employees paid a minimum
award wage rate as a proportion of all employees in businesses
that paid at least one employee a minimum award wage rate.
As can be seen from Table 2.6, for the small and medium sized
business sector, the employment of minimum award wage rate
workers is highly concentrated with these employees compris-
ing 54.1 per cent of all employees in those businesses that have
at least one employee paid a minimum award wage rate. This
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concentration is highest for part-time workers with part-time
workers paid a minimum award wage rate making up 80.5 per
cent of all part-time workers in businesses that pay at least one
worker a minimum award wage rate. The comparable Þgure
for casuals is 77.7 per cent and for full-time workers is 36.6 per
cent.
Table 2.5: Number of employees in businesses that have at
least one employee paid a minimum award wage rate
Size FT FT PT Casual All
1 to 5 431445 238241 310226 979911
6 to 10 267974 63030 260597 591601
11 to 20 324959 56369 144454 525782
21 to 50 400977 58187 163919 623082
51 to 100 258996 22993 34181 316170
100+ 287930 19264 32841 340035
Sub Total 1972281 458084 946218 3376581
Table 2.6: Employees paid a minimum award wage rate as
a percentage of all employees in Þrms that have at least one
employee paid a minimum award wage rate cross tabulated by
size of Þrm, per cent
Size FT FT PT Casual All
1 to 5 36.5 78.6 83.3 61.5
6 to 10 35.0 89.1 71.9 57.0
11 to 20 38.1 74.9 49.6 45.2
21 to 50 36.2 85.7 97.5 56.9
51 to 100 30.5 83.7 83.3 40.1
100+ 42.6 72.5 90.8 49.0
Sub Total 36.6 80.5 77.7 54.1
Source: Calculation. Element in Table 2.4 as a percentage of
corresponding element in Table 2.5
2.16. One policy implication of this feature is that the annual SNA
will have diﬀerential eﬀects across categories of business. Most
businesses will not be directly aﬀected because they do not
have any minimum award wage rate employees.3 Those that
are aﬀected will, on average, experience a substantial eﬀect be-
cause, on average, minimum award wage rate employees make
up more than one half of all their employees.
3 Businesses without minimum wage employees cound still be directly
aﬀected because they have agreements that provide for automatic pass
on of the SNA to employees paid more than minimum wages. The
extent of this eﬀect is discussed in section 2.3.
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Distribution by industry
2.17. Retail trade (526,135 persons) and accommodation cafes and
restaurants (335,150 persons) are the two industry groups that
account for the largest number of minimum award wage rate
employees. Finance and insurance is the industry group that
accounts for the smallest number of minimum award wage rate
employees. Estimates of the number of minimum award wage
rate employees by industry are provided in Table 2.7
Table 2.7: Number of employees paid a minimum award wage
rate, by industry
Industry FT PT Casual All
C Manufacturing 81567 17817 34349 133732
E Construction/Building 47925 4548 16042 68516
F Wholesale 60740 21355 27425 109521
G Retail trade 166094 65043 294997 526135
H Accommodation, cafes
and resturants
99171 55628 180351 335150
I Transport / storage 47234 16612 21917 85763
J/L Communication, Prop-
erty and Business Ser-
vices
91539 47367 47913 186818
K Finance and Insurance 17629 10066 10508 38203
O Health and Commu-
nity Services
59521 99448 25025 183992
P/Q Cultural and recre-
ation and other
services
50711 30747 76916 158374
All industries 722131 368630 735442 1826203
2.18. Table 2.8 shows the number of employees in businesses that
have at least one employee paid a minimum award wage rate.
This Table provides the denominator for the calculations re-
ported in Table 2.9.
2.19. As can be seen from Table 2.9 minimum award wage rate em-
ployees are heavily concentrated in the Accommodation, Cafes
and Restaurants industry group, where they comprise 75.3 per
cent of all employees in businesses that pay at least one em-
ployee a minimum award wage rate.
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Table 2.8: Total employment in Þrms that pay at least one
employee a minimum award wage rate, cross tabulated by in-
dustry
Industry FT PT Casual All
C Manufacturing 297716 24206 38077 359998
E Construction/Building 150709 5825 22098 178632
F Wholesale 178732 23668 35109 237509
G Retail trade 428656 77771 300318 806745
H Accommodation, cafes
and resturants
181456 58964 204551 444971
I Transport / storage 99442 18957 27387 145786
J/L Communication, Prop-
erty and Business Ser-
vices
365430 93283 104015 562729
K Finance and Insurance 43950 10778 10881 65609
O Health and Commu-
nity Services
108186 106619 37262 252067
P/Q Cultural and recre-
ation and other
services
118004 38012 166521 322537
All industries 1972281 458083 946219 3376583
Table 2.9: Employees paid a minimum award wage rate as a
percentage of all employees in businesses that have at least one
employee paid a minimum award wage rate, cross tabulated by
industry
Industry FT PT Casual All
C Manufacturing 27.4 73.6 90.2 37.1
E Construction/Building 31.8 78.1 72.6 38.4
F Wholesale 34.0 90.2 78.1 46.1
G Retail trade 38.7 83.6 98.2 65.2
H Accommodation, cafes
and resturants
54.7 94.3 88.2 75.3
I Transport / storage 47.5 87.6 80.0 58.8
J/L Communication, Prop-
erty and Business Ser-
vices
25.0 50.8 46.1 33.2
K Finance and Insurance 40.1 93.4 96.6 58.2
O Health and Commu-
nity Services
55.0 93.3 67.2 73.0
P/Q Cultural and recre-
ation and other
services
43.0 80.9 46.2 49.1
All industries 36.6 80.5 77.7 54.1
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2.20. Inspection of Table 2.9 also reveals that there is great diversity
in the concentration of minimum award wage rate employees.
In Manufacturing, for example, minimum award wage rate em-
ployees comprise only 37.1 per cent of employees in businesses
that pay at least one employee a minimum award wage rate.
But even within manufacturing Þrms that have at least one
employee paid a minimum award wage rate there is diversity,
for example, casuals paid a minimum award wage rate com-
prise 90.2 per cent of all casual workers paid a minimum award
wage rate. By way of contrast, in manufacturing, full-time
workers paid a minimum award wage rate comprise only 27.4
per cent of all full-time workers in businesses that pay at least
one employee a minimum award wage rate.
2.3 Automatic pass on of SNAs
2.3.1 Number of businesses covered by agreements providing for automatic
pass on of SNAs
By size of business
2.21. Almost 140,000 businesses, 23.8 per cent of small and medium
enterprises, were covered by agreements that provided for au-
tomatic pass on of the SNA to over award employees. As is
shown in Table 2.10, small businesses with less than 5 FT
employees were least likely to be covered by agreements that
provide for automatic pass on of the SNA. Businesses with
51 to 100 FT employees were the most likely to have such an
agreement. The table also shows there is considerable varia-
tion across sizes of business in the propensity to pass on SNAs.
Table 2.10: Number of businesses that automatically passed
on the 2003 SNA to over award employees, cross tabulated by
size of business
Size (FT) Number covered
by agreements pro-
viding automatic
pass on of SNAs
All Þrms Per cent
1 to 5 85795 432497 19.9
6 to 10 29641 79734 37.2
11 to 20 11041 38155 28.9
21 to 50 8406 23835 35.3
51 to 100 3271 7795 42.0
100+ 1137 3461 32.9
Sub Total 139291 585476 23.8
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By region
2.22. There are marked regional and industry diﬀerences in the pro-
portion of businesses that are covered by agreements which
provide for automatic pass on of SNAs. Businesses in metropol-
itan NSW are least likely to be covered by such agreements
while those in non-metropolitan Tasmania are the most likely
to be covered; see Table 2.11.
Table 2.11: Number of businesses that automatically passed





pass on of SNAs
All Per cent
Sydney 23241 121854 19.1
Other NSW 22478 70068 32.1
All NSW 45719 191922 23.8
Melbourne 34458 128300 26.9
Other VIC 8490 33338 25.5
All Victoria 42948 161638 26.6
Brisbane 11684 51119 22.9
Other QLD 11745 60862 19.3
All Queensland 23429 111981 20.9
Adelaide 6490 31000 20.9
Other SA 1496 7732 19.3
All South Australia 7986 38732 20.6
Perth 8928 42022 21.2
Other WA 3155 12477 25.3
All Western Australia 12083 54499 22.2
Hobart 1180 5386 21.9
Other TAS 2521 7024 35.9
All Tasmania 3701 12410 29.8
Northern Territory 1375 4998 27.5
ACT 2050 9295 22.1
All regions 139291 585476 23.8
By industry
2.23. Wholesale trade is the industry group where businesses are
least likely to be covered by agreements providing automatic
pass on of SNAs with only 14.1 per cent of businesses reporting
such agreements. In manufacturing, by way of contrast, some
32.5 per cent of businesses are covered by agreements providing
for automatic pass on of SNAs. See Table 2.12.
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Table 2.12: Number of businesses that automatically passed
on the 2003 SNA to over award employees, cross tabulated by
industry
Industry Number All Per cent
C Manufacturing 16033 49263 32.5
E Construction/Building 19160 75579 25.4
F Wholesale 7756 54916 14.1




I Transport / storage 7974 36462 21.9
J/L Communication, Prop-
erty and Business Ser-
vices
30210 137290 22.0
K Finance and Insurance 3709 25134 14.8
O Health and Commu-
nity Services
6454 27746 23.3




All Industries 139291 585476 23.8
2.3.2 Employment
By size of business
2.24. Just under 1.1 million employees of small and medium sized
businesses received automatic pass on of the May 2003 SNA;
see Table 2.13. This represented 15.9 per cent of all employees
of small and medium business enterprises; see Table 2.14.
Table 2.13: Number of over award employees that automati-
cally received a pass on of May 2003 SNA, cross tabulated by
size of Þrm
Size FT FT PT Casual All
1 to 5 148443 40869 100706 290018
6 to 10 117787 43589 92816 254192
11 to 20 69100 13238 9869 92207
21 to 50 216780 6965 11593 235337
51 to 100 102508 3010 9520 115037
100+ 77304 1796 1471 80571
Sub Total 731921 109467 225975 1067363
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Table 2.14: Proportion of over award employees that received
automatic pass-on of the May 2003 SNA, crosstabulated by
size of business
Size FT FT PT Casual All
1 to 5 13.2 9.4 10.0 11.3
6 to 10 20.1 29.5 25.7 23.2
11 to 20 12.1 18.5 6.1 11.4
21 to 50 27.0 9.2 6.0 21.9
51 to 100 19.7 8.9 18.0 19.0
100+ 15.9 7.1 3.7 14.7
Sub Total 17.9 13.9 12.5 15.9
By industry
2.25. As shown in Tables 2.15 and 2.16, there are also diﬀerences
between industry groupings in the proportion of over award
employees who received automatic pass on of the 2003 SNA.
Table 2.15: Number of over award employees that automati-
cally received a pass on of May 2003 SNA, cross tabulated by
industry
Industry FT PT Casual All
C Manufacturing 154918 5666 12838 173423
E Construction/Building 60735 2460 37995 101191
F Wholesale 55574 5010 8701 69285
G Retail trade 139761 8465 21511 169738
H Accommodation, cafes
and resturants
42384 488 15756 58628
I Transport / storage 23400 2195 43345 68940
J/L Communication, Prop-
erty and Business Ser-
vices
143521 63366 15636 222523
K Finance and Insurance 23237 1878 111 25226
O Health and Commu-
nity Services
39333 15862 49669 104863
P/Q Cultural and recre-
ation and other
services
49057 4077 20413 73547
All industries 731921 109467 225975 1067363
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Table 2.16: Proportion of over award employees that received
automatic pass on of the 2003 SNA, by industry
Industry FT PT Casual All
C Manufacturing 23.9 14.1 19.1 22.9
E Construction/Building 16.0 7.7 50.8 20.8
F Wholesale 14.3 9.2 16.4 14.0
G Retail trade 17.6 6.7 6.3 13.5
H Accommodation, cafes
and resturants
18.0 0.8 6.6 10.9
I Transport / storage 10.8 6.1 50.3 20.3
J/L Communication, Prop-
erty and Business Ser-
vices
16.9 29.9 2.5 13.3
K Finance and Insurance 15.3 7.4 0.8 13.3
O Health and Commu-
nity Services
16.3 10.9 43.0 20.8
P/Q Cultural and recre-
ation and other
services
25.7 8.0 9.9 16.4
All industries 17.9 13.9 12.5 15.9
2.4 Discretionary pass on of the May 2003 SNA
2.26. Businesses may also choose to pass on the SNA to over award
employees who are not covered by an agreement that provides
for automatic pass on of the SNA. We refer to this as discre-
tionary pass on of the SNA. Discretionary pass on is a little
more diﬃcult to summarize than is automatic pass on. The
reason for this is that businesses that have adjusted the pay
of their employees between mid May 2003 and mid October
when the survey went into the Þeld, will have passed on the
SNA, made a decision to pass it on in the future or decided
not to pass on the SNA. However, those businesses that have
not adjusted the pay of their employees can only say whether
or not they intend to pass on the May 2003 SNA when they
next adjust the pay of their workers. This is made even more
complex by the fact that businesses can elect to exercise dis-
cretionary pass on for all or some of their workers. Describing
these outcomes by size of business, region and industry proved
to yield too complex a set of tables so we have chosen just to
present the aggregate Þgures here.
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2.4.1 Number of businesses that provided discretionary pass on of the May
2003 SNA to their employees
2.27. Almost 20 per cent of small and medium sized businesses ex-
ercised their discretion to pass the 2003 SNA on to some or
all of their over award employees. A further 6.1 per cent of
businesses intend to exercise their discretion to pass on the
SNA when they next adjust the pay of their employees.
Table 2.17: Number of Þrms providing discretionary pass on
of the May 2003 SNA to some or all over award employees
Passed on SNA Intend to pass on SNA
Passed on to Number Per cent Number Per cent
All employees 92979 15.9 29614 5.1
Some employees 23075 3.9 6194 1.0
Sub Total 116054 19.8 35808 6.1
Note the percentage is obtained by using as the denominator the
number of businesses with at least one employee (ie 585,476).
2.4.2 Employment
2.28. Just over 1.4 million employees of small and medium busi-
nesses receive pay increases via discretionary pass on of safety
net adjustments. This represents 23.8 per cent of all employ-
ees of small and medium businesses. The bulk of workers who
receive pay adjustments in this way are employed full-time.
About one third of casual workers receive their pay increases
via this discretionary pass on mechanism.
Table 2.18: Employment in businesses that have exercised, or
intend to exercise their discretion, to pass on the May 2003
SNA to over award employees, cross tabulated by size of busi-
ness
FT PT Casual All
Have passed on to
All employees 544141 47072 517237 1108450
Some employees 66305 1158 1667 69130
Intend to pass on to
All employees 192244 34653 23887 250784
Some employees 20150 92 342 20584
Total 822840 82975 543133 1448948
Per cent of all employees 20.1 10.5 30.0 23.8
42
2.5 Reasons for exercising discretion to pass on the May 2003
SNA to employees paid over award wages
2.29. Maintaining the motivation and workplace eﬀectiveness of em-
ployees was the rationale that businesses most strongly ad-
vanced for providing discretionary pass on of the May 2003
SNA. The next most important rationale given was to main-
tain wage relativities. These results are consistent with a ver-
sion of the eﬃciency wage model in which the eﬀort supplied by
workers depends on the premium that they are paid over min-
imum award wage rates. Such a model suggests that once an
increase in the Safety Net is granted, businesses face a choice
between passing that increase on to over award employees or
face a reduction in motivation and ultimately a reduction in
worker eﬀort.


















64.1 19.1 16.3 0.5
Because it was close
to wage increase that
these employees would
have obtained
21.2 20.7 54.1 4.0
2.6 Factors that inßuence wage setting
2.30. Table 2.20 provides information on the factors other than SNAs
that inßuence wage setting. Interestingly, inßation is low on
the list of factors and this is true independently of whether
the business is asked about past consumer price inßation, ex-
pected consumer price inßation, productivity, or the price at
which the businesses own goods or services are increasing.
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2.31. The factors that are important in wage setting are
 paying a wage necessary to retain good employees, re-
duce turnover and attract high quality employees;
 rewarding good performance;
 proÞtability of the business; and
 paying a wage that motivates employees.
Table 2.20: Factors that inßuence businesses in wage setting, per cent
Importance of factor
Very Some what Not important Dont Know
Rate of CPI inßation since last
wage review
19.1 34.4 44.9 1.6
The expected rate of CPI inßation
until the next wage review
9.3 25.9 62.9 1.8
Wage competitors are paying com-
parable employees
31.9 31.7 34.4 1.9
The wage necessary to motivate
employees
50.2 31.5 16.8 1.5
The wage necessary to attract high
quality employees
48.1 24.8 25.6 1.5
The wage necessary to retain good
employees and reduce turnover of
employees
63.2 23.4 12.0 1.4
The rate at which productivity has
increased since the last wage re-
view
31.5 37.5 28.5 2.6
The rate at which the price of the
Þrms products and services is ex-
pected to increase
21.4 31.9 43.5 3.3
The proÞtability of the business 57.3 29.6 12.2 1.0
Merit and good performance 68.3 21.8 8.8 1.2
2.32. The information in Table 2.20 has some important implica-
tions. First, it tells us that competition is intense among Aus-
tralian businesses to attract and retain employees. There is no
support for the hypothesis that Australian business is charac-
terized by monopsony.
2.33. Second, the Table suggests that the eﬃciency wage model is
likely to be relevant to the study of wage setting in Australia.
However, interpreting Table 2.20 in the context of the Þnd-
ings of the rest of this report suggests that it would be inap-
propriate to simply apply the standard eﬃciency wage model
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to Australia. The reason is that the baseline eﬃciency wage
model needs to be extended to incorporate Australias partic-
ular wage setting institutions. Most importantly that model
needs to be extended so that minimum award wage rates play
the role of a reference wage and thus Safety Net adjustments
have an eﬀect on over award wages and thus aggregate em-
ployment. Undertaking that research is beyond the scope of
this report but it is very important that it be done so that
misleading conclusions are not drawn from the eﬃciency wage
model when it is applied to analyse Australian issues.
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3 Estimated eﬀect on employment of the May
2003 SNA
3.1 Introduction
3.1. The question examined in this chapter is what was the short
run impact, on minimum award wage rate employment, of
the May 2003 Safety Net Adjustment.1 Here short run was
given the precise meaning of the three month period prior to
the survey. We focused on businesses that have at least one
employee paid a minimum award wage rate and therefore the
employment eﬀects reported here do not include the eﬀect on
employment prospects of the 2.5 million workers that received
automatic or discretionary pass on of the 2003 SNA. Thus, the
estimates reported here provide a lower bound on the short run
employment eﬀects of the May 2003 SNA.
3.2. Section 3.2 reports the dates at which the SNA was passed on
into Federal and State awards.
3.3. Our estimates of the aggregate eﬀect on employment of the
May 2003 Safety Net Adjustment together with our estimates
of the short run elasticity of demand for minimum award wage
rate employees with respect to minimum award wage rates are
reported in section 3.3.
3.4. The remainder of the chapter provides a more detailed discus-
sion of how these estimates were obtained.
3.5. Businesses that reported at questions 12a, 13a and 14a that
they have at least one full-time, part-time or casual employee
paid a minimum award wage rate, were then asked whether
their employment levels had increased, stayed the same or de-
creased. Responses are reported in Section 3.4. Depending
on their response, these businesses were then asked about the
eﬀect of the 2003 SNA on their decision to increase, maintain
or decrease the size of their workforce. Firms that reported an
eﬀect were then asked to quantify the size of that eﬀect. The
responses are reported in sections 3.5 to 3.7.
1 All data in this section relates to businesses that have one or more
employees other than the respondent. That is, businesses that reported
yes to q11.
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3.2 Dates at which the May 2003 SNA passed on into Federal
and State Awards
As can be seen from Table 3.2 the Safety Net decision was
passed on to awards in all Þve States with industrial commis-
sions by 1 August 2003.
Table 3.1: Date of State wage case decisions, 2003
State Date
New South Wales 27 May
Victoriaa 1 August
Western Australia 5 June




Note: (a) The Victorian adjustment is due to an AIRC decision
that was made on 25 July and came into eﬀect on 1 August.
The pass an of the SNA to Federal awards was a little slower
than for state awards but even here the bulk of the pass on
was completed by August 2003 and 91 per cent was complete
by the time the survey went into the Þeld in October.





May 34 6 6
June 147 28 34
July 146 28 62
August 61 12 74
September 80 15 89
October 13 2 91
November 20 4 95
December 26 5 100
Total to receive 2003 SNA 527 100 na
Source: Safety Net Adjustments Database, DEWR
Notes: (a) proportion of all awards adjusted for the 2003 SNA
as at 31 December 2003
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3.3 Aggregate eﬀect and estimated short run elasticity of
employment demand with respect to the minimum award
wage rate
3.6. In the three months prior to the survey, just over 14,000 jobs
were lost (or not created) because of the 2003 Safety Net ad-
justment. This represents just under a 0.8 of one per cent
reduction in employment of workers paid a minimum award
wage rate and just over 0.4 of one per cent reduction in em-
ployment of all workers in businesses that employ at least one
person at a minimum wage rate.
3.7. As is shown in Table 3.3 just under half of these (49 per cent)
were full-time jobs and a further 35 per cent were part-time
jobs.
Table 3.3: Estimated eﬀect of the 2003 SNA on the number
of employees
FT PT Casual All
Estimated reduction in employment over past
three months attributable to the 2003 SNA
6847 4893 2320 14061
Memo Item: Estimated number of employees paid
a minumum award wage rate
722131 368630 735442 1826203
Estimated reduction in employment as a percent-
age of the number of employees paid a minimum
award wage rate
0.95 1.33 0.32 0.77
Memo Item: Estimated number of employees in
businesses that pay at least one employee at a
minimum award wage rate
1972281 458084 946218 3376581
Estimated reduction in employment as a percent-
age of all employees in businesses that pay at least
one employee at a minimum award wage rate
0.35 1.07 0.25 0.42
Memo Item: Estimated number of employees in
all small and medium sized businesses
4093667 788100 1812740 6694507
Estimated reduction in employment as a percent-
age of all employees
0.17 0.62 0.13 0.21
3.8. The estimated reduction in employment as a percentage of the
number of employees paid a minimum award wage rate of 0.77
when combined with the fact that award wages increased by
about 4 per cent as a result of the 2003 SNA yields a short run
elasticity of demand for minimum award wage workers with
respect to minimum award wages of about -0.2.2
2 One could quibble about what to use as the wage change in the elas-
49
3.9. Analysis of those businesses that reported an adverse eﬀect of
the SNA on employment shows that the bulk of the eﬀect oc-
curred though loss (or non creation) of minimum award wage
jobs. SpeciÞcally, 94 per cent of casual jobs, 98 per cent of
part-time jobs and 55 per cent of full-time jobs in these busi-
nesses are paid an award wage rate. From this information we
calculate that at least 10,842 of these 14,061 job losses were
minimum wage jobs. Our expectation is that almost all of the
reported job loss relates to minimum wage jobs.
3.4 The direction of employment change
3.10. Firms that we established at questions 12a, 13a and 14a have
at least one employee paid a minimum award wage rate were
asked at question 20 whether their employment levels had in-
creased, stayed the same, or decreased over the past three
months. Their responses are in Table 3.4.
3.11. As expected, the bulk of Þrms did not change their employ-
ment levels over the past three months. Of those Þrms that
changed employment, a larger proportion (19.4 per cent) in-
creased employment than decreased employment (12.4 per cent).
Table 3.4: Number of Þrms by nature of change to workforce
over the past three months
Workforce Number of Firms Proportion of Þrms
with at least one
employee paid a mini-
mum award wage rate
(per cent)
Increased 46133 19.4
Stayed the Same 162464 68.2
Decreased 29512 12.4
Total 238109 100.0
3.5 Businesses that reported an overall increase in
employment levels
3.12. Those businesses that reported an increase in employment lev-
els in the past three months were asked to choose one of four
statements regarding the eﬀect of the May 2003 SNA on their
employment levels. Those statements were:
ticity calculation. We note that for wage changes in the range of 3.08
per cent to 5.13 per cent the elasticity calculated will round to -0.2.
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1. The 2003 Safety Net wage increase had no eﬀect on our
decision to expand our workforce.
2. My business would have expanded its workforce by more
if there had been no Safety Net wage increase in 2003.
3. My business would have expanded its workforce by less
if there had been no Safety Net wage increase in 2003.
4. Dont know.
3.13. The responses to these questions are in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5: Direction of eﬀect on employment of May 2003











1. The 2003 Safety Net wage
increase had no eﬀect on our
decision to expand our work-
force.
43377 94.0
2. My business would have ex-
panded its workforce by more
if there had been no Safety Net
wage increase in 2003.
1422 3.1
3. My business would have ex-
panded its workforce by less if
there had been no Safety Net
wage increase in 2003.
513 1.1
4. Dont know. 821 1.8
Total 46133 100.0
3.14. Businesses that reported an eﬀect of the May 2003 SNA were
asked to quantify by how much. The results are in Table 3.6.
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Table 3.6: Estimated eﬀect on employment of the 2003 SNA,
businesses that increased overall employment
Estimated eﬀect on employment FT PT Casual All
Would have increased by more 1774 828 752 3354
Would have increased by lessa 452 452 452 1355
Net eﬀect 1322 376 300 1999
Note: (a) Numbers in row add to 1355 rather than 1356 because
of rounding.
3.15. We estimate that businesses that expanded employment in the
three months prior to the survey would have created just under
2,000 more jobs if the Safety Net had not been increased. Two
thirds of these jobs would have been full-time.
3.6 Businesses that reported no change in employment
3.16. Businesses that reported no change in employment were also
asked to choose one of the following four statements regarding
the eﬀect of the May 2003 SNA on their employment levels.
1. The 2003 Safety Net wage increase had no eﬀect on our
decision to keep our workforce constant.
2. My business would have expanded its workforce in the
past three months if there had been no Safety Net wage
increase in 2003.
3. My business would have reduced its workforce if there
had been no Safety Net wage increase in 2003.
4. Dont know.
3.17. The responses to these questions are in Table 3.7
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Table 3.7: Direction of eﬀect on employment of May 2003











1. The 2003 Safety Net wage
increase had no eﬀect on my
businesss decision to keep our
workforce constant.
144231 88.8
2. My business would have
expanded its workforce in the
past three months if there had
been no Safety Net wage in-
crease in 2003.
8277 5.1
3. My business would have re-
duced its workforce in the past
three months if there had been
no Safety Net wage increase in
2003.
428 0.3
4. Dont know. 9528 5.9
Total 162464 100.0
3.18. Businesses that reported an eﬀect of the May 2003 SNA were
asked to quantify by how much. The responses are in Table
3.8.
Table 3.8: Estimated eﬀect on employment of the 2003 SNA,
businesses that increased overall employment
Estimated eﬀect on employment FT PT Casual All
Would have increased employment 4207 3301 2020 9528
Would have reduced employment 178 0 0 178
Net eﬀect 4029 3301 2020 9350
3.19. We estimate that Þrms that did not change employment in the
past three months would have employed an additional 9350
people if the Safety Net had not been increased in 2003. Some
43 per cent of these extra jobs would have been full-time and
35 per cent part-time.
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3.7 Businesses that reported a decline in employment
3.20. Businesses that reported a decline in employment were also
asked to choose one of the following four statements regarding
the eﬀect of the May 2003 SNA on their employment levels.
1. The 2003 Safety Net wage increase did not inßuence my
businesss decision to reduce our workforce.
2. If there had been no Safety Net wage increase in 2003
my business would have reduced our workforce by more.
3. The 2003 Safety Net wage increase did inßuence my busi-
nesss decision to reduce our workforce.
4. Dont know.
3.21. The responses to these questions are in Table 3.9
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Table 3.9: Direction of eﬀect on employment of May 2003











1. The 2003 Safety Net wage
increase did not inßuence my
businesss decision to reduce
our workforce.
26669 90.4
2. If there had been no Safety
Net wage increase in 2003 my
business would have reduced
our workforce by more.
0
3. The 2003 Safety Net wage
increase did inßuence my busi-
nesss decision to reduce our
workforce.
2264 7.7
4. Dont know. 579 2.0
Total 29512 100.0
3.22. Businesses that reported an eﬀect of the May 2003 SNA were
asked to quantify by how much. The results are in Table 3.10.
Table 3.10: Estimated eﬀect on employment of the 2003 SNA,
businesses that decreased overall employment
Estimated eﬀect on employment FT PT Casual All
Business would have re-
duced workforce by less if
there was no SNA in 2003
1496 1216 0 2712
Business would have re-
duced workforce by more if
there was no SNA in 2003
0 0 0 0
Net eﬀect 1496 1216 0 2712
3.23. We estimate that if there had been no SNA in 2003, 2,712 jobs
would have been saved in businesses that reduced employment
in the past three months. Just over one half of these jobs would
have been full-time and the remainder part-time.
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4 Estimated eﬀect on employment of not changing
the Safety Net for a period of Þve years
4.1 Introduction
4.1. The issue studied in this chapter is what is the long run impact
on labour demand of the system comprised of minimum award
wage rates and Safety Net adjustments to those wages.1 In
framing the questionnaire to obtain this information we felt
that it was important that:
 The period of time speciÞed should be suﬃciently long
as to allow businesses to adjust their capital stock and
possibly their location. We settled on a period of Þve
years.
 The hypothetical situation put to business involved a
signiÞcant expected change in real minimum award wage
rates, and a signiÞcant expected change in relative wages.
This was necessary in order to ensure that there would
be suﬃcient incentive for Þrms that currently employ no
minimum award wage rate workers to consider employ-
ing such workers. We felt that a hypothetical guarantee
of no change to the Safety Net for a period of Þve years
was the best option to satisfy this requirement.
 That the hypothetical situation put to respondents pro-
duced information on the extent to which the Safety Net
has an adverse employment eﬀect by removing the op-
tion for businesses not to adjust, in poor economic cir-
cumstances, the pay of those workers who are paid an
award wage rate. To fully examine this issue we needed
information on how businesses would adjust the wages of
employees paid an award wage rate in situations where
there was no legal obligation to raise the wages of such
workers. A guarantee of no change to the Safety Net for
a period of Þve years was the main situation that would
generate this information.
1 All data in this section relates to businesses that have one or more
employees other than themself. That is, businesses that reported yes
to q11.
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 That the hypothetical situation put to respondents should
be as free from ambiguity as possible and minimize the
extent to which they had to undertake complex mental
calculations in forming their response. We felt that a
hypothetical guarantee of no change in the Safety Net
the best option to satisfy this requirement, since the ex-
pected change in real minimum award wage rates would
be minus the expected change in inßation, and the ex-
pected change in the relative wage of those paid min-
imum award wage rates would be minus the expected
change in the nominal wage of over award employees.
4.2. Estimates of the eﬀect on aggregate employment, of a guar-
antee that the Safety Net would not be changed for a period
of Þve years, together with estimates of the medium to long
run elasticity of demand for minimum award wage rate work-
ers with respect to minimum award wage rates are reported in
section 4.2.
4.3. Section 4.3 discusses the eﬀect on wage setting of a guarantee
of no change in the Safety Net for Þve years.
4.2 Estimated eﬀect on aggregate employment of a guarantee
of no change in the Safety Net for a period of Þve years
4.4. Businesses that at question 11 were identiÞed as having at
least one employee were asked at question 24a which of a list
of Þve statements best described the eﬀect on their business
of a guarantee of no increase in the Safety Net for Þve years.
The statements and the responses are reported in Table 4.1.
Some 81.7 per cent of businesses reported that they would not
change employment decisions in response to a guarantee of no
change to the Safety Net for a period of Þve years. While
11.8 per cent of businesses reported that they would increase
employment, 2.5 per cent said they would not decrease employ-
ment by as much as they otherwise would have done. Just 0.3
of one per cent of businesses reported that they would reduce
employment in response to such a guarantee.
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Table 4.1: Estimated eﬀect on employment of a guarantee not
to change the Safety Net for Þve years









1. My business would put on
additional employees
68964 11.8
2. My business would not re-
duce its workforce by as much
as it would have otherwise
done
14551 2.5
3. My business would not
change the number of people
it employs
478625 81.7
4. My business would reduce
the number of people it em-
ploys
1627 0.3
5. Dont know 21710 3.7
Total 585476 100.0
4.5. Those businesses that indicated that they would change em-
ployment in response to a guarantee not to change the Safety
Net were asked to say by how much for each of the categories
of full-time part-time and casual employees. The results are
reported in Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2: Estimated eﬀect on employment of a guarantee not
to change the Safety Net for Þve years
Employment response FT PT Casual All
Put on additional employees 95792 39460 60217 195469
Reduce workforce by less 11128 3058 3959 18145
Reduce workforce by more 172 58 116 346
Net eﬀect 106748 42460 64060 213268
Memo Item: Number of work-
ers paid a minimum award
wage rate
722131 368630 735442 1826203
Employment eﬀect as a per-
cent of all minimum award
wage rate employees
14.78 11.52 8.71 11.68
Implied elasticity -1.14 -0.89 -0.67 -0.90
Memo item: Total employ-
ment
4093667 788100 1812740 6694507
Employment eﬀect as a per-
cent of all employees
2.61 5.39 3.53 3.19
Implied elasticity -0.20 -0.41 -0.27 -0.25
4.6. In chapter 2 we found that the bulk of businesses currently
do not have employees paid at a minimum award wage rate.
The magnitude of the employment response to a reduction in
real minimum award wage rates therefore depends on whether
such businesses will respond by employing minimum award
wage rate employees. Table 4.3 sheds light on this issue and
shows that about 8.7 per cent of businesses that currently do
not have any employees paid at a minimum award wage rate
would respond to a guarantee of no change in the Safety Net
for a period of Þve years by employing workers at the mini-
mum award wage rate. By way of comparison 16.3 per cent of
businesses that currently have at least one worker paid a mini-
mum award wage rate would hire additional employees (or not
dismiss existing employees) in response to such a guarantee.
4.7. Businesses that currently have at least one minimum award
wage rate employee account for 64.8 per cent of the jobs that
would be created or saved though a guarantee not to change
the Safety Net for a period of Þve years. See Table 4.4. The
bulk of these (59.2 per cent) involve job creation, and 5.8 per
cent the saving of jobs. Businesses that currently do not have
minimum award wage rate employees would account for the
other 35.2 per cent of jobs that are created or saved though
such a policy. Again the bulk of these are jobs that are created
rather than saved.
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Table 4.3: Response to a guarantee not to change the Safety
Net for a period of Þve years, cross tabulated by whether
the business currently has any minimum wage rate employ-








Number Per cent Number Per cent
1. My business would
put on additional em-
ployees
30147 8.7 38817 16.3
2. My business would
not reduce its work-
force by as much as it
would have otherwise
done
6910 2.0 7640 3.2
3. My business would
not change the number
of people it employs
297004 85.5 181621 76.3
4. My business would
reduce the number of
people it employs
95 0.0 1531 0.6
5. Dont know 13211 3.8 8499 3.6
Total 347367 100.0 238108 100.0
4.8. A guarantee of no change in the Safety Net for a period of
Þve years would also save some jobs in Þrms that currently
do not have minimum award wage rate employees. This situ-
ation arises where, without such a guarantee, an over award
employee would experience suﬃciently slow wage growth for
the minimum award wage rate to become binding and result
in job loss. We estimate that 2.7 per cent of the total employ-
ment eﬀect from a guarantee of no change in the Safety Net
would be attributable to this eﬀect.
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Table 4.4: Response to a guarantee of no change in the Safety
Net for a period of Þve years, cross tabulated by whether the
business currently has minimum award wage rate employees,








Number Per cent Number Per cent
1. My business would
put on additional em-
ployees
69350 32.5 126119 59.2
2. My business would
not reduce its work-
force by as much as it
would have otherwise
done
5750 2.7 12394 5.8
4. My business would
reduce the number of
people it employs
78 0.0 346 0.2
Total 75022 35.2 138167 64.8
4.3 Eﬀect on wage setting for those currently on minimum
award wage rates of a guarantee of no change to the
Safety Net for a period of Þve years
4.9. A guarantee of no change in the Safety Net for a period of
Þve years, would have a signiÞcant eﬀect on how wages are set
for workers that are employed at a minimum award wage rate.
An important question for evaluating the equity eﬀects of such
a policy is whether businesses would begin to pay overaward
wages for some workers who are currently paid a minimum
award wage rate. In order to gather information on this we
asked the following question of those businesses that said they
would change employment levels if there was a guarantee of
no change in the Safety Net for Þve years.
Q24f. : Which of the following statements best describes the di-
rect eﬀect that such a guarantee would have on how your
business adjusts the pay of employees who are currently
paid a wage exactly equal to the award rate of pay?
4.10. The responses are in Table 4.5, and show that if a guarantee of
no change in the Safety Net for a period of Þve years were to
be made, only 8.7 per cent of these businesses would make no
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adjustment to the wages of employees currently paid minimum
award wage rates. The remaining 91.3 per cent of businesses
would provide its employees with some wage adjustment. It is
reasonable to interpret the detailed responses of this 91.3 per
cent of businesses as indicating the dominant practice that
they would follow in setting the pay of these employees.
4.11. Some 9.7 per cent of businesses would adjust the wages of min-
imum award wage rate employees by less than the percentage
increase in the CPI.
Table 4.5: Response to a guarantee of no change in the Safety
Net for a period of Þve years, cross tabulated by whether the
business currently has minimum award wage rate employees,
number of businesses
Number Per cent
1. My business would not adjust the wages
of any of these employees in line with in-
ßation
4182 8.7
2. My business would provide some of
these employees with wage increases but
at a rate less than the rate of inßation
4673 9.7
3. My business would provide some of
these employees with wage increase equal
to the rate of inßation
18386 38.3
4. My business would provide some of
these employees with wage increase greater
than the rate of inßation but less than the
percentage increase over award employees
receive
4092 8.5
5. My business would provide employees
currently on award rates of pay with the
same percentage increase in wages as over-
award employees
9049 18.9
Dont know 7609 15.9
Total 47991 100.0
4.12. That is, under such a guarantee of no change in the Safety
Net, the bulk of business would, on average, adjust, to at
least compensate for inßation, the pay of some workers hired
at a minimum award wage rate. More than one-third (38.3
per cent) of these businesses said they would provide wage
increases that fully adjusted wages for inßation.
4.13. A further 8.5 per cent of businesses said that, under a guaran-
tee of no change in the Safety Net they would provide employ-
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ees hired at an award wage rate with wage increases between
the rate of inßation and the rate of wage increase given over
award employees.
4.14. Some 18.9 per cent of businesses said that they would provide
the same percentage wage increase as they give to over award
employees.
4.15. These results, although anticipated by us, may well seem counter
intuitive to some, and thus need some explanation and discus-
sion to establish that it is consistent with economic theory.
The Safety Net places a ßoor on the wages that a Þrm can pay
certain workers. When deciding whether to hire such workers,
the Þrm weighs up if the expected beneÞts exceed the wage by
an amount that is suﬃcient to cover the Þxed cost of hiring and
the expected cost of retrenchment.2 The Safety Net removes
the option for the Þrm not to make wage increases in bad times
and thus increases the probability that the worker will be re-
trenched in the future. This has two eﬀects on the Þrms cost
beneÞt calculation regarding hiring. First, it shortens the ex-
pected period of time that the worker will be employed by the
Þrm and thus reduces the expected stream of beneÞts to the
Þrm from hiring the worker. Second, it increases the expected
cost to the Þrm of retrenchment because it increases the prob-
ability of retrenchment. Thus, it is rational for businesses to
say that they will hire additional employees in response to a
guarantee of no change in the Safety Net for a period of Þve
years even though, on average, they would give those newly
hired workers the same percentage wage increase as aﬀorded
to over award employees. As can be seen from Table 4.5 this
eﬀect is quantitatively important.
4.16. In summary the imposition of a Safety Net increases the ex-
pected costs of businesses without necessarily increasing the
wage received by employees. For employees at Þrms aﬀected
in this way, the Safety Net then provides a lottery. Those that
remain employed have a wage security, but it comes at the cost
of an increased probability of being retrenched which operates
as a force to reduce income security for low paid workers as a
group.
2 Retrenchment cost should be understood to include the disruption to
work teams, adverse eﬀects on morale and loss of goodwill. Expected
costs of retrenchment will vary with the size of the business because
smaller Þrms may be exempt from legislative provisions regarding pay-
outs in the event of retrenchment.
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5 Estimated eﬀect of SNAs on employment by
Þrms that currently have one employee
5.1 Introduction
5.1. We estimate that some 189,599 businesses have no employee
other than the respondent. This represents 24.5 per cent of
all small and medium sized businesses. These businesses are
of interest in this study for three main reasons.
5.2. First they may contain some businesses that previously were
employers, section 5.2 sets out the evidence on this.
5.3. Second, some of these businesses may have ceased being em-
ployers because previous Safety Net adjustments had increased
their labour costs to an unsustainable level. Evidence on the
extent to which this is the case is provided in section 5.3.
5.4. Third, under a guarantee of no change in the Safety Net for
a period of Þve years some of these businesses may choose
to become employers. Section 5.4 provides evidence on these
employment eﬀects.
5.2 Past employment by Þrms that currently have one
employee
5.5. Just under 40 per cent of businesses that currently have one
employee had more than one employee at some stage in the
past. See Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Whether or not business has previously had more
than one employee, number of businesses
Business has: Number Per cent
Previously had more than one employee 75534 39.8
Only had one employee 114065 60.2
Total 189599 100.0
5.6. Business that had previously had employees were asked what
was the maximum number of people they had employed. The
modal response was two but the maximum number of employ-
ees ranged up to 18. See Table 5.2.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Number 13236 18122 16531 8761 910 4269 4721




8 9 10 11 12 15 18
Number 5926 767 347 1506 364 37 37
Per cent 7.8 1.0 0.5 2.0 0.5 0.0 0.0
Note: The total number of businesses is 75,534.
5.7. Businesses that previously had employees were asked what was
the year in which the maximum number of staﬀwere employed.
The responses are in Table 5.3 where it can be seen that the
largest mode was at 2002.
Table 5.3: Frequency histogram of year in which business had
maximum number of employees, number of businesses
Year in which business had maximum
number of employees
Number Per cent















Dont know 1043 1.4
Total 75534 100.0
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5.3 Extent to which previous SNAs were a factor in the Þrm
reducing employment
5.8. To Þnd out whether previous SNA adjustments had been a
factor in these businesss decision to reduce employment we
asked the following question.
Q28. : Which one of the following best describes the extent to
which previous Safety Net wage increases were a factor
in your businesss decision to reduce the number of em-
ployees.
5.9. The responses which are summarised in Table 5.4 lead us to es-
timate that previous Safety Net adjustments had played some
role in 75,103 job losses in Þrms that currently have one em-
ployee and played a major role in 23,589 of those job losses.
Table 5.4: Eﬀect of previous Safety Net adjustments on the
businesss decision to reduce employment
Businesses Employment loss
Number Per cent Persons Per cent
A major inßuence 5934 7.9 23589 8.5
A moderate inßuence 8684 11.5 25741 9.3
A minor inßuence 5952 7.9 25773 9.3
Not an inßuence 54964 72.8 202161 72.9
Total 75534 100.0 277264 100.0
5.4 Eﬀect on future employment intentions of a guarantee not
to change the Safety Net for a period of Þve years
5.10. Businesses that currently have one employee were asked how
likely they are to hire in the future. As shown in Table 5.5,
19.7 per cent responded that they are either very likely or
somewhat likely to hire in the future.
Table 5.5: How likely businesses that currently have one em-
ployee are to hire in the future
Number Per cent
Very likely 16616 8.8
Somewhat likely 20670 10.9
Unlikely 142264 75.0
Dont know 10050 5.3
Total 189599 100.0
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5.11. We then asked businesses that currently have one employee
whether a guarantee of no change in the Safety Net for a period
of Þve years would make them more or less likely to hire in the
future. As shown in Table 5.6, 10.7 per cent of businesses said
that such a guarantee would increase the prospect that they
would hire in the future. Just 0.3 of one per cent of businesses
said that such a guarantee would make them less likely to hire.
Table 5.6: Eﬀect of a guarantee not to change the Safety Net
for a period of Þve years on the prospect that businesses cur-
rently with one employee would hire in the future
Number Per cent
Much more likely to employ in the future 4852 2.6
Somewhat more likely to employ in the fu-
ture
15318 8.1
Would not change my decision about fu-
ture hiring
167727 88.5
Would be less likely to employ in the future 506 0.3
Dont know 1196 0.6
Total 189599 100.0
5.12. Businesses that said a guarantee of no change in the Safety Net
for a period of Þve years would inßuence their hiring decisions
were asked to say by how much. The results which are in Ta-
ble 5.7 indicate that they would hire about 32,026 employees.
In contrast to businesses with employees, businesses currently
with one employee would be more likely to hire casual workers
than full-time or part-time employees.
Table 5.7: Estimated eﬀect on employment of a guarantee not
to change the Safety Net for a period of Þve years, businesses
that currently have no employees
Estimated eﬀect on employment FT PT Casual All





6 An economic framework for understanding the
eﬀects of the Safety Net on employment
6.1 Introduction
6.1. This chapter is concerned with the task of setting out the
relevant economic theory that guided our analysis.
6.2. A natural starting point is the perfectly competitive model
without frictions and uncertainty which is discussed brießy
in section 6.2. Although this model is reasonably well known
there are some aspects of it that are less well known but which
turn out to be empirically important and thus warrant some
discussion.
6.3. The perfect competitive model is a useful starting point, but
we also need to consider what the eﬀects would be in situa-
tions where the operation of the economy departs from perfect
competition. We consider four such models.
6.4. The Þrst of these is an extension to the perfectly competitive
model. It is described in section 6.3 and relates to the case
where businesses face Þxed costs of hiring and Þring workers,
and are subject to random shocks that aﬀect either the demand
for their product or their production technologies. This model
has not to our knowledge been discussed previously in the
minimum wage literature but we feel it warrants discussion
for two main reasons. First, it is a natural, and arguably
more realistic, extension to the perfectly competitive model.
Second, it provides an additional prediction that turns out to
be empirically relevant in the data analysed for this report.
6.5. The second model considered has long been regarded as a the-
oretical curiosity. It is mentioned here because it was advanced
by Card & Kruger (1995) as an explanation of the results that
they Þnd in their studies. This model which involves the hy-
pothesis that Þrms are monopsonistic is set out in section 6.4.
6.6. Section 6.5 sets out the standard labour search model. This
model provides an explanation as to why it is that, in some
countries, the interaction between the tax and welfare system
on the one hand and the minimum wage on the other results
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in a minimum wage that has only a small eﬀect on employ-
ment, while in other countries the interaction is such that the
employment eﬀect is large.
6.7. The fourth model we consider relaxes the implicit assumption
in the competitive model that the eﬀort supplied by workers is
not inßuenced by the wage paid. This model which in the lit-
erature is given the rather unattractive and slightly misleading
name of the eﬃciency wage model is set out in section 6.6.
6.8. The various models are put together in a stylized framework
in section 6.7.
6.2 The eﬀects of wages ßoors on employment in a perfectly
competitive world with no frictions or uncertainty
6.9. The predictions of economic theory regarding the eﬀects of
minimum wages in a perfectly competitive world without fric-
tions and uncertainty are well known and are found in standard
intermediate microeconomics textbooks.
6.10. In the competitive model an increase in the minimum wage
causes the wages of those low paid workers whose wage was
below the previous minimum to rise. This causes Þrms to
substitute away from low skilled workers towards higher skilled
workers and capital.
6.11. An auxiliary assumption that is frequently made in economic
analysis is that some of both high skilled and low skilled labour
must be used in production.1 This assumption is implicit in
most of the standard production functions used in the em-
pirical literature such as the constant ratio elasticity of sub-
stitution homothetic (CRESH) production function and all of
its special cases such as the constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) and Cobb-Douglas production function.
6.12. It should be obvious that this auxiliary assumption is highly
problematic since there is some level of the minimum wage at
1 Technically, this assumption is imposed whenever the analysis uses a
production function that involves the assumption that the marginal
product of the Þrst increment in unskilled labour is inÞnite. This as-
sumption occurs when ever the production function F (Lus, Ls,K) is
such that lim
Lus&0
F (Lus, Ls,K) = ∞, where (Lus, Ls) are hours of un-
skilled and skilled labour respectively and K is the capital stock. The
assumption is implicity made in production functions that aggregate
skilled and unskilled labour and it is also made implicitly in models
that work with either the logarithm of unskilled labour input or that
raise the unskilled labour input to a negative power. In short, the
assumption is widely used.
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which businesses will stop using low skilled labour and thus
stop paying the minimum wage. Thus, variations in the mini-
mum wage will have two eﬀects. The Þrst of these is to cause
some Þrms to vary their decision as to whether or not to use
low skilled labour. The second is to cause Þrms that use low
skilled labour to vary the intensity with which they combine
that labour with other inputs. Empirical analysis that, by
their choice of production function, makes the implicit assump-
tion that both low skill and high skill labour are essential in
production, measure the second of these eﬀects, albeit imper-
fectly and with a bias towards underestimation of the eﬀect.
But they completely neglect to measure the Þrst eﬀect.
6.13. One indication of the empirical relevance of this considera-
tion is provided by the proportion of businesses that have no
employees on the minimum wage; see section 2.2 page 30 for
estimates of that proportion. Another indication of the empir-
ical relevance of this eﬀect is the proportion of businesses that
currently do not have employees paid the minimum wage but
who report that in response to a guarantee of no change to
the Safety Net they would take on additional employees; see
section 4.2 page 58 for estimates of this proportion.
6.3 The eﬀect of minimum wages in the presence of
uncertainty and Þxed hiring and Þring costs
6.14. The minimum wage places a ßoor on the wage that a Þrm can
pay certain workers. In the standard neoclassical model with-
out uncertainty or any Þxed costs of hiring and Þring workers
the result of imposing a minimum wage is a lower level of em-
ployment of low skilled workers. But those low skilled workers
who remain employed gain a higher wage and the welfare ef-
fects of raising the minimum wage depend, in part, on whether
the increase in income for those who remain in jobs is greater
than the loss of income of those who become unemployed.
6.15. In reality things are not as smooth as assumed in the per-
fectly competitive model. Most importantly, Þrms typically
incur Þxed costs when seeking to vary the number of people
employed. Hiring costs are one source of these Þxed costs and
Þring or retrenchment costs are another source. Thus when
deciding whether to hire such workers the Þrm must weigh up
whether the expected beneÞts exceed the wage by an amount
that is suﬃcient to cover the Þxed cost of hiring and the ex-
pected cost of retrenchment if economic circumstances prove
to be adverse. Imposition of a minimum wage removes the op-
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tion for the Þrm not to make wage increases in bad times and
thus increases the probability that a low skilled worker will be
retrenched in the future. This has two eﬀects on the Þrms
cost beneÞt calculation regarding hiring. First, it shortens the
expected period of time that the worker will be employed by
the Þrm and thus reduces the expected stream of beneÞts to
the Þrm from hiring the worker. Second, it increases the ex-
pected cost to the Þrm of retrenchment because it increases
the probability of retrenchment.
6.16. For employees at Þrms aﬀected in this way the minimum wage
then provides a lottery. Those that remain employed have
an increased wage and reduced ßuctuations in their wage but
it comes at the cost of an increased probability of being re-
trenched which operates as a force to reduce income security
for low skilled workers as a group.
6.17. The extension of the perfectly competitive model just described
yields the prediction that if the minimum wage is lowered and
it is guaranteed that the lower minimum will stand for a pe-
riod of time then, there will be a number of businesses that
are willing to hire workers at the old minimum wage. Thus,
unlike the perfectly competitive model, this model does not
require the wage paid to low skilled workers to fall in order for
there to be an employment gain. The reason for this is that
the lowering of the minimum wage increases the scope for the
business to allow the real wage to fall by holding the nominal
wage Þxed should adverse circumstances eventuate in the fu-
ture. Thus lowering the minimum wage confers an increased
option value on the Þrm and this beneÞt explains why some
Þrms will be willing to employ more workers at a wage that is
equal to the old minimum wage.
6.18. Thus, for example, this model predicts that a guaranteed of no
change in the level of the minimum wage may cause a signif-
icant increase in employment without there necessarily being
a large fall in the wage paid to low skilled workers. Evidence
on the empirical relevance of this theory is provided in section
4.3 page 62.
6.19. This eﬀect operates in addition to the standard substitution
eﬀect that is captured in most econometric studies. Neglect of




6.20. In the perfectly competitive model the quantity of labour de-
manded by the Þrm does not aﬀect the wage at which that
labour is available. Monopsony is the situation where this as-
sumption does not hold and the wage paid by the Þrm depends
on the quantity of labour it uses. In this situation the proÞt
maximizing Þrm takes into account the eﬀect on the wage of
using more labour and optimally chooses to use less labour
than in the competitive case.2
6.21. In this situation the imposition of a legislated minimum wage
means that the Þrm is faced with a situation whereby, while
the minimum wage is binding, increased use of low skill labour
does not aﬀect the wage paid. Thus in this case imposition of
a minimum wage can increase the quantity of low skill labour
that is used by the Þrm.
6.22. How plausible is the monopsony story? Well, the monopsonist
earns above normal proÞts so unless it can prevent the entry
of another business into its market it will ultimately be forced
to compete for labour with new entrants. In the long run
such entry would result in a situation approximating perfect
competition. For the small and medium sized business sector
such entry is likely to be a powerful force acting to eliminate
monopsony.
6.23. Because the monopsony story has been advanced by Card &
Kruger (1995) we designed the questionnaire so that it would
elicit evidence of monopsony if it existed. For example, we
allowed businesses the opportunity to say that the May 2003
SNA saved jobs as would be the case if they were monopson-
ists. We also allowed businesses to respond that not adjusting
the safety net would cost jobs as would be the case if the
business were a monopsonist. Since monopsony is not prohib-
ited they had no reason not to report this eﬀect if it existed.
When we asked about factors that aﬀect wage setting we also
allowed businesses the opportunity to report that monopsony
existed. They could do this by rating the following items as
unimportant in wage setting
 The wage competitors are paying comparable employees;
 The wage necessary to attract high quality employees;
2 It is sometimes asserted that the fact that Þrms set wages is an indica-
tion of monoposony power on the part of Þrms. Such logic, if applied
to business, would brand the local lolly store a monopolist because it
sets the price at which its lollies are oﬀered to the customers.
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 The wage necessary to retain good employees and reduce
turnover.
6.24. However, businesses rated all of these as very or somewhat
important suggesting that monopsony is not a major feature
of the Australian labour market. See section 2.6 page 43.
6.5 Labour search models
6.25. In the perfectly competitive model and its extension consid-
ered in section 6.3, wages are assumed to adjust instanta-
neously to clear the market. This is an unsatisfactory assump-
tion. A more realistic description of the labour market recog-
nizes that Þrms search for workers and that the unemployed
search for jobs.
6.26. Search models capture these features of the labour market.
The search model introduces the notion of the reservation
wage. That is, the wage below which it is not optimal for
an unemployed person to accept a job oﬀer. The reservation
wage is determined by the interaction between the workers
preferences for labour and leisure with the tax and welfare
system. This interaction is important because the tax and
welfare system may result in the reservation wage being above
the minimum wage. This has three main implications.
6.27. First, most econometric studies do not attempt to sort out the
eﬀects of the minimum wage from the eﬀects of the reservation
wage on employment outcomes. Again this means that in sit-
uations where the reservation wage is near the minimum wage
econometric studies are likely to underestimate the eﬀects on
employment of variations in the minimum wage. One of the
advantages of the survey based approach taken in this report
is that it is not compromised by the interaction of the mini-
mum wage with the reservation wage and therefore identiÞes
the eﬀect on labour demand of a guarantee not to increase the
minimum wage for a period of Þve years.
6.28. The second implication is that for this increased quantity of
labour demand to be translated into employment it is neces-
sary for the wage paid to be above the reservation wage. Thus
depending on the level of the reservation wage it may be nec-
essary to adjust labour tax and welfare beneÞts in order to
ensure that the increase in the quantity of labour demanded
actually turns into an increase in employment.
6.29. The third implication is that studies of the employment eﬀects
of minimum wages are not immediately transferable between
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countries because the estimated eﬀects will depend in part on
the interaction of the tax and welfare system with the min-
imum wage. Thus the studies conclusions would need to be
adjusted to take into account these diﬀerences.
6.30. We note that little research has been undertaken on how to
adapt search models to Þt the institutional features of the
Australian labour market.3
6.6 Eﬃciency wage model
6.31. In the perfectly competitive model and in the search model
the eﬀort supplied by workers is assumed not to depend on the
wage paid. The assumption made in the competitive model is
that Þrms can costlessly monitor the eﬀort supplied by workers
and can costlessly write and enforce contracts that ensure the
required level of eﬀort is supplied. There are many instances
where this assumption is implausible.
6.32. Eﬃciency wage models explicitly allow for instances where
monitoring and contracting over the level of eﬀort is costly.
In these cases the eﬀort supplied by workers depends on the
wage rate that is paid. In this setup Þrms choose a wage that
results in the employee providing the optimal, for the Þrm,
level of eﬀort. This eﬃciency wage may be above or below
the minimum wage. If it is above the minimum wage then
small changes in the minimum wage would have no eﬀect on
employment outcomes. Here it should be remarked that this is
not because the Þrms demand for labour is inelastic, although
one would reach this conclusion from econometric studies that
did not make allowance for eﬃciency wage eﬀects. As with the
situation in the search model, if the eﬃciency wage is above
the minimum wage, this may indicate that adjustment of the
tax and welfare system, which also inßuences the level of the
eﬃciency wage, may be required in order to realize the em-
ployment eﬀects from adjusting the minimum wage.
6.33. Eﬃciency wage theories can suggest, depending on their exact
formulation, that businesses will voluntarily pass-on increases
in minimum wages to some employees paid more than the min-
imum wage. Within the eﬃciency wage model the Þrms mo-
tivation for doing this would be to encourage eﬀort from those
employees paid more than the minimum wage. To the extent
3 Don Hardings Intermediate Macroeconomics lecture notes on search
unemployment set out a basic model that includes the interaction be-
tween minimum wages and the tax and transfer system. The lecture
notes are available from the authors on request.
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that this eﬀect is present it will mean that increases in min-
imum wages will have more widespread implications for em-
ployment than is the case in the perfectly competitive model
of the labour market.4
6.34. In the survey we asked businesses whether it was important
in setting wages to take into account the eﬀect that the wage
had in motivating employees. Some 50.2 per cent of busi-
nesses responded that this consideration was very important;
a response that they would not make if the labour market was
characterised by perfect competition.
6.7 Combining the models to provide a stylized representation
of wage ßoors
6.35. The modern theory of the labour market can be interpreted as
viewing employment in a business as determined by the inter-
action of the businesses labour demand with the maximum of
four wage ßoors. These wage ßoors are discussed below.
Sources and implications of wage ßoors
6.36. The Þrst case is the neoclassical model where the wage ßoor
is the wage necessary to retain good employees and to attract
employees from other businesses. This wage ßoor, which is
set through competition with other businesses for labour, de-
termines both the wage paid and the businesses employment.
Figure 6.1 shows a stylized representation of this case for an
individual business. Here, small changes in the level of the
other wage ßoors do not inßuence either the wage paid or the
level of employment. If the other three wage ßoors are not
binding in any of the other businesses with which this busi-
ness competes for labour then that particular labour market
is well approximated by the neoclassical model. Notice that
in this case a business answering Q24a would respond that a
guarantee of no change in the safety net for a period of Þve
years would have no eﬀect on their employment of labour.
6.37. For future reference we note that the aggregate labour demand
for an industry is obtained by taking the labour demand curves
for each business and summing horizontally over all the busi-
nesses. By summing horizontally we mean that a given wage
is chosen and the labour demand for each business is obtained
4 Don Hardings Intermediate Macroeconomics lecture notes on the eﬃ-
ciency wage model set out a basic eﬃciency wage model that includes
the interaction between eﬃciency wages and the tax and transfer sys-
tem. The lecture notes are available from the authors on request.
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Figure 6.1: Neoclassical model where the wage is determined
through competition for employees with other businesses
Real wage
Employment
Maximum of real 
minimum award 















at that wage. The sum, over all businesses in the particular
labour market, of all these individual labour demands, at that
wage, yields a point on the aggregate labour demand curve.
The process is repeated for diﬀerent wage rates until the com-
plete aggregate labour demand curve is obtained.
6.38. In Figure 6.1 there are three other wage ßoors that are referred
to. These comprise,
 The wage ßoor set by the Safety Net for the particular
industry or occupation. We refer to this as the mini-
mum award wage rate.
 The eﬃciency wage.
 The reservation wage.
6.39. The second case is where the wage set by the Safety Net is
currently above the maximum of the other wage ßoors and
would remain in that position even if the Safety Net was not
increased for Þve years. This case is shown in Figure 6.2.
Businesses in this situation are those that would respond at
Q24a that they would hire additional employees if a guarantee
were given that the Safety Net would not be adjusted for a
period of Þve years and would respond at Q24f that they would
not give these new employees a wage increase over the next Þve
years.
6.40. The third case is where the wage set by the Safety Net is cur-
rently above the eﬃciency wage but after the Safety Net was
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Figure 6.2: Case where minimum wage would remain the bind-
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scenario of no safety net 
adjustment for five years
held constant for Þve years the eﬃciency wage would become
binding. This case is illustrated in Figure 6.3. Businesses in
this situation would respond at Q24a that they would hire ad-
ditional employees if a guarantee were given that the Safety
Net would not be adjusted for a period of Þve years but would
respond at Q24f that they would give these new employees
wage increases over the next Þve years. These wage increases
would come into play when the eﬃciency wage became bind-
ing.
6.41. The fourth case to consider is where the eﬃciency wage is
the binding ßoor that determines the businesses employment.
This case is shown in Figure 6.4. In this situation the business
will respond at Q24a that under a guarantee of no change in
the Safety Net they would not hire any additional employees
because the wage set by the Safety Net is not the binding
constraint that prevents their business from employing more
people.
Monopsony
6.42. Monopsony arises where the wage paid by the business varies
with the quantity of labour it uses. This is shown in Fig-
ure 6.5 by an upward sloping labour supply curve. Thus, the
monopsony case is very diﬀerent to the other cases illustrated
in Figures 6.1 to 6.4 where the wage paid by the business does
not depend on the quantity of labour used by the business. In
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Figure 6.3: Case where the wage set by the Safety Net is
binding now but after Þve years of no change in the Safety
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Figure 6.4: Case where eﬃciency wage is currently binding
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the monopsony case the labour supply curve is upward sloping
for two reasons only. The Þrst reason is that the labour force
in that market has diﬀerent reservation wages. The second
reason is that for each member of the labour force the wage
required to obtain an additional unit of labour is increasing
in the quantity of labour supplied. This reßects the standard
assumption made in all analysis of the labour market that the
marginal disutility of labour is non decreasing. The labour
supply curve is the horizontal sum of the labour supply curves
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6.43. Under monopsony the fact that the labour supply curve is up-
ward sloping means that each time the monopsonist hires an
additional worker the higher wage must be paid to all of the
existing employees. Thus the monopsonists marginal expen-
diture on labour is always above its average expenditure on
labour as measured by the labour supply curve. The monop-
sonists labour demand curve is equal to the value of the mar-
ginal product of labour. The monopsonist optimally chooses
the level of employment that maximizes its proÞts. This oc-
curs where the monopsonists marginal expenditure on labour
is equal to the value of the marginal product of labour. The
wage paid by the monopsonist is then obtained from the labour
supply curve faced by the monopsonist. The monopsonist ob-
tains a proÞt that is equal to the product of the diﬀerence
between the value of the marginal product of labour and the
wage paid with the monopsonists employment. Such proÞts
would in the normal course of events attract other businesses
to enter, to compete for labour with the monopsonist. If entry
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is completely unrestricted then it will drive the wage up to
the competitive wage where the labour demand curve inter-




7 The Survey and its analysis
7.1 Introduction
7.1. The questions that provide the data for this report were in-
cluded in a quarterly survey of small and medium sized busi-
ness. This survey is brießy described in section.7.2.
7.2. Because this is a survey funded by the Commonwealth, ap-
proval must be obtained from the Commonwealth Government
Statistical Clearing House. The approval number for this sur-
vey is 01438-02.
7.3. Details of the design of the survey instrument are in section
7.3.
7.4. Information on the administration of the survey instrument are
provided in section 7.4. Evidence from the survey that sheds
light on the quality of the survey instrument is presented in
this section which also contains a discussion of the response
rate and the estimation strategies adopted to deal with the
issue of non response.
7.5. Information on the cleaning, coding and analysis of the data
is provided in section 7.5. The statistical methods used to
analyse the survey are introduced and discussed in section 7.6.
7.6. Estimates of some important population characteristics are
presented in section 7.7.
7.7. The model based approach to estimation which is used in parts
of the report is explained in section 7.8.
7.2 The survey of small and medium sized business
7.8. This survey started in 1993 as a survey of small business which
are deÞned as businesses with 19 or fewer full-time employees.
7.9. In November 2000 the coverage of the survey was expanded
to include medium sized businesses which are deÞned as busi-
nesses with fewer than 200 full-time employees. At the same
time the regional and industry coverage of the survey was en-
hanced. These changes made the survey one of the most com-
prehensive of the quarterly surveys of Australian business. Be-
cause the survey is on-going it means that the results obtained
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are replicable in the sense that the survey instrument can be
re-administered at some point in the future within the same
broad survey structure.
7.10. The primary respondent is a person chosen by the business
who can speak authoritatively about all aspects of the busi-
nesses operations. Where feasible a secondary respondent is
nominated by the business as someone who can speak author-
itatively for the business should the primary respondent be
unavailable.
7.11. The panel is structured as follows:
 Size There are 1200 small businesses (i.e. businesses
with 19 or fewer full-time employees) and 600 medium
sized businesses (i.e. businesses with 20 to 200 full-time
employees).
 Region The regional structure is summarized in Table
7.1
 Industry The industry structure is summarized in Ta-
ble 7.2.
7.12. When one business leaves the panel a business of similar size
from the same industry and region is recruited into the panel.
Table 7.1: Regional structure of sample
Metropolitan Non-Metropolitan Total
New South Wales 240 60 300
Victoria 240 60 300
Queensland 165 135 300
South Australia 195 30 225
Western Australia 195 30 225
Tasmania 90 60 150
Northern Territory 90 60 150
ACT 150 0 150
Total 1365 435 1800
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Building and Construction E 250
Wholesale Trade F 150
Retail Trade G 250
Accomodation, Cafes and Restu-
rants
H 100
Transport and Storage I 150




Health and Community Services O 150




7.3 Design of the survey instrument
7.13. The survey instrument was designed in consultation with DEWR,
Sensis and Sweeney Research The consultation with DEWR
was designed Þrstly to ensure that the questionnaire would
produce information that could be used to address the ques-
tions regarding the eﬀects on employment and wage setting of
annual Safety Net adjustments to minimum award wage rates.
SpeciÞcally, we used screening questions so as to remove the
possibility of a question being seen as leading. In no case was a
respondent asked to quantify or describe an eﬀect until it had
been established, by the respondent, that the eﬀect existed.
7.14. Screening questions regarding the eﬀect on employment of the
annual SNAs were designed to start from a neutral perspec-
tive in which SNAs could have a positive eﬀect, no eﬀect or a
negative eﬀect on employment. Only after the direction of the
eﬀect was established was the business asked to quantify the
magnitude of the eﬀect.
7.15. The survey was piloted on seven Þrms in metropolitan New
South Wales. The pilot provided less help than usual in Þne
tuning the design of the survey because the bulk of Þrms con-
tacted proved to either have no minimum award wage rate
employees or so few such employees that they did not move
beyond the screening questions in the survey. When the survey
results came back we discovered why this occurred  there are
far fewer businesses with minimum award wage rate employees
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in metropolitan NSW than in any of the other States, or than
in non-metropolitan NSW.
7.16. This was a potential problem since, when designing closed
ended questions, it is important that:
 The wording of the question makes sense to the respon-
dent and seeks information that the respondent can rea-
sonably be expected to possess;
 The range of responses allowed encompass the responses
that the typical respondent is likely to provide. That is
one does not wish to omit valid responses; and
 The range of questions asked cover the relevant issues
that the respondent would canvass in a longer more con-
versational interview.
7.17. We addressed these issues in the following way.
7.18. First, we consulted extensively with both Sweeny Research
and Sensis to ensure that the wording of the question made
sense to small business and was relevant to the information
they possess. We also sought Sweenys input on the range of
responses to allow for in the open ended questions. Given that
they have administered the panel for eleven years Sweenys
knowledge and input was very useful.
7.19. Second, in several places after asking closed ended questions
we added open ended questions of the type are there any other
reasons ..?.
7.20. Third the last question of the section sought information on
any other eﬀects of the Safety Net that were not adequately
canvassed earlier in the report.
7.21. The result of these design features is that the choice of metropol-
itan NSW to pilot the survey did not compromise the quality
of the Þnal survey instrument. Moreover, several of the design
features of the survey just mentioned allow us to provide, in
section 7.3.2, quantitative information on the quality of the
survey instrument.
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7.3.1 Structure of the survey instrument
7.22. This section provides an overview of the survey instrument
which is available at Appendix C.
The term Safety Net
7.23. Safety Net is an emotive term. This raised the issue of what
language to use in the survey. The use of an emotive term such
as Safety Net is known to cause some bias as some respon-
dents will be unwilling to report adverse eﬀects. Against this,
surveys are made more accurate by using language that is in
popular usage. Ultimately, we chose to use the term Safety
Net as this term is speciÞed in the Workplace Relations Act
1996, is the term that the AIRC uses on its website and is the
term in popular usage.
7.24. In writing this report we found that using the term Safety
Net pushed us, unconsciously, towards thinking of the system
that we were analysing as one that was conÞned in its eﬀects
to low paid workers. It would be natural if some respondents
reacted this way and therefore were unwilling to report adverse
eﬀects arising from Safety Net adjustments and were unwilling
to report beneÞcial eﬀects from a guarantee of not increasing
the Safety Net for a period of Þve years.
7.25. One of the main Þndings of this report is that the Safety
Net extends, in its inßuence, well beyond low paid workers
and thus we feel that a more descriptively accurate and less
emotive term should be used in the future to describe the
system of wage ßoors and the process of adjusting those wage
ßoors. Such neutral language would reduce the scope for bias
in future survey based evaluations of the Safety Net.
Preamble
7.26. Once a business reached section 4 of the survey, which deals
with the Safety Net, they were read the following preamble:
Federal minimum award wages, often referred to
as safety net wages, are set each year by the Aus-
tralian Industrial Relations Commission and also
passed on to State award wages. I would like to
ask you some questions about how wages are de-
termined in your business, about whether the in-
creases in minimum award wages inßuence your
business in any way.
7.27. The objective of the preamble was to alert businesses to the
broad topic being investigated. The preamble also provides
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a space in the interview where the respondent can raise any
concerns about the next set of questions and if necessary seek
assurances regarding conÞdentiality of responses and the ulti-
mate use of the survey.1
Q11. Screening for businesses with more than one
employee
7.28. Businesses were then screened at Q11 according to whether
they employ one or more people other than the respondent.
Businesses with one employee only were directed to question
26 while those with more than one employee were directed to
Q12a.
Q12a to Q17e. Obtaining information on the number
of employees whose wages are adjusted via the Safety
Net
7.29. Questions 12a to 12d sought information on:
 how many full-time employees are paid exactly a min-
imum award wage rate;
 how many full-time employees are paid more than the
minimum award wage rate;
 how many of the over award full-time employees are
covered by agreements that provide for automatic pass
on of Safety Net adjustments; and
 how many of the over award full-time employees, that
did not receive the SNA via one of the mechanisms above,
were given discretionary pass on of the SNA.
7.30. Questions 13 and 14 sought comparable information for any
part-time and casual employees of the business.
7.31. Question 15 sought information on when the pay of over award
employees was last adjusted. Those businesses where the pay
adjustment was made in May 2003 or later were asked at Q16a
whether some or all of their employees receive a discretionary
pass on of the May 2003 Safety Net adjustment. Those that
responded some were asked at questions 16b to 16d howmany
full-time, part-time and casual employees received Safety Net
adjustments in this way. Those that said that they had not
yet given a discretionary pass on of the May 2003 Safety Net
adjustment were asked, at Q16e, whether they were likely to
1 This part of the conversation between the respondent and the inter-
viewer is not, usually, recorded and does not form part of the data
given to those analysing the data.
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provide a discretionary pass on of the May 2003 Safety Net
adjustment at some time in the future.
7.32. Question 17a to 17e sought comparable information, from busi-
nesses that had last adjusted the pay of their over award em-
ployees before May 2003, about those businesses intentions to
provide discretionary pass on of the May 2003 Safety Net.
Q18a to Q18b. Obtaining information on businesses
reasons for discretionary pass on of Safety Net adjust-
ments to overaward employees
7.33. Question 18 sought information on the reasons for providing,
or intending to provide, discretionary pass on of the May 2003
Safety Net adjustment. Question 18b provided businesses with
the option to provide additional information on their reasons
should the list of possibilities given at Q18 not be exhaustive
of their reasons.
Q19 and Q24f. Questions related to the impact of the
Safety Net on wage setting
7.34. In order to fully understand the impact of the Safety Net on
wage setting it is necessary to obtain information on how busi-
nesses would set wages in the absence of the Safety Net. We
approached this issue in two ways.
7.35. First, at Q19 we sought information from businesses that pay
over award wages on the factors that are important for them in
wage setting. As discussed earlier, there are several theories of
wage setting which diﬀer in terms of the factors that businesses
will take into account.
7.36. Second, at Q24f information is sought about how businesses
would set wages under a scenario where businesses were guar-
anteed that there would be no Safety Net adjustment for a
period of Þve years.
Q20 to Q23d. Questions on the impact of the May
2003 Safety Net adjustment on employment
7.37. At question 20 businesses were asked whether over the past
three months the size of their total workforce had increased,
stayed the same or decreased.2 The objective of this screening
question was to allow businesses to be asked about the eﬀect
of the May 2003 Safety Net adjustment in a way that related
to their own employment experience.
2 Since they were asked the question between late October and early
November the time period relates to the three months between
July/August and the survey date.
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7.38. Businesses that reported an increase in their workforce were
asked, at Q21a, to choose between four statements regarding
the eﬀect of the May 2003 Safety Net adjustment on their
businesses decision to increase employment The question was
asked in a neutral way that did not prejudge the issues of the
existence of an eﬀect or the direction of any aﬀect. The re-
spondent was also given the option to respond that they did
not know whether there was an eﬀect. Those that reported
an eﬀect were then asked at either Q21b or Q21c to quantify
the magnitude of the employment eﬀect for each of the cat-
egories or full-time, part-time and casual employees.3 They
were also provided with the option to respond dont know if
they knew the direction but could not quantify the magnitude
of the eﬀect.
7.39. Those that provided an answer that is consistent with there
being monopsony in the labour market were then asked at
Q21d an open ended question that required them to explain
the reasons for their response.4 This question was designed so
that we could identify any responses that might be evidence
of monopsony behaviour.
7.40. These questions were then repeated at Q22a to Q22d for those
respondents that reported no change in employment and at
Q23a to Q23d for those businesses that reported a decline in
employment. This structure of questioning meant that each
respondent was asked about the employment eﬀects of the 2003
SNAs in a way that related directly to their businesses own
employment experience.
7.41. Respondents were not given information about the magnitude
of the 2003 SNA as this could have been construed as lead-
ing the respondent. This raises the issue of what warrants
can we provide that the respondents were aware of the exact
magnitude of the 2003 SNA. There are three such warrants.
First, these questions were asked only of those businesses that
have at least one employee paid a minimum award wage rate.
Second we know, from analysis of the survey results, that for
the businesses that reported an adverse employment eﬀect, 86
3 Which of questions 21b or 21c was asked depended on whether the
eﬀect of the May 2003 SNA was said to be positive or negative on
employment. This structure was again used to eliminate the possibility
of asking a leading question.
4 Monopsony is the situation where a business can inßuence the wage
rate that it pays by varying the number of people that it employees. If
a labour market is monopsonistic then it is possible, but not automat-
ically assured, that raising the minimum wage could create additional
labour demand.
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per cent of their employees were directly aﬀected by the May
2003 SNA either because their employees were paid minimum
award wage rates or because they received automatic pass on
of the SNA. Moreover, 100 per cent of the part-time and casual
employees were directly aﬀected by the May 2003 SNA and 75
per cent of the full-time employees were directly aﬀected by
the May 2003 SNA. Third as discussed in the next paragraph
businesses were twice given the option to respond dont know.
As a result of these considerations it is evident that those re-
spondents who provided an estimate of the adverse eﬀect on
employment of the May 2003 SNA would have been acutely
aware of the magnitude of that adjustment to minimum award
wages.
7.42. In addition to being neutral, relevant to their experience, and
not leading the respondent, this structure of questions provides
assurance that where the respondent has ultimately given a nu-
merical estimate it is the result of a considered thought process
in which the respondent has explicitly rejected the answer of
no eﬀect in favor of there being an eﬀect, and when asked
to quantify by how much employment would change, has re-
jected the option of dont know in favour of providing an
estimate of the employment response. For these reasons the
estimates provided in this report represent the aggregation of
careful and considered responses in which the respondent was
not led and was given every opportunity to avoid making spec-
ulative responses.
Q24a to Q24e. Obtaining information on the medium
to long run impact of the Safety Net on employment
7.43. To investigate the medium to long run eﬀects of the annual
Safety Net adjustments to minimum award wage rates, we ex-
plored the implications of a guarantee to business that Safety
Net adjustments would not be made to award wages for a pe-
riod of Þve years. If inßation averaged 2.5 per cent per year,
this would result in the real value of minimum award wage
rates being 13 per cent lower at the end of the Þve year pe-
riod. 5
7.44. We chose to structure the question in this way for four main
reasons. First, we sought information about adjustments made
5 Of course, some respondents might expect inßation to be a little faster
than 2.5 per cent per year while others might expect it to be a little
slower. Respondents expectations regarding inßation only matters for
the magnitude of the calculated elasticity of demand. A quantity that
is inessential to the analysis as the latter focuses exclusively on the
magnitude of the employment eﬀect.
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over a suﬃciently long period of time as to allow businesses to
adjust capital and location of production. This allows the ef-
fects to be interpreted as long run. We judged that two years
would be too short and ten years would be too long. Sec-
ond, we sought an implied change in real (ie deßated by the
price level) minimum award wage rates of between ten and
twenty per cent. This would yield a decline that was large
enough to generate a reported eﬀect on employment demand
even if the elasticity of labour demand was small. Third, we
sought to explore the magnitude of the eﬀect that economic
theory suggests might arise because annual Safety Net adjust-
ments to minimum award wage rates removes the option for
businesses, in bad economic circumstances, not to adjust the
nominal wage of employees on minimum award wage rates.
Fourth, it is scenario that is readily understood by the respon-
dent. Most notably the respondent can assess for themselves
what they think would happen to real minimum award wages
under this scenario. Structured in this way the question avoids
the possibility of being seen as leading the respondent in re-
gard to what might happen to wages and prices under this
scenario. In addition, by not specifying what might happen
to prices and wages under this scenario we are able to ask the
business, at Q24f, how they would adjust wages under this
scenario.
7.45. In asking, at Q24a to Q24e, about the eﬀect of a guarantee of
no change in the Safety Net for Þve years we sought to ensure
that leading questions were not asked. Q24a is a screening
question that is asked in a neutral way so that it,
 does not prejudge the existence of an eﬀect;
 does not prejudge the direction of any eﬀect;
 does not prejudge that there would be a movement in
the businesses workforce in the absence of a guarantee
of no increase in the Safety Net for Þve years;
 does not prejudge the direction of any movement in the
businesses workforce in the absence of such a guarantee;
and
 allows the respondent to say they dont know what the
eﬀect of such a guarantee would be.
7.46. Those businesses that reported an eﬀect on their employment
were then asked at Q24b, Q24c and Q24d to quantify the
magnitude of the eﬀect on full-time, part-time and casual em-
ployment. Again this structure was used to ensure that the
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questions were relevant to the businesses expected employment
outcome, that businesses were not led in their answers and that
the direction, magnitude and composition of the employment
response was not prejudged.
7.47. Businesses that provided an answer that is consistent with
there being monopsony in the labour market were asked to
explain their responses so that the extent of monopsony could
be assessed.
7.48. Those businesses that ultimately provided estimates of the em-
ployment eﬀect of a guarantee of no change in the Safety Net
for a period of Þve years have explicitly rejected the option of
reporting no eﬀect at Q24a, have also explicitly rejected the
option of saying dont know and have explicitly chosen to re-
port a particular direction of eﬀect. Moreover, at one of Q24b
to Q24d they have explicitly rejected the option to say dont
know in favour of quantifying the magnitude of the eﬀect on
employment. As such, their responses should be regarded as
the outcome of a careful and considered thought process in
which leading questions were eschewed and businesses given
every opportunity to avoid speculative responses.
7.49. Under a guarantee of no change in the Safety Net for a pe-
riod of Þve years, businesses would have the option of paying
over award wages to employees that are currently paid exactly
an award wage. Businesses that said they would employ addi-
tional workers under such a guarantee were asked, at Q24f, how
they would adjust the wages of those workers. Their responses,
which are discussed in more detail on page 12, bring out two
main points that are relevant here. First, the responses to this
question indicate that, in framing their responses regarding
the employment eﬀect, the majority of businesses had given
consideration to how they would set wages under a guaran-
tee of no change in the Safety Net. Second most businesses
would at least maintain real wages under a guarantee of no
change to the Safety Net and many businesses would provide
real wage increases to those currently on awards under such
a guarantee. Relatively few businesses said that they would
leave the pay of those on awards unchanged for the Þve year
period over which the Safety Net was unchanged.
7.50. The discussion above shows that the questions were designed
so that the hypothetical change in the real value of the Safety
Net was not so large as to be outside of the comprehension of
businesses, but was suﬃciently large that at the end of the Þve
year period minimum award wage rates would be binding for
a much smaller proportion of businesses than is currently the
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case. In short, if an employment eﬀect existed we would Þnd
it.
Q26 to Q30. Obtaining information on the eﬀects of
Safety Net adjustments on businesses that currently
have one employee only6
7.51. Businesses that currently have one employee were asked, at
Q26, whether they had previously had employees. Those that
responded no were directed to Q31 and the end of the Safety
Net questions. Those businesses that previously had employ-
ees were asked at Q27a what was the maximum number of
people they had employed and at Q27b and Q27c were asked
about the date at which that maximum occurred.
7.52. They were asked at Q28 to choose from four statements regard-
ing the impact of previous Safety Net adjustments on their
decision to reduce employment. These statements allowed for
three gradations of eﬀect and the possibility of no eﬀect.
7.53. All businesses that currently have only one employee were
asked, at Q29, how likely they were to employ in the future.
They were given three gradations of response ie very likely,
somewhat likely and unlikely as well as the possibility of
saying dont know.
7.54. Respondents were then asked at Q30 about whether they would
be likely to hire additional employees under a guarantee that
there would be no Safety Net adjustment for a period of Þve
years. The question was asked in a neutral way that did not
prejudge the existence of an eﬀect or the direction of an eﬀect.
Respondents that indicated an eﬀect were asked at Q30b to
quantify the magnitude of that eﬀect for full-time, part-time
and casual employees.
7.55. Respondents who said that they would be less likely to employ
under this scenario were asked at Q30c to explain why. The
objective here was to obtain information on whether it was
the existence of monopsony power which underpinned this re-
sponse.
Q31a to Q31e. Is the questionnaire complete? Are
there any other eﬀects?
7.56. We also sought to gather information, from all respondents,
of any other economic eﬀects of annual Safety Net adjust-
ments, whether favourable, neutral or unfavourable. Question
6 Note there was no Q25 in the survey as all businesses were directed to
Q31.
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31a sought information on the existence of any such eﬀects.
Question 31b sought information on whether the eﬀects were
favourable, neutral or unfavourable  multiple responses
were permitted here to allow respondents to report a mix of ef-
fects. These eﬀects were followed up at Q31c to 31e where the
respondents were asked to describe the nature of these eﬀects.
7.57. The broad objective of this question was to provide informa-
tion on the issue of whether there was any aspect of the eﬀects
of the Safety Net that were not covered adequately in the
earlier questions. Evidence on the quality of coverage of the
survey instrument is presented below.
7.3.2 Evidence on the quality of the survey instrument in terms of its
coverage of the issues
7.58. At q31 we sought feedback from the respondents on whether
there were eﬀects arising from Safety Net adjustments that
were important to them but which had not been covered in
the previous questions. The bulk of respondents (93.3 per
cent) said that there were no other eﬀects.
7.59. The 6.7 per cent of respondents who reported that there were
additional eﬀects, were asked whether those additional eﬀects
were favourable, neutral or unfavourable. Multiple re-
sponses were allowed here as some eﬀects could be favourable
while others might be neutral or unfavourable.
7.60. Of the 6.7 per cent of respondents that reported additional
eﬀects only 0.3 per cent said that the additional eﬀects were
favourable. Thus, the remaining 6.4 per cent of respondents
thought that there were additional eﬀects that were not cap-
tured in the questionnaire and these additional eﬀects were
either neutral or unfavourable. The bulk of these (4.9 per cent
of all respondents) said that the additional eﬀects were un-
favourable and did not identify any favourable eﬀects. The
remaining 1.5 per cent of respondents said that the additional
eﬀects were neutral and did not specify any unfavourable ef-
fects.
7.61. Respondents in each of the categories above were then asked
to describe the nature of the additional eﬀects. Our reading
of those comments about the additional eﬀects is that the re-
spondents were seeking to emphasise the eﬀects of the SNAs
that had been captured elsewhere in the questionnaire rather
than raising any new issues or eﬀects that had not been incor-
porated into the questionnaire design.
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7.62. We conclude on the basis of the Þndings reported above that
the questionnaire was well designed in that it fully covered
the issues related to the eﬀects of SNAs on small and medium
sized businesses.
7.3.3 Evidence regarding the truthfulness of responses to the survey
7.63. Surveys rely on the assumption that respondents respond truth-
fully to the questions asked. Most religions and the humanist
tradition place an emphasis on truth telling. Moreover, lying
is costly since it requires the respondent to invent a false an-
swer when the truth is, costlessly, available. For these reasons
it can be assumed that the dominant strategy for the respon-
dent is to respond truthfully. We appeal to this assumption in
regard to Q11 to Q20 and Q26 to Q29.7
7.64. However, for certain questions the respondent may have an
economic incentive that could work against the usual presump-
tion of truth telling. In these circumstances the best approach
is to explore in greater detail the nature of those incentives
so as to reach a conclusion as to whether it is reasonable to
assume that truth telling was the dominant strategy pursued
by respondents.
7.65. The Þrst point to make in this regard is that, the questions
where this issue arises were located after Q11 to Q20 for busi-
nesses with more than one employee, and after Q26 to Q29 for
businesses with exactly one employee. Since in CATI inter-
views the respondent does not know what the next question
will be, this structure eliminated the possibility that truth
telling issues could have contaminated the responses to earlier
questions.
7 Q28 asks businesses without only one employee, the respondent,
whether previous safety net adjustments were a factor in that busi-
nesses decision to reduce employment. Since these businesses have no
employees other than the respondent the respondent has no incentive
to lie about the extent to which previous Safety Net inßuenced that
decision.
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7.66. The issue of the incentives for truth telling in regard to ques-
tions Q21 to 24 and Q30 is more complex and requires further
discussion. If no minimum award wage is binding then the
business has no incentive to say that it is binding and if at
least one such wage is binding then the business has no in-
centive to say that it is not binding. Thus, an estimate of
the proportion of businesses for which at least one minimum
award wage is binding can be obtained from the proportion of
businesses that respond at Q24a that given a guarantee of no
change in the Safety Net for a period of Þve years they would
either,
1. put on additional employees; or
2. not reduce its workforce by as much as it otherwise would
have done.
7.67. The issue remaining is whether some respondents have suﬃ-
cient incentive to overstate the adverse eﬀects of the Safety Net
on employment at Q21 to Q23 and overstate, at Q24 and Q30,
the beneÞcial eﬀect of guaranteeing not to change the Safety
Net for Þve years .8 The extent of the Þnancial incentive to lie
depends primarily on whether the respondent owns any assets
for which the price depends on the level of minimum award
wages. Respondents that are employees and are not owners of
the business will have no Þnancial incentive to lie since they
would obtain no pecuniary interest from changes in minimum
award wages.
7.68. There are two categories of respondent that we can identify
in the dataset that may have a signiÞcant Þnancial incentive
to over state the adverse employment eﬀect of the Safety Net.
These are family owned businesses and franchises.9 Some 14.6
per cent of all family owned businesses compared with 13.5 per
cent of all other businesses responded to Q24a that a guarantee
8 Here we can only discuss the magnitude of the Þnancial incentive. The
choice a respondent makes will depend not only on the magnitude of
this Þnancial incentive but also on how much the respondent values
truth telling. On average, larger Þnancial incentives will reduce the
extent of truth telling.
9 In both cases the respondent is more likely to be an owner of the busi-
ness. In the case of family owned businesses the existence of a Þnancial
incentive to lie depends on whether the business owns or rents Þxed
factors of production with a price that depends on the level of mini-
mum award wage rates. For franchisees the situation is much clearer,
if minimum award wages are biting then the value of the franchise will
rise if the real minimum wage falls. So there is a strong Þnancial incen-
tive for such businesses to overstate the adverse eﬀect on employment
of increases in the safety net.
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of no change to the Safety Net would either save or create
jobs. Thus, there is not much evidence that family businesses
overstated the adverse eﬀect of the Safety Net on employment.
7.69. In contrast 27.6 per cent of franchises, compared with 13.5 per
cent of other businesses responded to Q24a that a guarantee of
no change to the Safety Net would either save or create jobs.
Thus, we need to investigate further whether some franchises
over estimated the eﬀect of the Safety Net on employment.
We have not yet completed this investigation which involves
the estimation of a model and testing to establish whether the
higher propensity of franchises to report adverse employment
eﬀects is attributable to features of their business or to the
Þnancial incentives that they face. If we Þnd that franchisees
have overstated the employment eﬀects then we will need to
make an adjustment to the estimates that account for this
feature. Franchises account for 4.9 per cent of businesses and
we therefore do not expect that, if it is necessary, such an
adjustment will have a major impact on our estimate of the
employment consequences of not adjusting the Safety Net for
a period of Þve years.
7.4 Administration of the survey instrument
7.70. The survey was administered by Sweeny Research in October
and November 2003 using computer aided telephone interview
(CATI) and computer aided data entry (CADE) technology
which is described is section 7.4.1 below. Because this is a
panel survey, respondents fall into two categories. The Þrst
category comprises respondents who were in the panel at pre-
vious wave 42 and who remain in the panel at wave 43. The
second comprises those respondents who were recruited into
the panel in wave 43. Procedures for recruitment into the
panel are discussed in section 7.4.2. The quality of surveys
is enhanced by monitoring of the administration of the sur-
vey; section 7.4.3 describes the initiatives undertaken in this
regard. Information supplied to TPR for analysis is described
in section 7.4.4. Information on the average duration of the
interview in this, and the Þve previous waves of the survey, is
presented in section 7.4.5 and the implications of this informa-
tion are explained. Response rates are reported and discussed
in section 7.4.6.
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7.4.1 The CATI-CADE technology
7.71. The CATI-CADE technology involves interviewers using tele-
phones that are connected to a computer, video screen and
data storage device. The computer program selects the tele-
phone number that is to be dialed. Because this is panel survey
the telephone number would be selected in one of two ways:
 From the database of members of the panel;
 Randomly from the Desktop Marketing System (DtMS)
database.
7.72. Once the number is dialed there are a range of possible out-
comes for the call. These outcomes are referred to as Þnal
dispositions of cases and are helpful in understanding what
occurred during the survey process and to calculate the re-
sponse rates that are reported in section 7.4.6.
7.73. In order to use the records of the Þnal dispositions of cases to
understand the survey we need to organise them in a system-
atic way. A list of Þnal dispositions of cases (FDC) codes that
we constructed is provided in Table 7.3. In constructing these
codes we have taken as a starting point the AAPOR (2000)
Standard DeÞnitions: Final Dispositions of Case Codes and
Outcome Rates for Surveys which is primarily designed for
household surveys. We have modiÞed this framework for the
special features of the case at hand which are that it is a panel
survey of business. The Table is constructed so that each FDC
maps into one of the Þnal disposition categories supplied to us
by Sweeny Research.
7.74. Starting from the bottom of the table we see that some num-
bers when dialed either resulted in no contact because the
number was disconnected, or not working, or a contact that is
not in the scope of the sample because, for example, it turns
out to be a residence rather than a business. We have followed
the practice of Bates & Dixon (2003) and have included busi-
nesses that are ineligible because they are contacted after the
quota of businesses in a particular strata is full. The statistical
justiÞcation for this classiÞcation is provided in section 7.4.7
page 110.
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2. Eligible, non interview
2.1 Panel members
2.1.1 Refused - no longer wishes to participate
2.1.2 Refused - unable to participate this wave
2.1.3 Business sold to new owner
2.1.4 Taken over by another business
2.2 Potential recruits to the panel that refused to par-
ticipate
3 Unknown eligibility, non interview





3.1.5 Called too often
3.2 Contact made but not interviewed
3.2.1 Firm appointment made but not met
3.2.2 Tentative appointment made but not met
4.0 Not eligible
4.1 Residential
4.2 Over 200 full-time employees
4.3 Under 20 full-time employees
4.4 Business closed down
4.5 Mobile phone
4.6 Number not working
4.7 Phone disconnected
4.8 Quota Þlled
7.75. Moving up the table the next category comprises numbers di-
aled where it has proved not to be possible to determine the eli-
gibility of the respondent for inclusion in the survey. There are
two sub categories here. The Þrst comprises numbers where it
has proved impossible to make contact with a human who re-
sponds. The second category comprises cases where a person is
contacted, they cannot respond immediately and an appoint-
ment is made to contact the person but that appointment and
subsequent appointments are missed.
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7.76. The second category from the top comprises businesses that
were contacted, found to be eligible but were not interviewed.
The category is split into two parts.
7.77. The Þrst relates to businesses that were previously part of the
panel but were not interviewed. Here there are two main sub
categories. One relates to businesses that no longer wish to
participate in the panel, and the other comprises businesses
that remain in the panel but are not available for interview
this quarter.
7.78. The second part comprises businesses that were contacted as
potential recruits into the panel but were subsequently not
interviewed because they refused to join the panel.
7.79. This takes us to the Þrst category in the table which com-
prises businesses interviewed. Here the interview can run its
course leading to a completed unit record  the set of these
is the data to be analysed. Or it can be terminated during the
interview yielding a partial interview. There were no partial
interviews in wave 43 of the survey.
7.80. During the interview the CATI technology puts the question
on the interviewers screen along with prompts. The response
is entered by the interviewer and where necessary is automat-
ically checked for validity  this is the computer aided data
entry part of the technology. If the response is invalid the
interviewer seeks a valid one. The computer then follows a
program and undertakes any necessary intermediate calcula-
tions. Based on the results of those calculations and the re-
sponses to previous questions the program selects the next
question according to the decision rules speciÞed in the sur-
vey instrument. The survey instrument at Appendix C shows
how the questions asked are inßuenced by previous responses.
The process just described continues until all of the relevant
questions have been asked.
7.4.2 Procedures for recruitment into the panel
7.81. The survey is comprised of a panel of Þrms. In the Octo-
ber/November 2003 wave, membership of the panel was deter-
mined as follows:
 1150 businesses remained in the panel from the survey
conducted the previous quarter (wave 42);
 55 businesses that had entered the panel before wave 42,
but were not interviewed in wave 42, rejoined the active
panel members and were interviewed in wave 43; and
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 595 businesses were recruited to the panel to replace
those businesses that left the panel after the previous
wave.
7.82. Where replacement businesses are obtained the objective is to
replace like business (in terms of region, industry and size)
with like business. The telephone numbers of potential re-
placement respondents are drawn randomly and then dialed.
Once the potential replacement business is contacted they are
asked some screening questions about industry, business size
and the like. The business is admitted into the panel if it has
the characteristics of the business that is to be replaced. This
preserves the structure of the sample and means that it pro-
vides a good coverage of business by size, industry and region.
7.4.3 Monitoring administration of the survey instrument
7.83. Each days administration of the survey is monitored by the
survey supervisor at Sweeny Research. This is undertaken in
a room where summary details of each interview in progress is
projected on a screen. The survey supervisor can listen in on
selected interviews to ensure quality of administration.
7.84. On the Þrst half day that the survey was administered Don
Harding, together with a representative of Sensis, monitored
the interviews to establish whether there existed any prob-
lems that needed to be resolved. Interviews were selected and
listened to so as to establish whether:
 the instructions to the interviewers in their pre-survey
were being followed;
 the interviewers were experiencing any diﬃculty with the
questions;
 the questions made sense to the respondents and sought
information that they possessed;
 the range of responses allowed was suﬃcient given the
diversity of responses; and
 the questions covered the range of issues that the respon-
dent would raise regarding the Safety Net and minimum
award wage rates.
7.85. On all of these points there were no substantive issues that
came to light from this process. Some very minor changes were
made to the instructions given to interviewers. But there was
nothing abnormal in this. It was apparent that the complexity
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and precision of the questions was a slight problem for some
interviewers. We did not see evidence that this caused any
bias in the responses nor did we see evidence that it increased
the non-response rate by causing businesses to terminate the
interview.
7.4.4 Information from the survey supplied to TPR for analysis
7.86. On completion of the survey we were supplied with an SPSS
data Þle containing 1800 completed unit records from wave 43
of the survey.
7.87. We also obtained three additional pieces of information:
 The average duration of wave interviews for wave 43 and
the Þve earlier waves of the survey;
 Summary information to be used for calculation of re-
sponse rates; and
 A Þle that identiÞed respondents that remained in the
panel and respondents who were recruited into the panel
at wave 43.
7.88. For the reasons discussed in section 7.4.6 this information in-
ßuenced the judgements that we made as to the nature of the
assumptions that could be used to analyse the survey data and
to make statements about the population.
7.4.5 Average completion times
7.89. As shown in Table 7.4 the average interview for wave 43 (this
survey) was completed in 17 minutes 41 seconds. Wave 39
was conducted in October / November 2002 and did not con-
tain any supplementary questions. The diﬀerence between the
average response time for waves 43 and 39 therefore provides
an indication of the extent to which the Safety Net questions
increased the average interview duration. We calculate this to
be 6 minutes 30 seconds.
Table 7.4: Average interview duration, waves 39 to 43 of the
survey
Wave Average Interview Duration
43 17 minutes 41 seconds
42 21 minutes 35 seconds
41 24 minutes 05 seconds
40 17 minutes 05 seconds
39 11 minutes 11 seconds
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7.90. Our assessment is that the interview duration at wave 43 did
not produce an undue burden on small business respondents.
It is well within the range of experience when supplementary
questions have been added to this survey.
7.4.6 Response rates
7.91. In Table 7.5 we report the Þnal disposition of calls for waves
39 and 43 which were administered in October/November 2002
and 2003 respectively.
7.92. Inspection of Table 7.5 highlights some important features.
The most noticeable of these is that the number of businesses
telephone numbers dialed to obtain 1800 interviews was 9887
in wave 39 but had increased by 54 percent by wave 43. The
second notable feature is that 9887 is a large number relative
to the 1800 completed interviews. Thus, the issues that need
to be explored are:
1. What was the likely cause of the rise in the number of
businesses contacted in order to obtain the 1800 com-
pleted interviews?
2. What are the best practice measures that we can use to
summarize the response rate from this survey?
3. Is the response rate for the survey too low to justify
analysing the sample using the assumptions that the
sample is drawn randomly with known probability of se-
lection into the sample?
4. What alternative methods are available to analyse the
data from the sample?
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Table 7.5: Final dispostions of numbers dialed
Final disposition categories Wave
39 43
1 Interviewed 1804 1800
1.1 Completed interview 1804 1800
1.2 Partial interview 0 0
2 Eligible, non interview 3592 6474
2.1 Panel members 638 2334
2.1.1 Refused - declined 235 1161
2.1.2 Refused - unable to participate 365 1125
2.1.3 Business sold to new owner 19 31
2.1.4 Taken over by another business 19 17
2.2 Potential recruits to the panel refused
to participate
2954 4140
3 Unknown eligiblity, non interview 1083 918
3.1 No contact made 519 361
3.1.1 Answering machine 69 85
3.1.2 Unobtainable 66 34
3.1.3 Engaged 27 13
3.1.4 No answer 214 117
3.1.5 Called too often 143 112
3.2 Contact made but not interviewed 564 557
3.2.1 Firm appointment 76 103
3.2.2 Tentative appointment 488 454
4 Not eligible 3408 5247
4.1 Residential 0 541
4.2 Over 200 full-time employees 0 528
4.3 Under 20 full-time employees 0 651
4.4 Business closed down 198 172
4.6 Mobile Phone 27 111
4.7 Number not working 658 945
4.8 Phone disconnected 231 181
4.9 Quota Þlled 2294 2118
Total calls made 9887 14439
What are the best practice summary measures of sur-
vey response?
7.93. What constitutes best practice is, of course, a matter of judge-
ment. We have taken the guidance of Bates & Dixon (2003)
who summarise the eﬀorts of the United States Interagency
Household Survey Nonresponse Group. Theymention six mea-
sures of response rate but three of them diﬀer only in how
partial interviews are treated and since there were no partial
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interviews in this survey we can simplify things to three re-
sponse rates by ignoring partial interviews. Using the Þnal
disposition of cases codes above we deÞne the following vari-
ables:
I : Number of complete interviews (FDC code 1.1);
R : Number of refusals (panel members FDC code 2.1.1 plus
2.1.2 plus refusals by potential recruits FDC code 2.2);
This is comprised of:
RP : Refusals by panel members who no longer wish to
be in the panel (FDC code 2.1.1 plus refusals by
panel members who wish to remain in the panel
but who cannot participate in the current wave of
the survey (FDC code 2.1.2).
RPR : Refusals by potential recruits (FDC code 2.1.2)
NCO : Number of eligibles not contacted (FDC code 2.1.3 plus
2.1.4). This aggregates the categories non contact (NC)
and other in Bates & Dixon (2003).
UE : Number with unknown eligibility not contacted. This is
a somewhat broader group than the categories unknown
if household occupied and Unknown other in Bates &
Dixon (2003). Of course because this is a business survey
we replace the description of these as unknown whether
the business is working.
IE : Number of respondents that are ineligible.
Then Bates & Dixon (2003) suggest the following measures of
response rates,
RR2 : 100× I
I+R+NCO+UE
RR4 : 100 × I
I+R+NCO+eUE
. Where e is the proportion of re-
spondents of unknown eligibility that are estimated to
be eligible. Bates & Dixon (2003) comment that RR4
"estimates what proportion of cases of unknown eligi-
bility are actually eligible. In estimating e, one must
be guided by the best available scientiÞc information on
what share eligible cases make up among the unknown
cases and one must not select a proportion in order to
boost the response rate". In the absence of any scientiÞc
research for Australia on the magnitude of this parame-
ter we estimated it as the ratio of the number of eligibles
divided by the total number of businesses called. That
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is be = I +R+NCO
I +R+NCO + UE + IE
Since we expect businesses of unknown eligibility to be
less likely, than the typical business, to prove to be eli-
gible on further investigation, this procedure is likely to
over estimate the true proportion of those with unknown
ineligibility that are actually eligible and therefore un-
derestimate the true response rate.
RR6 : 100× I
I+R+NCO
as Bates & Dixon (2003) note this is just
a special case of RR4 with e set to zero. Thus, RR4 and
RR6 might be thought of as providing upper and lower
bounds for the true response rate.
7.94. Response rates calculated using the approach just described
are reported in Table 7.6. The response rates in wave 43 were
8 to 11 percentage points lower than in wave 39. The response
rates in wave 43 were between 20 and 22 per cent.






7.95. It is also useful to deÞne some other measures,
RFRP : 100 × RP
I+R+NCO
is the number of refusals by members
of the panel expressed as a percentage of known eligible
responses;
RFRPR : 100 × RPR
I+R+NCO
is the number of refusals by potential
members of the panel expressed as a percentage of known
eligible responses;
RFRO : 100 × NCO
I+R+NCO
is the number of non contacted panel
members expressed as a percentage of known eligible re-
sponses.
7.96. These refusal rates calculated for waves 39 and 43 of the survey
are reported in Table 7.7. As can be seen from the Table,
refusal rates by potential recruits into the panel are about
twice as high as refusal rates by members of the panel. It is
also apparent from the Table that about one half of potential
recruits refused to participate in the panel. The refusal rate
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by members of the panel increased from 11 per cent in wave
39 to 28 per cent in wave 43.






What was the likely cause of the fall in response rates?
7.97. The Þrst and most important point to make here is that the
refusals in wave 43 were not anything to do with the additional
questions placed in the wave 43 questionnaire. We know this
Þrstly because potential respondents were not informed about
these questions until they were at the preamble to question 11
and secondly because there were no partial responses to wave
43 of the survey.
7.98. It is also useful to report some statistics that summarise as-
pects of the panel process. Here it is useful to recall that 1205
members of the panel continue, 1150 of them were in the panel
last quarter, 55 were in the panel in previous quarters but not
the last quarter and 595 members left and had to be replaced.
Thus, one might calculate a continuation rate for the panel as
64 per cent.10
7.4.7 What are the implications of the response rate for analysis of the
survey using design based estimators?
7.99. The design based estimation methodology is explained in more
detail in appendix A which also establishes the properties of
design based estimators when applied to the particular survey
design used in this survey. SpeciÞcally, we show that the fea-
tures of the survey make it particularly robust to non response.
7.100. The central idea behind design based estimators is that there
is a population of interest and some Þxed quantity of interest
(yj) speciÞc to each member of that population. The objec-
tive is estimate the sum of the yj for the population as a whole
and perhaps construct conÞdence intervals for that estimate.11
10 Calculated as 100× 1150/1800.
11 That is, the population quantity of interest is Y =
PN
j=1 yj , where N
is the number in the population and yj is the quantity of interest for
the jth member of the population.
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This could be done by undertaking a census but that is too
expensive so a random sample is taken. Thus, in the design
based approach the only source of the randomness comes from
the random sampling that is necessary to reduce cost of esti-
mating the population quantity.12
7.101. Design based estimators are so named because the investiga-
tor puts all of the prior information that they have about the
population into the design of the survey. For example, if the
population responses are known to vary according to some
known characteristics of the respondent then that information
is included into the design of the survey by stratifying it ac-
cording to these characteristics. The survey is stratiÞed by
region, industry and size of business. The main reason for
doing this is to reduce the size of the standard errors for the
estimates but it also has the beneÞt of reducing the scope for
low response rates to cause bias in the estimates. The statisti-
cal reasons for this are set out in appendix A. Here we provide
a general discussion of the issues drawing on that appendix.
7.102. Assume that the investigator chooses I strata which are in-
dexed by i = 1, ..I. If the sample frame can be divided up
into these strata before the survey goes into the Þeld then the
survey is said to be pre-stratiÞed. If this is not the case then
questions can be put into the questionnaire so as to stratify
the sample after the questionnaire is completed, a procedure
that is called poststratiÞcation. In some cases surveys are a
mixture of pre and post stratiÞcation. This arises in this sur-
vey where the region in which the business is located is known
but the industry and size of the business may not be known
in the sample frame.
7.103. Once the strata are chosen the investigator can determine how
many members of the population fall into each strata. In the
case of this survey the information comes from the Australian
Bureau of Statistics Business Registrar. We will denote by Ni
the number in the population that fall into the ith stratum.13
The investigator then determines the number of respondents
they seek in each strata, denote this number as ni for the
ith stratum. Thus, there will be n =
PI
i=1 ni respondents
in total. In the case where the sample is pre stratiÞed the
investigator then randomly selects respondents using simple
12 This is in contrast to the model based estimation approach which is
concerned with an entirely diﬀerent source of randomness. See section
7.8 and Appendix B for further discussion.
13 The number in the population in each stratum sums to the total num-




random sampling within each strata.
7.104. In the case of a poststratiÞed sample, potential respondents
are selected randomly and their telephone number dialed. As
discussed earlier, there are four main classes of outcomes from
this process:
1. They are successfully contacted and interviewed;
2. They are successfully contacted, willing to participate in
the survey, asked some screening questions to determine
what strata they fall into, and from their responses it is
established that the quota of respondents for that strata
is full so they are not interviewed;
3. They are successfully contacted but refuse to be inter-
viewed; or
4. They cannot be contacted.
7.105. Recall that in the response rate calculations made earlier we
treated respondents in categories 2 and 3 above very diﬀer-
ently. SpeciÞcally, we excluded category 2 non respondents
from the response rate calculation but included category 3
non respondents. To understand why this is done it is use-
ful to observe that category 2 respondents might be described
as missing completely at random. This description is war-
ranted because we know that the only reason that they are
a non respondent is that their telephone number was drawn
after the quota for their strata was full. The refusals (cate-
gory 3) in contrast are a group for which the reason for refusal
is unknown. This diﬀerence together with some results from
sampling theory discussed below is the reason why they are
treated diﬀerently in the response rate calculations.
7.106. Returning to the discussion of the design based estimator, let
πj be the probability that the jth member of population com-
pletes the survey instrument. As is discussed in appendix A
this can be decomposed into the product of two probabilities.
The Þrst of these is the probability that the jth member of the
population is contacted (πCj ) and the second is the probabil-
ity that the jth member of the population would complete the






7.107. In appendix A we show that, for the particular statistical de-
sign used in this survey, the probability that the jth member of
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is determined by three things.
The Þrst of these is the number of completed responses that
are to be obtained n. The second is the number of members
in the population N . The third is the probability that the





. The Þrst two of these are Þxed either as a
feature of the survey design (n) or as a known feature of the




when analysing non response bias.
7.108. We will discuss two cases where the properties of πRj are such
that design based estimators remain unbiased in the presence
of low response rates. The Þrst of these is where looking across
the whole population the probability of response πRj is
1. Unrelated to any observable characteristics of the busi-
ness; and
2. Unrelated to the answers that the business would give
to the questions of interest.
7.109. In this case, which is referred to as non respondents missing
completely at random the design based estimator of popu-
lation quantities is unbiased although some adjustment would
need to be made to the design based estimator of the standard
deviation.
7.110. The second case is where the probability of response πRj is
1. Related to observable characteristics of the respondent
when looking across the population; but
2. Unrelated to observable characteristics of the respondent
within each stratum of the population; and
3. Unrelated to the answers that the non respondent would
give to the questions of interest.
7.111. In this case, which is referred to as non respondents missing at
random in the population but missing completely at random
within strata the design based estimators with stratiÞcation
are unbiased.
7.112. In all other cases non responsemight cause a bias although it
will not necessarily do so and the bias may not be very large.









1. σκi is the population standard deviation of the probabil-
ity of response from ni
Ni
;
2. σi is the population standard deviation of y for the ith
stratum; and
3. ρi which is the population correlation between the prob-
ability of πji response and (yji − µi).
7.113. In summary, if non respondents are missing completely at ran-
dom in the ith stratum then σκi = ρi = 0 and the bias is zero.
If this is not the case one needs to estimate the bias and then
use that estimate to produce a bias adjusted estimator for the
stratum. To make such an estimate of the bias one needs ad-
ditional information which can be obtained from a survey of
non respondents.14 This is combined with the original sam-
ple of non respondents and a model of probability of response
estimated. This model can be used to compute estimates of
σκi and ρi which when combined with the sample standard
deviation yield estimates of the bias via equation (7.2). This
approach also provides the basis for statistical tests of the
hypotheses that the non response is missing completely at
random or missing at random.
7.114. The other point to make about non response bias is that it is
unlikely that the bias in all of the stratum will be of the same
sign. This means that when the stratum sample means are
aggregated to obtain the estimate of the population quantity
of interest any biases in the strata are likely to cancel out and
any bias in the population estimate is likely to be small.
7.115. The variables that are used in poststratiÞcation are industry,
size and region. Investigation of the sample suggests that these
are the main variables that explain variation in the sample
and thus, by extension, these variables are likely to capture
the bulk of any variation in the probability of non response,
although we cannot know this for certain without conducting
and analysing a survey of non respondents. Thus our assess-
ment is that poststratiÞcation will reduce the non response
bias to such an extent that we consider it would be too small
to modify the conclusions of this report. We have suggested a
mechanism through which that judgement can be tested em-
pirically.
7.116. In order to provide further assurances that any remaining bias
14 See Lohr (1999, p. 256).
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is small we have also shown that the design based estimator has
an alternative interpretation as a model based estimator for a
one way analysis of variance model. This has the advantage
that it requires no assumptions be made about the probability
of selection into the sample being known and, is therefore,
robust to non response. Model based estimators are discussed
in more detail in section 7.8 and appendix B.
7.5 Cleaning coding and analysis of the data
7.117. The data was cleaned and checked for consistency Þrst by
Sweeny Research and then by us.
7.118. To be suitable for analysis the raw data needed to be coded
so that the missing values accurately reßected the structure of
the questionnaire with its many screening questions.
7.119. We made two substantive adjustments to the data as a result
of our consistency checks.
7.120. One business that currently has no employees reported at
Q30b that, in response to guarantee of no change in the Safety
Net for a period of Þve years, they would hire 20 casual work-
ers. This response seemed implausibly large and thus we
treated it as an outlier adjusting it down to 2 additional casual
employees. The eﬀect of this adjustment when weighted up to
be representative of the population as a whole was to reduce
by 13,000 the estimated number of casual jobs created by a
guarantee of no change in the Safety Net for a period of Þve
years.
7.121. Another business reported at Q22a that if the May 2003 SNA
had not occurred then they would have shed employees. Q22b
indicated that they would have shed 15 of its 30 casual employ-
ees in the absence of the SNA. Leaving aside the sign of the
response, its magnitude seemed implausibly large. On further
investigation we found that this business reported at question
24a that it would increase employment of casual workers in
response to a guarantee of no change in the Safety Net. Thus
the direction of the long run eﬀect on the businesses employ-
ment was opposite to the short eﬀect. Moreover, at Q24c the
business said that it would employ six more casuals in response
to a guarantee of no change in the Safety Net for a period of
Þve years. Thus, the magnitude of the long run eﬀect of was
just over one third of that for the short run eﬀect; something
that is also implausible. The reason given at Q22d indicated
that the business was concerned about the eﬀect of SNAs on
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labour costs. A justiÞcation that is more consistent with the
view that business was reporting that the SNA increase would
cost jobs. We concluded that a coding error was the most
likely explanation for these inconsistencies and thus adjusted
the businesses response to Q22b to zero. The eﬀect of this
adjustment when weighted up to be representative of the pop-
ulation as a whole was to reduce by 4370 the estimated number
of casual jobs saved by the May 2003 SNA.
7.122. Given the complexity of the survey and the diﬃculty of the
issues under investigation we were reassured that only the two
outliers mentioned above were found and required adjustment.
We take this as evidence of the high quality of the survey
instrument and the high quality of the administration of that
instrument.
7.6 Analysis of the survey
7.123. For the purposes of the analysis the data were classiÞed into
strata on the basis of region, size of business and industry. A
design based estimator was employed. The strata means were
estimated and were multiplied by the number of businesses in
the strata to obtain the population estimate of the quantity of
interest.
Source of weights used in this study
7.124. The number of Þrms in each strata used in this study were
supplied by Sweeny Research who obtained them from the
ABS Business Registrar.
7.6.1 Standard errors and conÞdence intervals
7.125. The discussion above relates to the estimation of means and
population. One also needs to provide information on the
precision of the estimates. This is done using standard errors,
conÞdence intervals and simulated probability distributions for
the quantities of interest. Good practice involves the reporting
of these measures of precision.
7.126. However, we are unable to calculate standard errors until,
 We have derived the correct formula for calculating de-
sign based standard errors for this survey. That formula
will need to take into account the fact that with non re-
sponse the number of businesses contacted is a random
variable; or
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 The model based approach, set out in section 7.8, is im-
plemented and appropriate assurances given regarding
the Þt of the model.
7.127. Until this further work is undertaken the calculation of stan-
dard errors could be interpreted as misleading readers regard-
ing the precision of the estimates presented in this report.
7.7 Estimates of some important population characteristics
7.128. We estimate on the basis of the responses to question 11 in
the survey instrument that 585,476 small and medium sized
businesses have one employee other than the respondent and
189,599 businesses have no employees other than the respon-
dent. The former group are the main focus of attention for
this report. The data presented in this section is used as the
denominator in many of the calculations of proportions made
throughout the report.
7.129. Small and medium sized businesses employ about 6.7 million
people. The bulk of these (4.1 million employees) are full-time,
0.8 million workers are employed on a part-time basis and 1.8
million workers are employed on a casual basis. Further infor-
mation on the distribution of employment by size of business is
presented in Table 7.8. Table 7.9 presents information on the
distribution of employment in small and medium sized busi-
nesses by industry. The regional distribution of employment
is reported in Table 7.10.
Table 7.8: Employment by size of business, business has em-
ployees other than self
Number FT FT PT Casual All
1 to 5 1127048 433974 1002288 2563311
6 to 10 585786 147795 361470 1095051
11 to 20 571879 71629 162057 805565
21 to 50 804036 75673 194448 1074158
51 to 100 520161 33658 52748 606567
100+ 484756 25370 39729 549855
All Businesses 4093666 788099 1812740 6694507
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Table 7.9: Employment by industry, businesses that have employees
other than self, number
Industry (ANZIC Division) FT PT Casual All
C Manufacturing 649116 40295 67201 756612
E Construction/Building 378612 32097 74822 485531
F Wholesale 388085 54224 53042 495351
G Retail trade 793615 126870 340483 1260968
H Accommodation, cafes
and resturants
235152 64685 240499 540337
I Transport / storage 217444 36260 86208 339912
J/L Communication, Prop-
erty and Business Ser-
vices
847328 211584 616187 1675099
K Finance and Insurance 151510 25344 13201 190056
O Health and Commu-
nity Services
241558 145898 115625 503080
P/Q Cultural and recre-
ation and other
services
191248 50841 205473 447562
All industries 4093667 788100 1812740 6694507
7.130. The ABS Forms of Employment Survey estimated that there
were just over 2 million casual employees at November 2001.
Given that this survey covers about 69 per cent of the work-
force and assuming that the number of casuals increased by
about six percent between November 2001 and November 2003
we would expect to see about 1.5 million casuals in the popula-
tion of small and medium sized businesses. Thus the estimate
of 1.8 million casuals employed in the small and medium sized
business sector in October/November 2003 seems somewhat
too high. Of course, this may reßect the fact that small and
medium sized businesses are more intensive employers of casu-
als than are large businesses, but we dont have any evidence
on that.
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Table 7.10: Employment by region, businesses with employees
other than self, number of employees
Region FT PT Casual All
Sydney 925517 129752 667295 1722565
Other NSW 512348 97457 237688 847494
NSW 1437865 227209 904983 2570059
Melbourne 832582 206408 334714 1373704
Other VIC 240701 50104 72812 363616
Victoria 1073282 256511 407526 1737319
Brisbane 362074 72445 87765 522283
Other QLD 367197 50753 182873 600823
Queensland 729271 123197 270638 1123106
Adelaide 213342 40467 40265 294074
Other SA 69348 5610 8596 83555
South Australia 282691 46077 48861 377629
Perth 279468 70498 91347 441313
Other WA 119205 20433 17582 157220
Western Australia 398674 90931 108929 598533
Hobart 49898 10819 16474 77191
Other TAS 42332 8173 15993 66498
Tasmania 92231 18992 32466 143689
Northern Territory 23352 4101 9628 37080
ACT 56301 21080 29710 107091
Australia 4093667 788100 1812740 6694507
7.131. Using the ABS Forms of Employment Survey we estimated
that in November 2001 there were 1.1 million permanent part-
time employees in the economy as a whole. Using the same
factors as in the calculation for casuals we estimate that there
should be 0.8 million permanent part-time employees in the
small and medium sized business sector. This is close to the
number reported in Table 7.8. Thus, the estimates from the
survey seem able to match some important population fea-
tures. This is reassuring since minimum award wage rate work-
ers are heavily concentrated in casual and part-time jobs.
7.7.1 Employment in businesses that reported at q11 they have no
employees other than self
7.132. Businesses were asked in question 2 to report their full-time,
part-time and casual employment. The notion of what con-
stitutes an employee is somewhat loosely understood by busi-
ness. For example, a family member working in the business
may not necessarily be an employee from the perspective of
the law. Similarly a partner working in a partnership may
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not be an employee. Thus, the preamble placed before ques-
tion eleven outlined what information the survey was seeking
and then at question 11 the respondent was asked to conÞrm
whether they had employees.
7.133. For the reasons outlined above some businesses that had stated
at question 2 that they had employees realized that although
these persons might work in the business on occasion they were
not employees for the purposes of this survey. Table 7.11 sets
out the number of employees identiÞed at question 2 that are
removed from the survey via question 11.
Table 7.11: Employment by size of busines, business has no
employees other than self
Number FT FT PT Casual All
1 to 5 230127 39211 22635 291373
6 to 10 1997 0 0 1997
10+ 0 0 0 0
7.134. As can be seen from Table 7.11 this feature of responses only
occurs in businesses with 10 or less employees and it is primar-
ily a feature of businesses with 5 or fewer employees. By re-
moving these employees we remove a potential bias from the
survey that could arise because of an imperfect understanding
among respondents of what constitutes an employee.
7.8 Model based approach to estimation
7.135. The model based approach is the main alternative to the de-
sign based approach that was discussed in section 7.4.7 and
appendix A. The model based approach which is discussed
in appendix B is based on the idea that data obtained from
the survey is the realization of a some unknown data gener-
ating process. The latter is understood to be a set of rules
that describe how the data is generated. The modelers task is
to postulate candidate models that are viewed as approxima-
tions to the data generating process. These models are then
estimated and evaluated in terms of their Þt to the data.
7.136. The diﬀerence between the model based method and the sam-
pling based method relates to the information that is being
used in the estimation process. In the sample based approach
only information about the sample design and the probability
of selection is used to construct the estimates. Thus any prior
information possessed by the investigator is incorporated into
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the structure of the questionnaire and the stratiÞcation of the
sample. For example, if responses are thought to vary by size
of business, industry and region then that information is in-
corporated into the survey design by stratifying the sample on
these features.
7.137. In the model based approach the prior information used relates
to the knowledge of the data generating process. In the case
of the models set out in Appendix B that knowledge is Þrstly,
that means and variances of responses may diﬀer by industry,
region and business size and secondly, that deviations from the
expected employment response are independently and identi-
cally distributed. This information is used to obtain estimates
of the relevant means and variances that satisfy one or more
estimation principles. The estimated mean for each cell is then
factored up to make statements about the population by mul-
tiplying it by the number in the population that occur in the
cell.
7.138. Because the model based approach breaks the link between the
weights and the probability of selection it can be used to make
statements about the population even when the probability
that a particular unit record is selected into the data set is not
known. This means that the model based approach remains
valid in the presence of non response. See Lohr (1999) for a
further discussion of the model based approach to the analysis
of surveys.
7.139. Among economists the model based approach is a widely used
method of making statements about the population using data
on unit records collected from the population.
7.140. The model based approach produces estimates of the popu-
lation quantities in the following way. Let yj be the variable
of interest and xj be characteristics of the respondent. The
modeler speciÞes, estimates and tests models yj = f (xj, α)
that relates the variable of interest to the observed character-
istics and the parameters α. Let f∗ (xj, α) the model that is
thought to provide the best Þt to the data and bα represent
the estimated parameters of the model. Then, for each unit
record in the data the model yield a predicted value byj which
is obtained as follows,
byj = f∗ (xj, bα)
7.141. Weights wj that represent how many businesses in the popu-
lation have the same characteristics as the jth business in the
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sample are obtained from a source such as the Australian Bu-
reau of Statistics Business Registrar. The weights here do not
rely on their being interpreted as probabilities of selection and
this means that non response does not cause a bias in the esti-
mates of the population quantities. With these methods there
is also no requirement that the data be drawn from a random
sample although the latter feature can help in satisfying the
assumptions of certain models.
7.142. The estimate of the population quantity of interest is then






7.143. The variance of the predicted value can be obtained from the
covariance matrix of the estimated parameters using the ap-
proach described in appendix B. Let bτ 2j represent the esti-
mated variance of byj then the variance of Y is obtained as
follows,




7.144. Here we have implicitly used the assumption that yj and yk
are independent in order to estimate the variance. This as-
sumption is guaranteed by design if the data is collected by a
random sample.
7.145. Two models that could be used in further work with this data
are described in appendix B.
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Appendix A Statistical properties of design based
estimators in the presence of non
response
A.1. Our objective in this appendix is make precise statements
about the properties of design based estimators in the pres-
ence of various types of non response. Some of this material
can be found in texts books on sampling design and analysis
by Sharon Lohr (1999).
A.2. However, most of the cases studied in textbooks relate to a
statistical design where the number of members selected from
the population is Þxed at the design stage and the response
rate then determines how many completed questionnaires are
obtained. The latter being a binomial random variable with
probability of success determined by the response rate.
A.3. In this survey, in contrast, the number of completed surveys
is set at the design stage and the number of businesses con-
tacted to obtain those completed responses is a random vari-
able whose distribution is determined by the response rate.
We felt that it was important to establish the properties of
design based estimators in the actual statistical design used
and much of this appendix is directed at that task.
A.4. Section A.1 provides a brief discussion of what it is that design
based estimation seeks to achieve and contrasts that method-
ology and its goals with model based estimation which is also
used in parts of this report. This discussion leads naturally to
the discussion of non response. Section A.2 discusses a par-
ticular case where the probability of non response is unrelated
to either the characteristics of the respondent or the answers
that they provide to questions of interest. Section A.3 dis-
cusses the case where the probability of response depends on
the characteristics of the respondent but not on their answers
to the questions of interest.
A.5. The two cases just mentioned are those where appropriately
stratiÞed design based estimators are unbiased in the presence
of non response. Section A.4 shows what factors determine
the size and direction of any bias that is present and section
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A.5 discusses procedures that allow the extent of non response
bias to be quantiÞed.
A.1 Design based estimation
A.6. Design based estimators are so named because the investiga-
tor puts all of the prior information that they have about the
population into the design of the survey. For example, if the
population responses are known to vary according to some
known characteristics of the respondent then that information
is included into the design of the survey by stratifying it ac-
cording to these characteristics. One reason for doing this is to
reduce the size of the standard errors for the estimates. But as
we show below stratiÞcation can be a useful tool for reducing
the extent of non response bias.
A.7. Design based estimation starts with the assumption that there
is a population of interest comprising N members. Each mem-
ber of that population has a vector of Þxed characteristics,
xj, and some Þxed quantity of interest to the investigator, yj.1
Interest centers on estimating the sum of the yj for the popula-
tion as a whole.2 This could be done by undertaking a census
but that is too expensive so a random sample is taken. Thus,
in this approach the only source of the randomness comes from
the sampling that is necessary to reduce the cost of estimating
the population quantity.
A.8. The random selection of members from the population is de-
scribed by two independent3 binary4 random variables Sj and
Rj. Where
1 It could be a vector of quantities of interest but we focus on the scalar
case here to simplify the presentation.
2 That is, the population quantity of interest is Y =
PN
j=1 yj , where N
is the number in the population and yj is the quantity of interest for
the jth member of the population.
3 Here indepence means that the joint probability density of Sj and Rj ,
f (Sj , Rj) , can be written as the product of the two marginal densities,
h (Sj) and g (Rj) . That is, f (Sj , Rj) = h (Sj) g (Rj) . In the case of
the Yellow Pages survey the assumption of independence is justiÞed
because the telephone numbers of respondents were selected randomly.
The fact that this random drawing of telephone numbers occured at
diﬀerent times, depending on when the businesses entered the panel,
does not aﬀect the independence of Sj and Rj .
4 Binary means that Sj can take on one of two values 1 (Selected) or
0 (not selected) and, simlarly, Rj can take on one of two values 1
(response if selected) or 0 (non response if selected). The non response
could be split into further categories according to the FDC codes but
we will not do that here.
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1. Sj describes the selection process
(a) Sj = 1 if individual j is selected; and
(b) Sj = 0 if individual j is not selected.
2. Rj describes how members of the population respond if
selected:
(a) Rj = 1 if individual j completes the survey when
selected; and
(b) Rj = 0 if individual j does not complete the survey
when selected.







A.10. In many surveys the number of completed responses nc =PN
j=1 SjRj is a random variable but in this survey the sampling
continues until the actual number of completed interviews nc
is equal the planned number of interviews n. That is nc = n.













E (Sj)E (Rj) yj
where E (X) denotes the expected value of X. Because Sj and
Rj are binary variables E (Sj) and E (Rj) can be interpreted,
respectively, as the probability that the jth member of the
population is selected for interview and the probability that
the jth member of the population responds by completing the
interview.
A.12. There are three cases to consider here,
1. E (Rj) is equal to a constant π that is independent of
both the characteristics of the respondent xj and the
respondents answer to the question of interest yj. In
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this case the non respondents are said, in the literature,
to be missing completely at random. In this survey
missing completely at random non response might arise,
for example, where the business person is has unusually
high demands on their time during the interview period
and thus
(a) if in the panel cannot respond this interview period;
or
(b) if a potential recruit to the panel is too busy to
agree to join the panel.
These would be missing completely at random if the
factors causing demand on their time did not depend
on the businesses characteristics and were not correlated
with any of the variables of interest in the survey such as
the number of award employees the business has or the
number of additional employees the business would hire
in the event of a guarantee of no change in the Safety
Net;
2. E (Rj) varies with the characteristics of the respondent
xj, but does not vary with the respondents answer to the
question of interest yj. In this case the non respondents
are said, in the literature, to be missing at random.
In this case we write E (Rj) = γ (xj) , where γ (xj) is a
function that describes how the probability of response
varies with the characteristics of the respondent. In this
survey, missing at random, non response might arise,
for example, where larger businesses, as measured by
turnover, are more (or less) likely than small businesses
to respond to the survey;
3. E (Rj) varies with the characteristics of the respondent
xj and with the respondents answer to the question of
interest yj. In this case the non respondents are said, in
the literature, to be non ignorable nonresponse.5 In
this case we write E (Rj) = θ (xj, yj) , where θ (xj, yj) is
a function that describes how the probability of response
varies with the characteristics of the respondent and with
the answer to the question of interest. In this survey non
ignorable nonresponse might, for example, arise if:
5 We do not like the term non ignorable non response as it implies,
incorrectly, that the other categories of non response are ignorable.
Nonetheless, we use the term because it is used in the literature; see
Lohr (1999).
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(a) Businesses where the respondent had unusually higher
demand on their time during the survey period were
more likely to pass-on the SNA to over award em-
ployees;
(b) Businesses where the respondent had unusually higher
demand on their time during the survey period were
more likely than other businesses to have high de-
mand for their product and thus, arguably,
i. less likely, than businesses that responded, to
report that the 2003 SNA cost jobs in their
business; but
ii. more likely, than businesses that responded, to
report that they would hire additional employ-
ees if there were a guarantee of no change in
the Safety Net for a period of Þve years.
A.13. The examples given above were deliberately chosen to illus-
trate the point that there are swings and roundabouts with
bias. The biases mentioned, in the examples, would cause un-
derestimation of the extent to which SNAs are passed on, over
estimation of the job loss from the 2003 SNA but under es-
timation of the number of jobs created by a guarantee of no
change in the Safety Net for a period of Þve years. Non sta-
tisticians often claim that the bias works against their case
and cite example to support that contention. But this is a
poor statistical practice. The best statistical practice is to re-
administer the survey to non respondents and then estimate
the probability of non response and test whether it is missing
completely at random, missing at random or non ignorable
non response.
A.2 What are the implications of missing completely at
random non response?
A.14. From the preceding discussion we know that under this form
of non response that E (Rj) = π a constant. Now we need
to obtain E (Sj) . To do this we observe that the Sj belong
to a Bernoulli process that continues until n interviews are
completed. To work this out notice that we can write the






E (Sj|k) Pr (K = k|n)
A.15. Where E (Sj|k) is the probability that the jth member of the
population is selected for interview given that k members of
the population were contacted. And, Pr (K = k|n) is the prob-
ability that n+ k members of the population were to be con-
tacted so as to obtain the n completed responses. It is well
known that under random samplingE (Sj|k) = kN . The Pr (K = k|n)
is, for large N, well approximated by the negative binomial dis-
tribution with probability of success π.6 Thus




































A.17. That is, for the particular design of the survey, the sample
mean is an unbiased estimator of the population mean, in the
presence of missing completely at random non response.
A.3 What are the implications of missing at random non
response?
A.18. From the preceding discussion we know that under this form
of non response that E (Rj) = γ (xj) , a function that varies
6 The exact distribution is a negative binomial that is truncated at N-n.
We see little value in using this exact distribution as it only introduces
additional complexity for negligible gain in accuracy.
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with the characteristics of the respondent but not with the
response to the question of interest.
A.19. For the purposes of exposition assume that:
1. The characteristics xj are discrete;
2. There is suﬃcient information to stratify the population,
according to these characteristics. We assume that there
are I strata, indexed by i = 1, .., I.
3. The number in the population is known for each stra-
tum from some source such as the Australian Bureau of
Statistics Business Registrar.
4. Within each strata the probability of response is a con-
stant that is γ (xj) = γi for j a member of the i
th strata.
A.20. With the assumptions given above, the non respondents while
missing at random for the population as a whole are missing
completely at random for each strata. This means that we
can appeal to the results for the missing completely at random
case to argue that within each strata the sample mean is an
unbiased estimator for the population mean of that strata.
A.21. Thus, for the particular design of the survey, stratiÞcation
provides a remedy for missing at random non response.
A.22. The use of poststratiÞcation to adjust for non response involves
the implicit assumption that the characteristics used to con-
struct the strata exhaust the list of characteristics on which the
probability of non response depends. As Lohr (1999, p. 268)
observes this means that we are assuming that the probability
of non response is the same for every member of a cell in the
strata. This assumption may fail in some circumstances. The
next section examines the factors that determine the extent of
non response bias in those situations where stratiÞcation does
not completely eliminate non response bias.
A.4 Factors that determine the magnitude of non response
bias
A.23. To identify the factors that determine the size of non response
bias we separate, for each stratum, the probability that a com-
pleted interview is obtained into two parts, viz,





A.24. Where, ji indexes the jth member of the population in the ith
stratum, Ni is the number of members of the population in the
ith stratum and ni is the number of members of the population
in the ith strata that are selected into the sample. Now the fact










































































































A.27. The Þrst part on the right hand side is the population mean for
the ith stratum and the second part is the remaining part of the




which, for large Ni, is approximately the number







κ2ji, which is the population standard
deviation of the probability of response from ni
Ni
. Given


















(yj − µi)2, which is the population
standard deviation of y for the ith stratum; and
4. ρi which is the population correlation between κji and
(yj − µi) a number that must lie between -1 and 1.
A.28. Making use of the various inequalities obtained yields the re-
sult that
|biasi| < |σiρi| < σi
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A.29. Thus the non response bias in the ith stratum will be less
than than one population standard deviation of y for the ith
strata. It is instructive to understand what would generate
the maximum bias. This would require the following:








2. choosing the one half of the population where κji equal
to −ni
N
to be where (yji − µi) < 0 and the other half to
be where (yji − µi) > 0; and
3. (yji − µi) to be proportional to −niN in one half of the
population and proportional to ni
N
in the other half of
the population. This is necessary to make |ρi| = 1.
A.30. Achieving the above three things would be a diﬃcult thing to
do and this suggests that the actual bias in any given stratum
is likely to be small relative to the maximum bias.
A.31. So far we have worked out the bias in a particular stratum.
The bias for the sample as a whole requires summing across
all the strata. Unless the bias in each stratum is of the same
sign the sum of the biases will be smaller than the sum of the
maximum bias in each stratum.
A.32. We do not want to trivialise the issue, non response bias is a
serious problem, and should be dealt with seriously. But we
do want to stress that the mere existence of non response bias
does not mean that such bias is large or signiÞcant in the sense
that it would aﬀect the policy conclusions from a survey.
A.33. Our assessment is that the stratiÞcation of the survey will re-
duce the non response bias to such an extent that correction
for any remaining non response bias would not signiÞcantly
modify the policy conclusions from this report. The next sec-
tion discusses how evidence could be gathered and analysed so
as to evaluate whether any signiÞcant bias remains.
A.5 What can be done to quantify the magnitude of non
response bias?
A.34. In the previous section we derived some bounds for non re-
sponse bias. These provide some guidance but ultimately the
careful investigator will seek to test whether any non response
bias exists, and if it does exist, quantify the magnitude of that
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bias. To do this the investigator must take a sample of the
non respondents. Usually, this is done by re-administering the
questionnaire to a randomly drawn sample of the non respon-
dents. Some of these will again refuse to respond but some will
respond. Combining the responses from the Þrst and second
surveys allows one to estimate the probability of non response
and to test whether the non response is missing completely at
random or missing at random. If it is the former then the
survey is unbiased, if it is the latter but further tests show that
non respondents were missing completely at random within
every strata then the stratiÞed survey is unbiased.
A.35. In all other cases there is bias that needs to be quantiÞed.
To do this one estimates a model explaining the probability
of non response for each member of each strata and subtracts
from that probability ni
N
, this yields cκji which is an estimate
of κji. One then uses the cκji to obtain estimates of ρi and σκ.
Combining all of these together yields an estimate of the bias
for the ith stratum. Estimates of the bias for all the other
strata are obtained in the same way and ultimately one can
create a bias adjusted estimate. Any remaining bias, after
these adjustments are made, would be very small.
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Appendix B Model based estimators
B.1. Two models could be used in further analysis of the survey
data used in this report. The Þrst model is the one way analy-
sis of variance (ANOVA-1) discussed in Lohr (1999, p. 46-48.).
It is a linear model and postulates that the mean and variance




αi1 (xj ∈ strata j) +
IX
i=1
σi1 (xj ∈ strata j) εij
(ANOVA-1)
B.2. Where 1 (xj ∈ strata j) is an indicator function that takes the
value 1 if xj is an element of strata j, αi is the mean of the ith
strata , σi is the standard deviation of the ith strata and εij
is an independently and identically distributed random distur-
bance with mean zero and variance one. The main reason for
mentioning this model is that the generalized method of mo-
ments (GMM) estimators of αi and σ2i are the sample mean
and sample standard deviation for the ith strata. That is,
the GMM estimators have exactly the same formula as the
stratiÞed design based estimator, although they now have a
diﬀerent interpretation as a model based estimator. Thus, the
ANOVA-1 model can provide an alternative foundation for the
estimates made in this report. A foundation that is valid in
the presence of non response.
B.3. Of course, the ANOVAmodel is not necessarily the best model
to Þt the data. SpeciÞcally, it is only unbiased if the expected
value of the yj are constant within each stratum and it is only
the model that yields the minimum variance among the class of
linear unbiased estimators for αi if the σi are constant within
each stratum.
B.4. The second model that we suggest attempts to capture the
fact that a viewing of the histogram of variables such as em-
ployment shows that it has a skewed distribution. Moreover,
employment as with most of the variables in this dataset, must
be non negative and take on integer values. The negative bi-
nomial distribution is a reasonable choice to model such data.
It is reasonably ßexible and its properties are well known.
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B.5. We specify the mean λj and variance σ2j of the Negative Bino-








B.6. Where, θ and β are vectors of parameters and zj is a vector
that has one as its Þrst element and then transformations of the
xj as its other elements. The Negative Binomial distribution

















where Γ (yj) is the gamma function.
B.7. The likelihood function for the full data, l (y1, ..yN ; θ, β) , is
deÞned as the product of the likelihoods for the individual
unit records. That is,




B.8. The parameters (θ, β) and their variance covariance matrix can
be estimated via the method of maximum likelihood. Proce-
dures to estimate this model are standard in the Constrained
Maximum Likelihood package that is written for the matrix
based computer language GAUSS. SpeciÞcally, the procedure
CMLNegbin in the Constrained Maximum Likelihood package
could be used to estimate the model.
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Appendix C Selected questions from the survey
instrument
The following questions formed part of the survey instrument
that is relevant to this report. The numbering reßects the




   
 










Now thinking about your workforce. 
 
How many full time people do you now employ?  That 
means people who work 20 hours a week or more –
including yourself but excluding casual employees or 
sub-contractors? 
 










Decrease   .....................................................2 





How many part time people (less than 20 hours 











How many part time people did you employ 
three months ago? 
 
RECORD : 
Increase  ...................................................................1 
Decrease   ...................................................................2 





How many casual employees, if any, do you 
employ in an average week. 
 
A casual employee is defined as someone who 
does is usually employed on a short term basis 




















How many casual employees, if any, were you 









Increase  ...................................................................1 
Decrease   ...................................................................2 







IF CHANGE IN EMPLOYEE MIX (i.e. CODE 1 
OR 2 IN Q2b, d OR d(3) ASK… 
Overall, taking into account the changes in the 
number of employees you have, has the total 
number of hours you obtain from all your 









Decreased   ...................................................................2 





SECTION 4 : EFFECTS OF SAFETY NET ADJUSTMENTS TO MINIMUM AWARD WAGES 
 
Federal minimum award wages, often referred to as safety net wages, are set each year by the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission and also passed on to State award wages.  I would like to ask you some questions about how wages are determined in 
your business about whether the increases in minimum award wages influence your business in any way. 
 
Q11. If (ANSWER AT Q2a > 0) or (ANSWER AT Q2c >  0) or 
 (ANSWER AT Q2d1 > 0). OTHERWISE GO TO Q26 
 First could I confirm that you employ one or more people 
 other than yourself?  Include casual employees but 
 exclude sub-contractors in your answer. 
 
 
Continue Has employees other than self ..................1 
Go to Q26 Has no employees other than self..............2 
 
FULL TIME EMPLOYEES ASK IF Q2a > 0 and Q11a = 1 
 
Q12a.  How many of your (SAY NUMBER IN Q2a) full time 
 employees have their wages set at exactly the 
 State or Federal  minimum award wage? 
               (IF ALL (I.E. Q12a = Q2a) SKIP TO Q13) 
 
 
Q12b.  How many have their wages set above the minimum 
 award wage? 
 
 
Q12c.  IF ANSWER IN Q12b > 0 CONTINUE – OTHERWISE 
 SKIP TO Q13 
  How many of these (SAY NUMBER IN Q12b) full      
 time employees who receive over award payments are 
 covered by agreements that provide for automatic pass 
 on of the Safety Net Adjustments?  
  (IF ANSWER IS DON’T KNOW – SKIP TO Q13) 








Q12d. So can I confirm that the remaining (Q12b – Q12c) full time 
employees who receive over award payments are not 
covered by an agreement that provides for automatic pass 
on of the Safety Net adjustment and it is at your business’s 
discretion whether or not to pass on the adjustment? 
 
                               Number 
                                
  Correct .....................................................................1 
 Not correct ...................................................................2 




PART TIME EMPLOYEES ASK IF Q2c > 0 and Q11a = 1 
 
Q13a.  How many of your (SAY NUMBER IN Q2c) part time 
 employees have their wages set at exactly the 
 State or Federal  minimum award wage? 
               (IF ALL (i.e. Q13a = Q2c) SKIP TO Q14) 
 
 
Q13b.  How many have their wages set above the minimum 
 award wage? 
 
 
Q13c.  IF ANSWER IN Q13b > 0 CONTINUE – OTHERWISE 
 SKIP TO Q14 
  How many of these (SAY NUMBER IN Q13b) part      
 time employees who receive over award payments are 
 covered by agreements that provide for automatic pass 
 on of the Safety Net Adjustments?  
  (IF ANSWER IS DON’T KNOW – SKIP TO Q14) 





Q13d.  So can I confirm that the remaining (Q13b – Q13c) part 
 time employees who receive over award payments are 
not covered by an agreement that provides for automatic 
pass on of the Safety Net adjustment and it is at your 
business’s discretion whether or not to pass on the 
adjustment.? 
 
                               Number 
                                
 Correct .....................................................................1 
 Not correct ...................................................................2 




CASUAL EMPLOYEES ASK IF Q2d(2) > 0 and Q11a = 1 
 
Q14a.  How many of your (SAY NUMBER IN Q2d(2)) currently 
employed casual employees have their wages set at 
exactly the State or Federal minimum award wage? 
               (IF ALL (i.e. Q14a = Q2d(2)) SKIP TO Q15) 
 
 
Q14b.  How many have their wages set above the minimum 
 award wage? 
 
 
Q14c.  IF ANSWER IN Q14b > 0 CONTINUE – OTHERWISE 
 SKIP TO Q15 
  How many of these (SAY NUMBER IN Q14b) casual 
employees who receive over award payments are 
 covered by agreements that provide for automatic pass 
 on of the Safety Net Adjustments?  
  (IF ANSWER IS DON’T KNOW – SKIP TO Q15) 





Q12b – Q12c 




Q14d.  So can I confirm that the remaining (Q14b – Q14c) 
casual employees who receive over award payments are 
not covered by an agreement that provides for automatic 
pass on of the Safety Net adjustment and it is at your 
business’s discretion whether or not to pass on the 
adjustment.? 
 
                               Number 
                                
 Correct .....................................................................1 
 Not correct ...................................................................2 
 Don’t know ...................................................................3 
 
 
CONTINUE IF NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES WHO RECEIVE OVER AWARD PAYMENTS AND ARE NOT COVERED BY AN 
AGREEMENT HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED (i.e. CODE 1 IN Q12d, Q13d OR Q14d). OTHERWISE GO TO Q19. 
 
Q15a. When did your business last review the pay of your full 
time, part time or casual employees who are paid over 
award payments are not covered by an agreement that 







Q15b. And when do you expect that your business will next 
review the pay of these employees? 
 (Note to interviewers, if response is DON’T KNOW then 
prompt by asking how frequently does business review 
wages.  Combine this with date of last review to get an 
estimate of the date of the next review.  Only if this fails 






Don’t know   
 
Q16a. ASK IF ANSWER AT Q15a AT OR LATER THAN MAY 
2003 OTHERWISE GO TO Q17 
 Thinking about employees that are paid over award wages 
but are not covered by agreements that provide for 
automatic pass on of the Safety Net Adjustment. 
 In your most recent wage review in (SAY MONTH AND 
YEAR FROM Q15a) did your business pass the full 2003 
Safety Net wage increase on to all or some of these 
employees? 
Go to Q18 All of them..............................................1 
Continue Some of them.........................................2 
Go to Q16e None of them..........................................3 
Go to Q19 Don’t know .............................................4 
 
 
Q16b.  IF ANSWER AT Q12d > 0 
  How many of these (SAY NUMBER IN Q12d) full time 
 over award employees received the full Safety 




Q16c.  IF ANSWER AT Q13d > 0 
  How many of these (SAY NUMBER IN Q13d) part time 
 over award employees received the full Safety 




Q16d.  IF ANSWER AT Q14d > 0 
  How many of these (SAY NUMBER IN Q14d) casual 
 over award employees received the full Safety 
 Net wage increase in this way? 
 
 









Q16e. Is your business likely to pass on this safety net 
adjustment at some time in the future? 
 
 
Go to Q18        Yes ................................................................1 
Go to Q19         No ................................................................2 
Go to Q19         Don’t know......................................................3 
 
 
Q17a. ASK IF BEFORE MAY 2003 AT Q15a IF DON’T KNOW 
IN Q15b GO TO Q17e 
 Still thinking about employees that are paid over award 
wages but are not covered by agreements that provide for 
automatic pass on of the Safety Net Adjustment. 
 In your next wage review in (SAY MONTH AND YEAR 
FROM Q15b) is it likely that your business will pass on the 
2003 Safety Net wage increase on to some or all of these 
employees? 
Go to Q18 All of them..............................................1 
Continue Some of them.........................................2 
Go to Q17e None of them..........................................3 
Go to Q19 Don’t know .............................................4 
 
 
Q17b.  IF ANSWER AT Q12d > 0 
  How many of these (SAY NUMBER IN Q12d) full time 
 over award employees do you expect to pass the 2003 




Q17c.  IF ANSWER AT Q13d > 0 
  How many of these (SAY NUMBER IN Q13d) part time 
 over award employees do you expect to pass the 2003 




Q17d.  IF ANSWER AT Q14d > 0 
  How many of these (SAY NUMBER IN Q14d) casual 
 over award employees do you expect to pass the 2003 
 Safety Net wage increase on to? 
 
 
 IF ANSWERED CODE 2 AT Q17a GO TO Q18 
 
Q17e. Is your business likely to pass on this Safety Net 
adjustment at some time in the future? 
 
 
Go to Q18        Yes..................................................................1 
Go to Q19         No ..................................................................2 







Q18a . IF ANSWER IN Q16a = 1 OR 2 
  
 How well do the following statements describe the reasons why your business passed on the 2003 Safety Net wage increase to 
these employees? 
 OR 
 IF ANSWER IN Q17a = 1 OR 2 
 OR ANSWER IN Q16e = 1 OR Q17e = 1 
 How well do the following statements describe the reasons why your business expects to pass on the 2003 Safety Net wage 











To maintain wage relativities between employees 1 2 3 4 
To maintain the motivation and workplace effectiveness of our employees  1 2 3 4 
Because it was close to the wage increase that we would have  given other employees 1 2 3 4 
 
       b. What other reasons, if any, do you have for (passing on) (expecting to pass on) the Safety Net Wage increases to employees 








Q19. ASK IF Q12b OR Q13b or Q14b > 0, (i.e. HAVE OVER AWARD EMPLOYEES) OTHERWISE SKIP TO Q20. 
 Thinking now about all employees that receive over award rates of pay, when reviewing or adjusting the wages of those 







1. The rate of consumer price inflation since the last wage review ................  1 2 3 4 
2. The expected rate of consumer price inflation until the next wage review..  1 2 3 4 
3. The wage that competitors are paying comparable employees .................  1 2 3 4 
4. The wage necessary to motivate employees............................................  1 2 3 4 
5. The wage necessary to attractive higher quality employees......................  1 2 3 4 
6. The wage necessary to retain good employees and reduce turnover of 
employees..............................................................................................  1 2 3 4 
7. The rate at which productivity has increased since the last wage review ...  1 2 3 4 
8. The rate at which you expect the price of your products and/or services to 
increase .................................................................................................  1 2 3 4 
9. The profitability of your business .............................................................  1 2 3 4 






Q20. ASK IF Q12a OR Q13a OR Q14a > 0 (i.e. HAVE 
EMPLOYEES PAID EXACTLY THE AWARD RATE) – 
OTHERWISE GO TO Q24 
 Could I just check.  Over the past three months have you 
increased, decreased or made no change to the size of 
your total workforce? 
Ask Q21 Increased ...............................................1 
Ask Q22 No change..............................................2 
Ask Q23 Decreased..............................................3 
 
Q21a. IF INCREASED IN Q20 
 Which of the following statements best describes the effect 
of the 2003 Safety Net wage increase on the decision to 
increase your workforce? 
Go to Q24 The 2003 Safety Net wage increase had no 
 effect on our decision to expand our 
 workforce ...............................................1 
Ask Q21b My business would have expanded its 
 workforce by more if there had been no 
 Safety Net wage increase in 2003...........2 
Ask Q21c My business would have expanded its 
 workforce by less if there had been no 
 Safety Net wage increase in 2003...........3 
Go to Q24 Don’t know .............................................4 
 
Q21b. How many additional full time, part time or casual jobs 
would you have created if there had been no Safety Net 







Don’t know............................................................................. X 
 NOW GO TO Q24 
 
Q21c. How many full time, part time or casual jobs would have 








Don’t know............................................................................. X 
 












Q22a. IF NO CHANGE IN Q20 
 Which of the following statements best describes the effect 
of the 2003 Safety Net wage increase on your business’s 
decision to keep the size of your workforce constant? 
Go to Q24 The 2003 Safety Net wage increase had no 
 effect on my business’s decision to keep our 
 workforce constant .................................1 
Ask Q22b My business would have expanded its 
 workforce in the past three months if there 
 had been no Safety Net wage increase in 
 2003 ......................................................2 
Ask Q22c My business would have reduced its 
 workforce in the past three months if there 
 had been no . Safety Net wage increase in 
 2003 ......................................................3 
Go to Q24 Don’t know .............................................4 
 
Q22b. How many additional full time, part time or casual jobs 
would your business have created if there had been no 







Don’t know............................................................................. X 
 NOW GO TO Q24 
 
Q22c. How many full time, part time or casual jobs would have 








Don’t know............................................................................. X 
 












Q23a. IF DECREASED IN Q20 
 Which of the following statements best describes the effect 
of the 2003 Safety Net wage increase on your business’s 
decision to decrease your workforce? 
Go to Q24 The 2003 Safety Net wage increase did not 
 influence my business’s decision to reduce 
 our workforce .........................................1 
Ask Q23b If there had been no Safety Net wage 
 increase in 2003 my business would have 
 reduced our workforce by more...............2 
Ask Q23c The 2003 Safety Net wage increase did 
 influence my business’s decision to reduce 
 our workforce .........................................3 
Go to Q24 Don’t know .............................................4 
 
Q23b. How many full time, part time or casual jobs were saved 







Don’t know............................................................................. X 
NOW GO TO Q23d 
 
Q23c. How many full time, part time or casual jobs were lost 







Don’t know............................................................................. X 
 NOW GO TO Q24 
 











Q24a. If you were guaranteed that, over the next 5 years, there 
would be no Safety Net increases to award wages, which 
of the following statements best describes the effects that 
guarantee would have on your business? 
Ask Q24b My business would put on additional  
  employees......................................................1 
Go to Q24c My business would not reduce its workforce 
  by as much as it otherwise would have done ...2 
Go to Q31 My business would not change the number 
  of people it employs........................................3 
Go to Q24d My business would reduce the number of    
 people it employs ...........................................4 
Go to Q31 Don’t know .....................................................5 
 
 
Q24b. Can I follow up and ask how many full time, part time or 
casual jobs you would expect to create per year if you 
were guaranteed that there would be no Safety Net Wage 







 NOW GO TO Q24f 
 
Q24c. Can I follow up and ask how many full time, part time or 
casual jobs you would expect to save per year if you were 
guaranteed that there would be no Safety Net Wage 







 NOW GO TO Q24f 
 
Q24d. Can I follow up and ask how many full time, part time or 
casual jobs you would expect to lose per year if you were 
guaranteed that there would be no Safety Net Wage 




















Q24f. IF Q12a >0 OR Q13a > 0 OR Q14a > 0 
 
            Which of the following statements best describes the 
direct effect that such a guarantee would have on how 
your business adjusts the pay of employees that are 
currently paid a wage exactly equal to the award rate of 
pay? 
My business would not adjust the wages of any of these 
employees in  line with inflation................................................1 
My business would provide some of these employees with wage 
increases but at a rate less than the rate of inflation..................2 
My business would provide some of these employees with wage  
increases equal to the rate of inflation ......................................3 
My business would provide some of these employees with wage  
increases greater than the rate of inflation but less than the  
percentage increase over award employees receive.................4 
My business would provide employees currently on award rates of  
pay with the same percentage increase in wages as over award  
employees ......................................................................5 
Don’t know ......................................................................6 
NOW GO TO Q31 
 
NOTE : NO Q25 – ALL RESPONDENTS ARE ASKED Q31 
CONTINUE IF HAVE NO EMPLOYEES, OTHERWISE GO TO Q31 
 
Q26. IF (ANSWER AT Q11a =2) 
 You said you currently have no employees.  Has your 
business ever had any employees?  Include both casual 
and permanent employees in your answer? 
Continue Yes .............................................................1 
Go to Q29 No...............................................................2 
 
 
Q27a. What was the maximum number of people your business 











 Q27c.  IF 2002 OR 2003 IN Q27b 
  And in what month was this? 
 




                             Month 
                                    
 
Q28. Which one of the following best describes the extent to 
which previous Safety Net wage increases were a factor in 
your businesses’ decision to reduce the number of 
employees? 
A major influence ....................................................................1 
A moderate influence...............................................................2 
A minor influence ....................................................................3 
Not an influence at all ..............................................................4 
 
Q29. Which one of the following statements describes how likely 
your business is to take on employees in the future? 
Very likely ...............................................................................1 









Q30a. If you were guaranteed that, over the next 5 years, there 
would be no Safety Net Adjustments to minimum award 
wages.  Which of the following statements best describes 
the direct effect this would have on your decision to 
employ people in the future? 
Ask Q30b Much more likely to employ in the future ............1 
Ask Q30b Somewhat more likely to employ in the future.....2 
Go to Q31 Would not change my decision about future 
  hiring ................................................................3 
Go to Q30c Would be less likely to employ in the future........4 
Go to Q31 Don’t know........................................................5 
 
Q30b. Can I follow up and ask how many full time, part time or 







 NOW GO TO Q31 
 
Q30c. IF (ANSWER AT Q30a = 4) ASK… 
 Can I follow up and ask why you would be less likely to 









Q31a. Do the annual increases to the safety net award wages 
have any effects on your business that you have not 
already had an opportunity to report on in this 
questionnaire? 
Ask Q31b Yes .............................................................1 
Go to Section 7 No...............................................................2 
 
Q31b. How would you describe that effect on your business?   




Q31c. IF (ANSWER AT Q31b = 1) ASK… 







Q31d. IF (ANSWER AT Q31b = 2) ASK… 








Q31e. IF (ANSWER AT Q31b = 3) ASK… 















SECTION 7 : CLASSIFICATION 
 
 
Now, a few questions to help classify your answers.  We need to ask these questions even though we asked some of them the 













Roughly what is your total annual turnover?  
 
Based on last years figures was it… 
Under $10,000  .................................................................. 1 
$10,000 to $30,000  ........................................................... 2 
$31,000 to $50,000  ........................................................... 3 
$51,000 to $100,00  ........................................................... 4 
$101,000 to $500,000......................................................... 5 
$501,000 to $1 million......................................................... 6 
$1.1 million to $2 million      ................................................ 7 
$2.1 million to $5 million...................................................... 8 
$6 million to $10 million    ................................................... 9 
$11 million to $20 million      ............................................... 10 
Over $20 million     ............................................................. 11 
(Refused/Don’t know)    ..................................................... 12 
 
    C3 Approximately what proportion of your total 
income from all sources does this particular 
business represent?  
Less than 10 per cent  ......................................................... 1 
Between 10 and 25 per cent  ............................................... 2 
Between 26 and 50 per cent ................................................ 3 
Between 51 percent and 75 per cent  ................................... 4 
Between 76 percent and 99 per cent  ................................... 5 













Is your business a franchise? 
 
Yes .................................................................................1 





Does this business operate primarily out of your 
home or out of commercial business premises? 
 
Ask b 
Go to C6 
Go to C6 
 
Home...................................................1 
Business Premises ...............................2 
Other (specify)   .....................................                       










And would most of the work done by your firm 
be done in the home or outside the home – at 
clients’ premises for example? 
 
In the home .......................................................................1 






And could you tell me into which of the 
following age groups you fall?  (READ OUT) 
 
30 or under ........................................................................1 
31 -  40 .............................................................................2 
41 -  45 .............................................................................3 
46 -  50 .............................................................................4 






Are you located in….? 
 
A capital city      ......................................................................1 
A major regional centre with a Population of over 250,000 ........2 
A provincial city or town with  a Population of between  
10,000 & 250,000  ..................................................................3 







Male            ......................................................................... 1 
Female        ......................................................................... 2 
 
 
16 
 
 
 
